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Further Slipchenko Comments on Strategic Balance
PM2806095588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jun 88 First Edition p 4

[Final part of two-part article by Doctor of Military Sciences Colonel V. Slipchenko: "Strategic Equilibrium"]

[Text] 2. Stabilization Measures [subhead]

One sometimes hears the following kinds of statement overseas: The Soviet objections to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program allegedly prove its effectiveness and are a point in favor of its implementation—even in violation of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty. Let us note right away that such claims are a cover for attempts to confuse—to put it mildly—the U.S. public and the world public as a whole.

The fact is that the SDI program, under the guise of "defense," stipulates the creation of an offensive system basing state-of-the-art weapons in space. In other words, it is planned to transfer the arms race to space in order to give the United States an opportunity to inflict a first, surprise, disarming strike from space. This prospect would be likely both to violate the existing strategic equilibrium and, moreover, to destabilize in the most serious fashion the entire situation on the planet, since the security of all peoples and continents would be threatened. The Soviet Union cannot permit this, and it resolutely opposes the U.S. launching of strike weapons into space. If our hand is forced, our reply will be sufficiently effective and considerably less expensive.

That is the state of play with the exceptionally dangerous space venture, which Washington tries to camouflage as "defensive." As for the planned creation [sozdaniye] of a space-based antimissile system, in the event of a violation of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union would choose and implement retaliatory measures aimed at meeting as far as possible the interests of its defense capability. The symmetrical path—that is, the creation by our country of a multilayered ABM system along U.S. lines resulting in considerable economic expenditure, a colossal overloading of the defense industry, and very arguable effectiveness—is unacceptable to us. The Soviet side has repeatedly stated that, if necessary, it will quickly find an answer—and it will not be the answer expected in the United States. But it will be an answer which devalues the "Star Wars" program.

The sober-minded politicians, military men, and technical specialists in the United States itself who have sharply criticized the SDI program realize the inevitability of this. "Because of the serious underestimation of Soviet retaliatory measures, this program is a recipe for financial and military disaster, unless Congress or the next administration takes steps to correct the situation," a report by members of the Senate Appropriations Committee states. The authors of the report cite discussions with many specialists from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, representatives of Pentagon subcontractors, and officials from the CIA and the Defense Department.

We have quite an extensive selection of retaliatory measures to choose from in terms of countering the above-mentioned U.S. space effort. Our measures could be directed at developing [razvitiye] strategic nuclear arms capable of ensuring an adequate [adekvatnyy] retaliatory strike under the conditions of the existence of a multilayered U.S. ABM system, or at the creation of countermeasures against [protivodeystviye] the system itself.

The most accessible option in this respect would be the simple buildup of strategic nuclear arms potential, first and foremost, the number of ICBM's. It is well known that it is virtually impossible to create an absolutely impenetrable ABM defense against ICBM's. Even many foreign specialists—including Americans—recognize that, however great the hypothetical effectiveness of such a defense in the distant future, an increased number of ICBM's could guarantee that an aggressor would suffer unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike.

The Soviet Union has SLBM's in its armory. If the necessary technical measures were taken and if only some of the missiles were fired on very flat trajectories to stratospheric altitudes, this could also present a space-based U.S. ABM system with a complex problem in combating them.

The possibility of reducing the boost phase of ICBM trajectories is another technical means of countering such a system. It has already been proved that it is possible to reduce the length of the boost phase to 40 seconds and to complete it at heights of no more than 80 km. This means that the main giveaway feature of an ICBM launch—the launch and boost stage plume—will shut down much earlier, which could create considerable difficulties both for detection and for downing the missiles using space-based ABM systems.

Under the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, each side pledges not to jam the other country's national technical means of verification, and at the same time both sides pledge not to take deliberate concealment measures to complicate the implementation of verification by national means. If the United States unilaterally withdraws from this treaty, the Soviet Union will be entitled to carry out the corresponding concealment.

Many special measures for countering SDI can also be cited; these are linked with protecting missiles from laser radiation, with the earlier separation of front sections and their division into warheads, with the extensive use of various kinds of dummy targets, and with electronic jamming and the distortion of reflected signals.

If we view the U.S. ABM system itself in the form in which, judging by foreign press reports, it is being developed under the SDI program, then—apart from the fact that it is exceptionally expensive—foreign specialists note that it will be too complex and cumbersome and will be more vulnerable than the systems designed to attack it.

Thus, the Soviet Union can, if necessary, take measures to maintain strategic equilibrium. Maintaining defense at modern and reliable levels is our duty to our own people and our allies.

Washington proceeds from the false premise that the USSR will invariably lag behind in scientific and technical development with regard to developing [razrabotka] and creating new strategic offensive and defensive arms. The USSR has already repeatedly demonstrated its scientific and technical potential. In circumstances when it is necessary to eliminate a lag, our country relies on its unique scientific potential created as a result of first-class fundamental research across the whole spectrum of modern science. It is well known that our country has developed a corresponding program in response to Washington's expansion of the list of goods whose sale to us is prohibited. This program is called "Program 100," since it is a question of precisely 100 materials. We have fulfilled this program in less than 3 years.

The measures taken are starting to produce concrete results. Fundamentally new developments have emerged in the sphere of computers, supercomputers, superconductivity, and so forth.

During the Moscow summit, the exchange of ratification documents that brought the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles into force marked the start of the nuclear disarmament process. However, at the moment, we are talking merely about a beginning. The peoples await the eradication of the obstacles to the two strongest powers' conclusion of a treaty on 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive arms while retaining the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed. The realistic Soviet policy determined by new political thinking is aimed at this. Moreover, as M.S. Gorbachev stated on 2 June at a meeting with members of the international public, we see the world of the future as a non-nuclear and nonviolent world, and will operate in all avenues to that end.

People of good will worldwide welcome this resolve of the USSR. At the same time, they realize that real nuclear disarmament depends not just on our country. "Over the decades," W. Coffin, president of the "Sane Freeze" antiwar organization, has stated, "the United States has always been ahead in the arms race, and the Soviet Union has tried to catch up. Now in the disarmament race, these countries have clearly switched roles." This "role reversal" is aptly noted, and the "disarmament race" remains the insistent demand of the peoples. The most important imperative of the present-day world is mankind's increasing demand to eradicate the nuclear threat from whatever quarter—land, underwater, the air, or space.

More on UN 3d Special Session on Disarmament

Kobysh Assessments

PM2906091188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Kobysh "Political Observer's Opinion": "We, the Peoples..."]

[Text] Even if the UN General Assembly's third session on disarmament which has just ended in New York had not been called "special," it would nevertheless have been defined as "special" by force of circumstances and because of everything it became.

We will begin with the fact that more than two dozen heads of state and government and also the foreign ministers of most UN member countries came to New York.

The composition of some delegations was unusual. The Soviet delegation led by E.A. Shevardnadze, besides highly experienced professional diplomats, included such people as V.M. Shabanov, deputy defense minister and an outstanding expert on military technology, and prominent scientists Academician V.I. Goldanskiy and V.V. Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Their participation in the special session's work confirmed the Soviet leadership's new approach toward working out and implementing a diplomatic course.

The first days of the special session's work coincided with the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow. The success of this meeting set the tone of the discussions in the United Nations. Whether it is connected with this or not, what I will say now is extremely serious both for the United Nations and for all peoples. For the first time in the more than 40-year history of this international organization—mankind's only general forum—multilateral discussions took place here not on individual questions but on the entire package of disarmament problems, including those like the concept of defense sufficiency and the essence of military doctrines. This was more than convincing confirmation that our idea of a united, integral world in which security can only be universal is receiving wide support.

There was in the very tone of the speeches delivered by the different countries' delegates both relief and faith that the plan to completely eliminate nuclear weapons this century and to sharply reduce all other arms (with a

complete ban on chemical weapons), which seemed highly unattainable and romantic, is quite realistic, and that the world is becoming more reliable and predictable.

I can say with satisfaction that the speeches by FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher and representatives from a number of other countries also belonging to NATO, were in the same spirit. The speech by Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi, who basically spoke on behalf of all the developing states, aroused increased interest. Everything that he and many others said once more confirmed what had started to emerge even before this worldwide forum. No, we are not alone in this world with our persistent desire for life without wars, a life based on agreement and cooperation. This also explains the interest which greeted the new Soviet proposals, which were submitted at the special session, on stopping the arms race at sea, on making further progress in improving the strictest measures of verification, and on completely eliminating by the year 2000 military presence on foreign territories.

All the same, what is the main, basic point in the discussion which took place? I think everyone agreed that two outstanding events determine today's international relations.

First: The beginning of nuclear disarmament connected with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles coming into effect.

Second: The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which also is most directly connected with the democratization of international relations.

Well then, did everything go smoothly at the General Assembly special session, and did the ideas of peace and cooperation take everyone "by storm?" Far from it. Other voices were also heard. U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, for instance, delivered a speech in which, failing to put forward a single specific proposal, he spoke in the old, confrontational style. There were few such speeches, however, and they were somehow uttered hurriedly and in muffled tones. There were reasons for this.

It has already been reported, unfortunately not sufficiently fully and not always precisely, that 6 months before the opening of the UN General Assembly special session, peace supporters from dozens of countries and from all continents started to prepare a parallel international peace conference there in New York.

The conference assembled in the UN building not far from the General Assembly hall. More than 120 delegates spoke at it including representatives from the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and five other Soviet public organizations. Each of these 120 organizations, as UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and his deputies explained to us, represented 3-5 of the most diverse nongovernment organizations. We are, therefore, talking about 500 of these antiwar organizations, we were told.

We mentioned that most of the delegates' speeches at the special session on disarmament followed the peace-loving initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Here, at the peace conference, essentially all its participants expressed their solidarity with our proposals and, above all, with the ideas for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century.

It would be untrue if I were to say that other voices basically representing the "Third World" were not heard. One of them said that the developed and the backward countries have different priorities. Developing this idea, another explained with anguish that people in his country and the entire region are dying of hunger, and the nuclear threat does not worry them much. Someone else claimed that the USSR and the United States had come to an agreement and had shared out their spheres of influence in the world.

The people said this sincerely; one had to heed them. But they also listened attentively and, to their credit, by the end of the conference they were saying in their speeches that struggling against hunger and backwardness is possible only by eliminating nuclear and all other weapons, and that disarmament and development go hand in hand.

The General Assembly and the peace conference, which is also an assembly of peoples, were like two communicating vessels. Receiving the leaders of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the above-mentioned UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar noted in turn that "the antiwar, antinuclear movement which has developed in the world, like the peace conference which took place in New York, are becoming the base for UN activity. Now that we have this base, we are capable of resolving any problems, and above all, the most acute one—ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war." "We are very grateful to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace for becoming the trail blazer for the people's diplomacy," the UN secretary general stressed.

The third UN General Assembly special session and the International Peace Conference have completed their work. They revealed a great deal, including how realistic and how probably attainable is the all-important goal—attaining civilized relations between states and regimes, however different they may be. The words from the UN Charter "We, the peoples... " now sound not simply triumphant; they are once again determining the world situation that has taken shape: Only peoples can stop the war, force people to forget about weapons or, as the same Charter says, "rid future generations of the calamities of war."

U.S. Stance 'Obstructionist'

PM2906080988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jun 88 Second Edition pp 1, 5

[Unnamed own correspondent dispatch: "Loss For Everyone. The U.S. Stance Impeded the Adoption of a Final Document at the UN Session"]

[Text] New York, 27 Jun—New Yorkers had long been fast asleep. Yet the lights in the UN building were on all night. Discussion of the third UN General Assembly special session on disarmament's final document went on all night. The members of our delegation only got back to their hotel at 0830 hours—tired and pale. And disheartened—just as I am sure most UN members' delegations were disheartened. For a final document was not adopted, owing to the obstructionist U.S. stance.

U.S. representatives on the commission to elaborate the final document sharply objected to a number of the provisions in the draft: in particular, those on the creation of UN naval forces, on banning the militarization of space, and certain other clauses. The idea of creating "peace zones" and nuclear-free zones, especially in the Near East, aroused particular U.S. discontent. "The last proposal was especially not to the liking of the United States because it directly mentioned Israel," I was told by K.F. Mikhaylov, a member of the Soviet delegation and deputy chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry directorate.

Then things did not go much better in the full committee. Nevertheless, all provisions of the final document—with the exception of three or four—proved amenable to agreement. U.S. delegation members, apparently, had differing viewpoints on the nature of the final document. That is why it seemed at one moment that a final compromise was possible. The Soviet delegation cancelled a number of its demands, notably on UN naval forces, and somewhat relaxed the wordings on space.

At 0600 hours, a plenary session of the UN General Assembly was convened. It was opened by the Pakistani M. Ahmad, chairman of the full committee, who described the course of the previous discussion and the participants' positions. V. Walters, head of the U.S. UN delegation, stated that his government's position remained unchanged and flatly refused to agree to the final document in its present form. No arguments, either from our delegation or from other UN members, had any effect. P. Florin, chairman of the third special session, had no choice but to note the prevailing situation with regret.

It bears mentioning that, according to the resolution, a final document should be adopted only on the basis of "consensus," that is, with general agreement. An objection, even from a single country, could thus jeopardize the fruits of the tremendous work of the last month carried out by dozens of members of the world community of states. And this is what happened.

The events of that night in the UN building have led me to ponder one question. The work of our delegation, as far as I understand it, is assessed in terms of how many of our initiatives "get through" the United Nations. How the work of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations is assessed is a mystery—apparently by the single criterion that as many as possible of the USSR's initiatives should not get through. Or that any steps in the sphere of disarmament and improvement of the international climate should cost the world community as many sleepless nights and as much nervous sweat as possible, owing to U.S. obstruction. The more "costly" these efforts are for the rest of the world, the better, the United States apparently feels.

The United States has not only failed to master the new political thinking but it has, apparently, also lost some elements of the old thinking. One of the old behests the U.S. founding fathers handed down to their descendants consisted of the need to "respect the opinion of enlightened mankind." This is precisely what is lacking in current U.S. policy at the United Nations.

The cause of worldwide disarmament and the cause of normalizing international life is suffering, owing to the U.S. stance. Consequently, everyone loses.

Kampelman Geneva Position on SLCM's Attacked

PM2806154988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by V. Likhovid "Who Is Hampering the Elaboration of Accords"]

[Text] A few days ago, M. Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, accused the Soviet side of putting forward certain conditions which are hampering the elaboration of accords on strategic offensive arms and the observance of the ABM Treaty. Let us take a closer look at this.

During the Washington summit in December 1987, the sides agreed to establish ceilings on long-range nuclear-tipped SLCM's [sea-launched cruise missiles] and to try to find methods of their effective verification. The Americans are refusing to discuss Soviet proposals to this effect. What is more, their stance is characterized by a failure to even mention these missiles, not to speak of any limitations. However, Kampelman is trying to shift the blame onto the Soviet side, declaring that if the problem of the SLCM's continues to be raised by the Soviet side as a condition for the conclusion of the treaty, he allegedly sees no possibility of the drafting of such a treaty in the current year.

It is well known that the Soviet Union advocates the limitation of long-range SLCM's, the establishment of a ceiling of 1,000 units of such missiles in the nuclear and conventional version, and the deployment of both these types of missiles on a limited number of agreed types of

submarines and surface vessels. This would be accompanied by strict verification, including remote verification [distantsionnyy kontrol], and provision would be made for determining the presence of of nuclear SLCM's on warships and submarines. The Soviet side has proposed that a joint experiment be carried out to test the effectiveness of remote verification. However, the U.S. side has declined carrying out such an experiment, calling the realistic nature of the Soviet proposals into question.

It is obvious that the United States does not want a limit on SLCM's, of which it is planning to produce up to 4,000 units within the next few years under the "strategic modernization" program. This is the reason why it wants to exclude its SLCM's from the limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Hence it is not the Soviet side which is obstructing the talks but the American side, which is holding up progress by its unwillingness to seek a solution to the question of the SLCM's. It is quite plain that without a limitation of the long-range SLCM's, deep cuts in strategic offensive arms are not possible because this would provide an opportunity to side-step the future treaty by leaving a channel open for continuing the strategic offensive arms race.

In Kampelman's view, the absence of an accord between the USSR and the United States on the observance of the ABM Treaty and a pledge not to withdraw from it during an agreed period does not present an obstacle to achieving a treaty on strategic offensive arms. In other words, Kampleman would like a treaty on strategic offensive arms to be prepared for signing in isolation from the ABM Treaty. But did not the leaders of the USSR and the United States agree in Washington that in connection with the drafting of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, an accord would be elaborated which would oblige the sides to observe the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972 and not to withdraw from it during an agreed period? They did agree. Kampelman is clearly trying to break the fabric of the agreement in principle reached in Washington and reaffirmed in Moscow in the course of the fourth meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan.

When they signed the ABM Treaty, both sides proceeded from the premise that the creation of a large-scale ABM system would fuel the strategic arms race and undermine strategic stability. Therefore, the observance of the ABM Treaty is of fundamental importance for the process of strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction.

It is precisely this interconnection which the U.S. side is trying to shrug off. Its desire to reinterpret the concepts laid down in the ABM Treaty and to ignore the essential interconnection between strategic offensive arms reductions and the observance of the ABM Treaty is hampering the elaboration of accords at the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. It would be contrary to common sense to cut back strategic offensive arms on earth and, at the same time, to transfer the arms race to space.

At present questions of strategic offensive arms reductions in conditions of the strict and rigorous observance of the ABM Treaty are being discussed at the Geneva talks. These questions are at the focus of the Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament problems. The sooner they are resolved, the sooner preconditions for the development of future relations will be created.

Ponomarev Views Toronto Summit Declaration

PM2806103188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 First Edition p 3

[Own observer M. Ponomarev "Military-Political Review": "Time Demands That We Proceed Further"]

[Text] To begin with, the reports from the Toronto meeting of the major capitalist countries' leaders and a representative of the Common Market seemed to be of a predonominantly arithmetical nature. It was the 14th meeting of the "Seven," and the 8th attended by R. Reagan; 16, 18, or 20 million Canadian dollars had been spent to organize it, there were 3,000 policemen and security guards, and it was being covered by 3,000—and according to some as many as 5,000—representatives of the press, radio, and television.... This plethora of "figures" was used to cover up the scantiness of available information about what really went on in the isolated—even windowless—"convention center" where the participants were meeting.

The explanation for the scantiness of detail about the course of the discussions of the capitalist world's leaders, however, was not only the fact that they were taking place behind tightly shut doors. By tradition, the debates themselves were of an informal, private nature. Prior to the publication of the final documents and the communique, it was difficult for observers to judge the participants' approaches to the problems under discussion and the decisions being elaborated. However, now these documents have been published, and at least one of them deserves closer attention.

I am referring to the political declaration adopted by the "Club of Seven" participants. It must be emphasized that problems of the state of the capitalist world's economy and its prospects, the indebtedness of African and Latin American states, and some other problems took up much space in the debate. However, East-West relations occupied the leading place at the talks, and this is especially stressed in the declaration.

Indeed, this is not surprising. The "Seven" gathered in Toronto shortly after the summit in Moscow, and it is, therefore, quite natural that the representatives of the other capitalist states wanted to hear the U.S. President's opinion about this meeting and to bring their political course in line with its results. A resume of these discussions is given in the political declaration, whose main section bears the heading "East-West Relations."

In this section, the Toronto meeting participants reaffirm their faith in constructive and realistic dialogue and in the possibility of East-West cooperation in spheres such as arms control, human rights, regional problems, and other spheres. On this basis, the declaration notes, it is possible to achieve "stability in our mutual relations and to ensure security at lower armament levels." The capitalist world's leaders appraised positively the entry into force of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, expressed support for the talks on 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive arms, and welcomed the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

This makes it possible to conclude that the winds of change which are blowing across the world today are beginning to penetrate even to where the main guidelines of Western countries' policy are being decided. The individual propositions of their political declaration cited here would have been unthinkable in the final documents of similar meetings even as recently as 2-3 years ago. This has become so much part and parcel of the current state of international relations that many observers have described the meeting of the "Seven" which has just ended as "a meeting which produced no surprises."

Their assessment is based on the fact that no sensational decisions were adopted at the meeting. Nor was there any call for such decisions. As R. Reagan noted, these summits "are not intended to produce impressive declarations. They are regular, businesslike meetings which enable each one of us to get an idea of what the others are thinking."

All this is correct. However, in my opinion, there are other considerations which would justify describing the Toronto meeting as "a meeting which produced no surprises." The old thinking and outmoded stereotypes are still bearing down on the leaders of the capitalist world, and this was also fully reflected in the political declaration adopted by the "Seven."

In actual fact, in addition to entirely sound propositions and conclusions, this document also clearly reflects an admiration for force, the force of arms, and, above all, nuclear arms. "We also reaffirm," the declaration states in black and white, "that in the foreseeable future, nuclear deterrence and adequate might in conventional arms will remain the guarantees of peace and freedom." Guarantees of universal catastrophe would have been a better way of putting it. After all, nuclear weapons have turned billions of people into hostages! Soviet researchers have come to the conclusion that since the mid-seventies, as a result of the deployment and improvement of individually targetable systems, given the retained and even increased capability of mutual assured destruction on the part of the USSR and the United States, the possibility of gaining relative advantage by means of a counterforce strike began to increase. This has boosted the incentive to launch a preemptive attack in a conflict situation and has thus increased the likelihood of nuclear war and undermined stability even in conditions of strategic parity.

In its Theses for the 19th all-union party conference, the CPSU Central Committee deemed it necessary to emphasize especially that "efforts to ensure states' security will shift more and more from the sphere of the

correlation of military potentials to the sphere of politics, the primacy of law, and universal human morality in the implementation of international commitments." However, people in the West continue to think in categories of military superiority and, as a result, try to put a spoke in the wheel of disarmament negotiations and, in particular, the Soviet-American negotiations on radical reductions of strategic offensive arms. So for instance, M. Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation at these talks, tried to justify the U.S. stance on SDI during a news conference organized by the "Worldnet" television network, alleging that this program was "vitally necessary for U.S. security and world stability," although everyone knows that it is merely fraught with the danger of the extension of the arms race into space. He also expressed the view that the treaty on strategic offensive arms can only be signed provided that one category of these weapons—sea-launched cruise missiles—is excluded from it and stated categorically that "if the Soviets continue to insist on the viewpoint that the question of sea-launched cruise missiles must be resolved," there will be no treaty this year.

In general, there is more than enough speculation around this treaty. M. Fitzwater, the official White House spokesman, for instance, permitted himself to express the following view at a recent briefing for journalists in Toronto: "There can be no treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms until a balance in conventional arms has been achieved." What is this, a slip of the tongue, or an official change in the U.S. stance? You might conclude that the United States is much less interested in a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms than the Soviet Union. This would be a dangerous misconception. Yet such misconceptions have left their mark on the approach of the United States and its allies to the most acute problems of the present time. This is reflected in the declaration which was adopted in Toronto. The sacred "but" contained in it does not just apply to the glorification of the concept of "nuclear deterrence." It also embraces other spheres.

After that, the sentences contained in the declaration about the "indisputable superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in conventional weapons," about the socialist countries' potential for delivering an "aggressive surprise strike," and about the "Soviet military threat" in the Far East do not sound particularly surprising.

What can be said in this context? The United States and its allies have clearly chosen to ignore the Soviet proposals to exchange information about armed forces and armaments in the region from the Atlantic to the Urals, to verify all the data with the help of on-site inspections, to eliminate all imbalances and asymmetries exposed in the course of this exchange and inspections, and subsequently to reduce both sides' armed forces. There is no evidence of a buildup of Soviet military might in the Far East.

Why then are the old fabrications and calumnies repeated over and over again? Partly, of course, out of inertia. But not only because of that. The circles interested in the continuation of the arms race are very, very influential.

Expressing the interests of these circles, General Galvin, the NATO supreme allied commander, is calling for a further reorganization and modernization of the allies' conventional armed forces in order to "compensate for the recently ratified Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles." At the same time, he warns against a "premature"—as he put it—notion of "the weakening of the Soviet threat."

So what is to be done, in what direction are we to proceed? This question confronts the whole of mankind. The answer has been supplied by the USSR and the other socialist states. Of late, the Warsaw Pact countries have submitted to the international community an integrated concept of demilitarization on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. It has found its expression in the large-scale initiatives of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is entirely ready, together with the other countries which possess nuclear weapons, to eliminate its status as a nuclear power, and to do so as soon as possible, M.S. Gorbachev has pointed out. The proposals submitted by our country at the third UN General Assembly special session on disarmament are widely known. A number of socialist countries have put forward major initiatives for the creation of a nuclear-free zone and a zone free from chemical weapons in central Europe, for arms limitation and confidence-building measures in central Europe (the Jaruzelski Plan), for the creation of a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line dividing the two military blocs, and for the creation of a new mechanism for the peaceful settlement of crises and the prevention of military incidents in central Europe. These initiatives received a largely positive appraisal at the international conference for the establishment of nuclear-free zones which was held in Berlin. Specifically, this conference once again reaffirmed the importance of such zones as possible steps toward a nuclear-free world and their role in the creation of an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

All these proposals taken together make up the outline of a future world, a world fit for a free life for the people of all countries and continents, a life unshadowed by the threat of self-destruction. Achieving this aim is not a simple task. But it has been set by the course of history itself. And Marx has taught us that mankind never sets itself tasks it cannot resolve.

CEMA-EEC Ties Established at Luxembourg Talks

Declaration Signed

PM2806134588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent V. Antonov dispatch: "CEMA-EEC: Relations Established"]

[Text] Luxembourg—The signing of the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Official Relations Between CEMA and the EEC has taken place at the Kirchberg

International Conference Center in the Luxembourg capital.

On the CEMA side the document was signed by R. Rohlicek, chairman of the CEMA Executive Committee and CSSR first deputy premier, and by CEMA Secretary V. Sychev. On the EEC's behalf it was signed by H.-D. Genscher, president of the EEC Council of Ministers and FRG foreign minister, and by W. De Clercq, member of the European Communities Commission.

The signing of the Joint Declaration is a reflection of the new political and economic situation in the world and of the growing desire of the European Continent's socialist and capitalist countries to expand multilateral business ties. The long path traveled by CEMA and the EEC in the search for mutual understanding and trust has been successfully completed. The sides expressed the intention to develop cooperation in spheres of common interest and to promote the further development of international economic cooperation.

"The normalization of relations between our economic organizations," R. Rohlicek emphasized at the document signing ceremony, "is a real contribution to realizing the CSCE Final Act and will help to improve the political climate in Europe and, consequently, throughout the world. It creates favorable preconditions for the practical implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different socioeconomic systems. Real opportunities are being opened up for the joint implementation of major all-European projects in various spheres—such as ecology, transportation, and energy, for example."

"By signing the document on the establishment of official relations between CEMA and the EEC, we have opened a new page in Europe's postwar history," H.-D. Genscher said. "I welcome the CEMA states' interest in closer economic and technological cooperation with the European Community with a view to modernizing the national economy. Today both sides have laid a sound foundation for creating a common European home, whose doors are open to the outside world and in which the European states could live in good-neighborliness."

An important step, but still only the first one, has been taken by signing the joint declaration in Luxembourg. During the period preceding it both sides repeatedly displayed good will and readiness for compromise, building up a good pace of progress. CEMA and EEC experts are now to begin detailed talks in order to ascertain the sphere of mutual interests in various spheres of cooperation and to resolve specific questions of its organization.

Statement Detailed

LD2506142088 Moscow TASS in English 1301 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Luxembourg June 25 TASS—A joint declaration on the establishment of official relations between the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has been (?signed) here today. The declaration runs as follows:

"The European Economic Community (?on the) one part, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance on the other part,

Having regard to the acts establishing the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and in particular the Treaty of Rome,

On the basis of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and taking account of the results of the subsequent stages of the CSCE process,

Desirous of contributing, by the activities they pursue within their fields of competence, to the further development of international economic cooperation, an important factor in economic growth and social progress,

Declare as follows:

1. The European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance establish official relations with each other by adopting this declaration.

2. The parties will develop cooperation in areas which fall within their respective spheres of competence and where there is a common interest.

3. The areas, forms and [words indistinct] the parties by means of contacts and discussions between their representatives designated for this purpose.

4. On the basis of the experience gained in developing cooperation between them, the parties will, if necessary, examine the possibilities of determining new areas, forms and [word indistinct] of cooperation.

5. As regards the application of this declaration to the (?community), it shall apply to the territories in which the treaty establishing the European Economic Community is applied and under the conditions laid down in that treaty.

6. This declaration is drawn up in duplicate in the Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Mongolian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Spanish and Vietnamese languages, each text being equally authentic."

Cooperation Viewed

LD2506225688 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Text] A joint declaration has been signed in Luxembourg on establishing official relations between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the European Economic Community. These are the two largest interstate economic organizations. A latest news commentary with Gennadiy Vedenyapin at the microphone.

[Vedenyapin] The diplomatic marathon that lasted 1 and ½ decades has ended. The results of talks on establishing permanent business contacts between CEMA and the EEC have taken the form of a joint declaration. Its signing shows that new approaches, new political thinking, common sense and good will have taken the upper hand. In actual fact, ultimately one could not fail to acknowledge the objectively existing reality: the existence of two most powerful integrational associations. After all, the scale of present production is so great that their most advantageous development is hardly possible within closed limits. All the more so since historical ties also exist between countries belonging to the socialist and capitalist systems of integration. Let me remind you that at one time, the CEMA put forward the initiative on establishing contacts. But years went by before this initiative found a sensible response at EEC headquarters.

The signing of the declaration has now put an end to that abnormal situation when CEMA, preparing to celebrate its 40th anniversary, and the Common Market, which has entered the 4th decade of its existence, had no official relations with one another. At the same time, the advantage of cooperation has also been unambiguously recognized, not to mention traditional areas. We may be talking of joint developments and the mastering of new technologies, thermonuclear synthesis, space research, and environmental protection. To give an example, cooperation within the framework of the comprehensive program of scientific and technological progress between CEMA and the West European Eureka would make it possible to strengthen the technological positions of the continent in competition with Japan and the United States. Joint enterprises and joint projects promise no small benefit for both sides. As the recent colloquium on the questions of relations between CEMA and the EEC in the Belgian town of Ghent showed, prominent politicians, businessmen, and scientists understand this.

The joining of the economies of the states of CEMA and the Common Market is undoubtedly not a simple matter, but more than this, the normalization of relations between them by no means signifies the completion of the Euro-marathon on the continent's economic track, where there is still, say, the European Free Trade Association. It comprises small but dynamically developing states that have relations with both the EEC and CEMA. This association, as far as one can judge, favorably regards the establishment of business contacts with CEMA. One cannot rule out in theory the probability of establishing in the future a zone of free trade in Europe that would stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals. At all events, we support the normalization of economic relations on the continent, and this is a natural result of our whole conception of an interrelated world, and directly reflects the new political thinking, the thinking of today.

Shevardnadze Receives Genscher Letter on CSCE

AU2406115388 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 24 Jun 88 p 6

[Udo Bergdoll report: "Genscher Is Looking for an Ally in Shevardnadze"]

[Text] Bonn, 23 June—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has sent a personal message to his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze expressing his concern about the further development of the Vienna CSCE meeting. In the letter, which was handed over by Andreas Meyer-Landrut, FRG ambassador in Moscow, Genscher recalls the agreement made with Shevardnadze in New York that each of them should try on his side to eliminate obstacles to the successful conclusion of the third Helsinki follow-up conference this summer.

According to reports from the Foreign Ministry, the personal message was aimed at promoting the speedy conclusion of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting with a balanced result that is acceptable to all sides so that negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe can be started soon. It was said that the message is a result of the talk of the two foreign ministers in New York on 7 June. Referring to the confidential nature of the message, details were not published.

In New York, Genscher and Shevardnadze agreed to accept the compromise proposal of the neutral and nonaligned countries for a final document as an appropriate basis for the concluding negotiations in Vienna. Now the foreign minister has probably pointed out that the progress at the CSCE negotiations, which had also been promised by the Eastern side, has not yet been achieved. The main obstacle to the speedy conclusion of the CSCE follow-up meeting is Romania's current strict rejection of any new agreements in the field of human rights and human contacts. Since the CSCE can adopt resolutions only by consensus, Romania could theoretically delay the conclusion of the Vienna meeting for an indeterminate period or could even break up the conference.

In his message, Genscher referred to the problem of Romania only indirectly. In a report on Hungarian television, Helmut Schaefer, state minister in the Foreign Ministry, was frank on this subject. For the FRG, the fate of the German minority, but also of other minorities in Europe, is a priority issue, Schaefer's unusual statement said. Bonn is in favor of the minorities' cultivating their cultural, linguistic, and other traditions and that they may be permitted to visit their

relatives. The FRG Government notes with great satisfaction that the Hungarian Government is aiming at these goals in its exemplary minority policy. This is also of great benefit to the German minority.

Unfortunately, this positive policy by Hungary is not being imitated by some neighboring states. Bonn sees developments in these countries that are regrettable and give rise to great concern. The Bundestag has just passed a resolution calling on Romania to stop its current minority policy and to cancel plans that would have serious effects on the minorities in Romania. The state minister also referred to plans to turn several thousand villages into arable land to establish "agro-industrial complexes" for this purpose. This would particularly affect the Hungarian and German minority.

State Minister Schaefer used his appearance on Hungarian television as an occasion to appeal to all CSCE states to respect the commitments for the protection of minorities and regional cultures that were made in the Helsinki Final Act. Furthermore, at the Vienna follow-up meeting, Bonn is in favor of securing and improving the situation of the minorities through further specific agreements.

'Illegal' Action Against UN Personnel Denounced

LD2506113688 Moscow TASS in English 0646 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Text] New York June 25 TASS—U.S. illegal actions against diplomats and U.N. staff members of several (?socialist) countries were resolutely denounced at a meeting of the U.N. Host Country Committee, which was held on Friday. Speaking at the meeting, representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland noted that limitations on movements of staff members of these countries' missions to the U.N., introduced by the U.S. authorities last May, were an unprovoked, arbitrary and totally unsubstantiated action which was a crude violation by the USA of its obligations under international law. These limitations, it was pointed out at the meeting, are incompatible with relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter and several international legal documents.

Statements by representatives of these countries were backed by delegates from the USSR, Belorussia, Cuba and Laos who pointed to the need for the earliest repeal of these illegal and discriminatory measures.

UN Committee on Peaceful Use of Space Meets

LD2406082188 Moscow TASS in English 0718 GMT 24 Jun 88

[Text] New York June 24 TASS—TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reports:

The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has wound up its 31st session here Thursday.

In an unanimously approved report the delegates to the session recognized the need to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes and noted that the strengthening of international cooperation in exploring and utilizing space was an effective way to attain this objective.

The main provisions of the charter of a world space organisation, which is seen as a center for working out in practice a universal model of mastering space on a global scope, submitted by the Soviet Union drew wide response at the session.

Just like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it could assume the functions of cooperation and ensuring guarantees for the use of space exclusively for peaceful constructive purposes. The Soviet delegation's readiness to treat with utmost consideration the remarks and proposals on this initiative won the support of delegates.

Evaluating the outcome of the session, Peter Jankowitsch, Austria, chairman of the committee, told TASS that a new and more constructive atmosphere on the international scene, which shaped up thanks to the results of the Moscow summit meeting, had a salutary impact on the session. The discussion at the session was of a businesslike, constructive and impartial nature.

We have already got accustomed that the Soviet Union proposes to the committee many constructive ideas, he commented on the initiative for a world space organisation. We exchanged the first views on it. This is a new idea and at the same time the idea that has been in the air. [sentence as received] Many countries and organisations have voiced in favour of a strong international organisation to coordinate the international activity in space. Its novelty is in its offering ways to accomplish this task, a model of coordinating various national and international efforts in mastering space.

U.S. Paper Cited on OAS Financial Problems

LD2506224188 Moscow TASS in English 2109 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Text] New York June 25 TASS—"The Organization of American States (OAS) is likely to suspend its aid programmes for the rest of the year because of the worst financial crisis in its history, according to OAS documents and officials", writes THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper.

"'The United States which is the largest contributor to the OAS, is in large part responsible for the financial problems', said Robert M. Sayre, assistant secretary for management at the organization. Mr. Sayre noted that the United States has cut its payments to the OAS by ten million dollars".

"The cuts come at a time when some members of Congress and some administration officials have questioned whether the OAS is an effective forum for resolving disputes between its members", THE NEW YORK TIMES points out. Those officials have criticized the organization for declining blindly to follow Washington's course with regard to Nicaragua and Panama. It is obvious that such "disobedience" angered the Washington administration and [word indistinct] sanctions against the OAS.

It follows from a statement by OAS Representative Irving G. Tragen that the U.S. discriminatory measures compel the organization practically to abandon programmes to combat narcobusiness. Such a blow on the programmes is being dealt to the accompaniment of the White House assurances as to its desire to fight resolutely the criminal trade in narcotics.

"I think historically that the OAS has had difficulties and crisis moments, but this is the worst situation that we have faced", said OAS Secretary General [name indistinct] Clemente Baena Soares. "It is so serious that the essence of the organization is in danger".

Reader Questions Value of Jamming Foreign Radio
PM2706160588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 6

[Letter from reader Yu. Biryukov under "Letters... 'Not for Publication'" rubric: "Is Jamming Really Necessary?"]

[Text] I have listened to various radio stations for a long time now. Previously, when they were jammed, I listened to them regularly nevertheless. Like many other people, I worked on the principle that if a station is being jammed it must be saying something interesting. Meeting up the next day, people secretly told each other what they had heard, often muddling the facts. This is how gossip, conjecture, and fears arose.

The time of glasnost and democracy have now come. The jamming of some stations has been halted. And what has happened? Many people have lost interest in these broadcasts. Virtually everything is now discussed openly in the press. Sometimes, out of habit, you still turn on the radio, but it is simply becoming uninteresting, sometimes even disagreeable (which never happened before) to listen to these stations. Our radio listeners have reached this conclusion themselves. That is what is important.

But still some broadcasts are being jammed. Is it really worth it?

We are witnesses to how the limits of glasnost are rapidly expanding. This shows trust in the people's political maturity. It strengthens our self respect and our patriotism. So is it really necessary to spend money on jamming radio stations, thereby perplexing people? Surely we can decide for ourselves what is the truth and what is false.

International Language Seminar in Azerbaijan
LD2306214188 Moscow TASS in English 1813 GMT 23 Jun 88

[Text] Baku June 23 TASS—The international symposium "Language and Ethnicity" came to a close today in Baku, capital of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Scientists discussed there the problem of the relationship of languages of big and small nations in conditions of the growth of national self-awareness and the internationalization of life.

The symposium was organized by the European (Vienna) Centre for the Coordination of Studies and Documents in the Sphere of Social Sciences, by the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan. Scientists from Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Poland, the U.S., France and the USSR took part in discussions. They said that the requirements connected with a social growth of each and every nation cannot be met without a language for international communication. At the same time they pointed out the need for bilingualism and for ensuring a real possibility of tuition in national languages.

'International Situation—Questions and Answers'
LD2406214888 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 24 Jun 88

["International Situation—Question and Answers" program presented by Sergey Pravdin, All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator; with Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin, TASS first deputy general director; and Vladimir Pasko. Boris Andrianov, Gennadiy Vedenyapin, Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, and Igor Surguchev, "colleagues" of Pravdin]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted on Shishkin remarks]

[Pravdin] Our permanent listener, Comrade Poluektov from Simferopol, writes: I am closely following the problem of reducing armaments. At last, something has started happening here, too, but why was it still not possible at the Moscow meeting to come to an agreement on reducing strategic offensive armaments? What is the problem of limiting sea-based cruise missiles? Your letter is answered by my colleague Vladimir Pasko.

[Pasko] By the start of the current year, the Soviet Union and the United States had 2,390 ICBM's and deployed launchers for them, 1,614 launch tubes and ballistic missiles in submarines, some 100 strategic underwater missile carriers, and 750 heavy bombers.

From the technical point of view, the problem of a 50-percent reduction of all this boils down to drawing up an agreement that would not upset the balance of forces at any stage of implementation, and whose verification measures would leave no doubt about whether the conditions of the agreement were being observed.

Preparing such accords is not a simple matter. For the main kinds of weapons, there is asymmetry among the sides. The United States has more heavy bombers. We have more heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles. The weapons each side has are, of course, different. How is all this to be compared?

There are as many complications in drawing up a monitoring system. On the one hand, verification must be reliable, on the other hand, it must not encroach on the other sides' security interests.

Progress toward a treaty is moving forward. The total threshold of strategic offensive armaments, which the sides have agreed not to cross, and a few other limitations have been established. There is progress in drawing up the rules of counting warheads for missiles and the armaments of bombers. The drafts of three joint documents on verification have been prepared. The sides have started exchanging data on their strategic forces.

At the Moscow meeting, the areas of agreement have been considerably widened, in particular on the question of air-based cruise missiles in matters concerning attempts to find and, if possible, agree on problems of verification with respect to mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, it was not possible to emerge with a treaty. The main obstacles here, one imagines, are not technical questions, problems of monitoring, and not even differences regarding the militarization of space, but the absence of political will by the U.S. leadership.

Take, for instance, the approach of the United States to the problem of limiting sea-based cruise missiles, which Comrade Poluektov is asking about. Outwardly, here, too, everything is also held up by verification. We proposed verification on a permanent basis of sea missiles leaving the plants where they are produced, and carrying out inspections on submarines and ships where they are deployed and in the centers where the missiles are fitted out with nuclear warheads. The United States is categorically against on-site inspection. But when we suggested remote inspections, they claimed that it is impossible to determine the presence of nuclear weapons with instruments. They even turned down an experiment.

It is, of course, not a matter of a lack of faith in the equipment. It exists, and we are prepared to share it, provided an accord in principle on verification is reached. The United States is planning to deploy some 4,000 sea-based cruise missiles in the nineties and they do not have the will to abandon this program. Revealing the ins and outs of the U.S. position on this matter, THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote on 10 May: The United States hopes that the Russians will in the end lift their demand for establishing limits subject to verification on these weapons.

Sea-based missiles are a destabilizing weapon, and without an accord on limiting them, there can be no reductions in strategic offensive weapons. Incidentally, the U.S. interest is no less than ours, and on 12 June, THE NEW YORK TIMES answered the administration's explanation of why no treaty was signed in Moscow—It explains this fact by the problem of monitoring—by writing as follows: The fact that this is a complex problem by no means signifies that a treaty is an unachievable aim. The Reagan team has every opportunity to see this thing through. Washington and Moscow have been studying these problems for decades. The only thing that remains to be clarified is the presence of political will. If Reagan can quickly manage to find within himself the strength and boldness, he will leave behind him the longest lasting legacy, a treaty that creates true hopes of reducing the threat of nuclear war.

I do not know whether anything needs to be added to that. [passage omitted on Andrianov, Lavrentyev remarks]

[Pravdin] Grigoriy Sergeyevich Latyshev from the village of Korsakov in Novosilskiy Rayon in Orel Oblast writes in his letter: The United States has hundreds of military bases, if not more, in many countries around the world. Are they taken into consideration under the 50-percent reduction in weapons? Evidently what Grigoriy Sergeyevich has in mind is the talks currently going on between our country and the United States on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. My colleague Gennadiy Vedenyapin will answer the question.

[Vedenyapin] In actual fact, there are now over 1,500 major bases and installations belonging to the Pentagon outside the United States. There are 500,000 U.S. military personnel deployed at them. That is approximately one quarter of the overall number of the country's armed forces. The web of the U.S. foreign military presence is by no means diminishing. Although the so-called base strategy of Washington has given rise to many acute contradictions and even crises in relations between the White House and other countries, and indeed in international relations as a whole in the postwar period.

Let me talk briefly about the aims of the notorious base strategy of the Pentagon. Its basic aim is to surround the Soviet Union along the entire perimeter of its border and to move U.S. military might beyond its own territory and closer to the probable enemy. The second aim is to draw the allied states more rigidly into its global military structure. The third aim is to set up support bases without which the operations of the Air Force and Navy would be rendered more difficult. Let me note that some very major and important U.S.

bases are situated at a considerable distance from our borders—take the island of Diego Garcia and the bases on the Philippines. They are not directly linked with the task of surrounding the USSR, but of course they cannot be left out of consideration.

A question arises: Has the United States achieved the aims set when it began creating its network of military bases? Maybe it has to an extent, but the main aim has not been achieved, the aim of achieving military superiority over us. The Soviet achievement of military and strategic parity with the United States to a large extent also diminished the value of the bases, and the degree of threat emanating from them was also reduced. It would be false, however, to say that they are some sort of sham installation. Washington is not yet even considering reducing the number of its military installations abroad. The concept of the U.S. military presence has not been removed from the agenda and that is unlikely to happen in, let us say, the next year or two.

The question of the bases, and let me note that it does not fall directly within the framework for talks on 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, will be resolved when the principle of sensible military sufficiency gains the upper hand in security matters, along with an understanding that truly reliable security must be achieved primarily by political means. [passage omitted on Surguchev remarks]

United States & Canada

Pogodin Analyzes Shultz Central American Tour

LD2806222288 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 28 Jun 88

[Text] The American Secretary of State George Shultz is leaving on 29th June on a tour of Central America. His official aim is to consult with the leaders of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica on the situation after the last fruitless round of talks on a cease-fire between the Nicaraguan Government and the contras.

The aim is formulated, writes our commentator Aleksandr Pogodin, rather vaguely. It allows for various interpretations. Here's my version.

I think the White House is pursuing both foreign and home policy goals in sending Shultz on this tour. First, attempts may be expected to persuade the Central American nations to give up their earlier decisions on a political settlement in the region. Washington's argument is that the Sandinist government is going back on its commitments. That ignores the fact that it was the contras who broke off the talks with the Nicaraguan Government to end the fratricidal war. The important point here is to secure the agreement of the Central American countries to a harder policy towards Nicaragua. Second, the American Administration, to my mind, intends to use this deferment to bring pressure on Congress balking at the White House line in Central America.

Let me recall that lately both President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz have spoken out for resumed allocations on military aid to the contras. Note that those statements were made practically right after the contras broke off the dialogue with the Nicaraguan Government. The American Administration [words indistinct] to obtain the consent of Congress to financing the contras, more exactly, financing the bloodshed in Nicaragua. That's what determines state secretary's Central American tour, concludes Aleksandr Pogodin.

Kozyakov on Party Conference, U.S. Relations

LD2806230488 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 27 Jun 88

[Text] What will be the impact of the party conference in Moscow on Soviet-American relations? Vladislav Kozyakov comments:

It can be said in advance that this country will open its doors still wider for cooperation with all countries, especially with the United States. The Theses of the party's Central Committee for the conference, that is, its platform of action, regards better Soviet-American relations as an opportunity to eliminate the nuclear threat. A task has been set to advance toward new agreements on the basis of a new thinking proclaimed in the course of the restructuring. Many Soviet ideas to promote security are addressed, above all, to the United States. These call for scrapping nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union expresses readiness to discuss any disarmament control measures and cooperate with the United States in settling regional conflicts.

However, an urgent question today is whether Washington is ready for a new approach to these pressing problems. When a new agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms was prepared, it turned out that the United States was unwilling to accept Soviet inspectors aboard ships with cruise missiles which was to have been carried out on a reciprocal basis. At the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, the American side has voiced objections to giving the United Nations a greater role in verifying compliance with agreements on disarmament. Incidentally, U.S. representatives have been at loggerheads on many other issues at the assembly with more than 100 states.

The impression is that the United States is lagging behind the rest of the world in what concerns new approaches to security. Can it overcome this lack? This really is a question, especially in the light of the Soviet side's determination to pursue the new thinking. The discussion before the party conference opening in Moscow tomorrow has shown that the mistakes of the past in Soviet policy are being brought out. The obsolete dogmas and stereotypes are being overcome. Openness and pluralism of views are being promoted. The conference is to work out new measures to give the restructuring a fresh impetus. This concerns foreign policy, too. So there is every reason to say tht the conference will provide fresh opportunities for better relations with the United States and all other countries.

Shishlin Assesses Results of Moscow Summit

AU2906101888 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Jun 88 p 6

[Article by Nikolay Shishlin, member of CPSU Central Committee staff: "What Have the Kremlin Negotiations Brought Us?; Results of the Soviet-American Summit Dialogue in Moscow; Written for PRAVDA"]

[Text] Only a few weeks after the event, it is possible to evaluate the results of the fourth Soviet-American summit meeting as follows: They did a good job in Moscow. The Soviet-American political dialogue is becoming more stable, the "cold war" is increasingly losing all justification, and it is also said that the world is now entering a new stage, in which international relations are increasingly characterized by stability and predictability, and in which hostility and distrust are increasingly retreating before the healthy rivalry of the two systems (one which simultaneously counts on developing mutually advantageous cooperation).

Obviously we can also encounter skeptics who proclaim that the world continues to be fraught with danger and that everything that has been done to date is like a drop in the ocean of problems. They never forget to stress that there were no sensations in Moscow.

Still, this very fact is remarkable. During the 6 months since the Washington summit, a great deal had happened in the sphere of political and diplomatic efforts; in Moscow, the results of these efforts were to have been appraised, the contours of possible solutions sketched, and the tasks for the following period formulated. In fact, this is precisely what happened.

The individual items of Soviet-American negotiations in the USSR capital were known in advance. There the two sides analyzed each item thoroughly and deeply, in less than 5 days, on the level of experts—prominent representatives of their foreign ministries. Understandably, the negotiations between CPSU Central Committee general secretary and the U.S. President stood at the center of attention. What were the results?

As expected, the two sides concentrated on working out an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, while adhering to the ABM Treaty. They achieved considerable progress in this; by progress, I do not mean merely the fact that the American and Soviet representatives will be resuming work at the Geneva talks as early as 12 July—the important thing is that the experts' activities will be based on new positions, on new approaches following from the results of the fourth Soviet-American summit negotiations. This applies to mobile ICBM's and to sea- and air-based cruise missiles, but also to inspection methods and their scope. Of course, this does not mean that both sides have reached a compromise on all issues. They still have a meticulous, difficult task before them. I think that their talks will not be shipwrecked, but will safely dock in the port which they are striving to reach. However, it is true that nobody can say when this will happen.

The talks on reducing conventional armament and the strengths of armed forces in Europe, on banning and eliminating chemical weapons, and on limiting and later banning nuclear tests have been fruitful. Although no specific decisions have been adopted (and, to tell the truth, none could have been adopted), it is apparent that the positions have drawn closer. From this viewpoint, the Moscow summit has opened the door for a new round of intensive talks on all the problems mentioned above.

True, the disarmament discussions in Moscow could have led to more significant decisions. The Soviet Union, equipped with the mandate of its socialist allies, was prepared for this—but the United States was not. For instance, the American side referred to the fact that in the matter of conventional weapons it needed the approval of its NATO partners prior to deciding to undertake any steps. And, naturally, it also had its own, American limits, above all, with regard to bold, resolute steps to slow down the revolutions of the armament race. However, the incentive to step up efforts in this direction undoubtedly exists. By this, I mean the ratification of the agreement to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which convincingly proves (even if we bear in mind the complicated and sensitive nature of the security problems involved) that these issues can be solved on the basis of new, nonconfrontational approaches. The formula that more missiles, more warheads, more tanks, and other military "toys" can guarantee security is becoming less and less topical. The increasingly prevailing view is that security must be equal and general and must go hand in hand with a reduced level of counterposed armed forces.

The Moscow negotiations also dealt (specifically and in depth) with regional conflicts. In this respect, the constructive tone was due to the results of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, and the decision to withdraw the Soviet military contingent from that country. However, the USSR and U.S. approaches to the solution of regional conflicts, to their causes and the methods of eliminating them, continue to differ. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in their dialogue, they no longer dwell on accusations and counteraccusations, but on looking for possibilities to set up constructive collaboration.

As expected, the U.S. President repeatedly spoke of human rights in Moscow, and also deemed it necessary to meet dissidents (who included a former Nazi collaborator). However, the effect produced by this meeting was totally different from that originally planned. The President's tribute to yesterday brought no political capital. But the important thing is that the two sides agreed on a dialogue aimed at providing the maximum guarantees for human rights and freedoms, for preserving human dignity, developing contacts between the people, and vigorously exchanging spiritual values.

The talks devoted to bilateral relations were both useful and specific. Soviet-American cooperation is developing in various definite spheres. So far its results have been modest, and the most important steps in this direction are still before us. Thus one of the key problems in USSR-U.S. relations is to eliminate the lack of positive aspects in this area. The problem can be solved only by providing a stable basis for mutual cooperation (in a wide range of spheres, from space to health care).

What are the foundations for the positive results achieved at the fourth Soviet-American summit? It is said that they were due to the good working contacts between the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and the U.S. President. And this is true. The two top representatives know each other well; they know how to express their stands frankly and clearly in reacting to each other's words. But I believe that other factors should be mentioned in this context, too.

One of the factors on the American side is the so-called overheating of the American economy. The chronic deficit of the U.S. state budget, the country's change from being a creditor to debtor, the loss of its first place on the world market, all this has produced a change in the U.S. way of thinking and feeling. The "right wing" is losing its popularity, and the axis of political life is shifting toward the political center. The situation demands more realism in foreign policy and the renunciation of illusions that it is possible to acquire military supremacy.

The moving force in the Soviet effort to radically normalize the international relations is restructuring, and the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society. This has produced a change in the century-old "image of the enemy." The humane substance of socialism is now coming to the fore—and this is precisely the factor that is deeply influencing the political circles and public opinion in the world.

The new political thinking (and M.S. Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed how essential it is) is now asserted its way in practical international life. Both the Soviet-American meeting in Moscow and its results are the latest example of this.

Paper's 'Crude Lies' About Afghan Bombs Deplored
PM2806121188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS dispatch: "LOS ANGELES TIMES Lies"]

[Text] San Francisco, 27 Jun—One of the major U.S. newspapers, the LOS ANGELES TIMES, has published crude lies about events in Afghanistan.

The article contains malicious fabrications, which have been disseminated by the U.S. media more than once since the signing of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, with the aim of ascribing to the Soviet forces the acts of terrorism against the civilian population currently being perpetrated by armed opposition formations with Washington's support.

The newspaper's correspondent Mark Feinman writes in particular about the mass use against the Aghan population of barbarous booby traps, many of them in the shape of plastic toys, to which Afghan children, in particular, fall prey. The detailed descriptions which he furnishes of the appearance and mechanism of this terrorist weapon are striking. It is noteworthy that Feinman has learned all these details from the Afghan anti-government rebels and "U.S. military analysts." According to their estimates, he writes, "between 3,000 and 5,000 booby traps of various kinds have been laid to date in Afghanistan... and they will kill or maim some 10,000 Afghans in the coming months." Why is he so well informed? In his efforts to give a semblance of authenticity to his fabrications, the correspondent discloses so many details as to betray the true organizers of the undeclared war against the Afghan people.

His "essay" goes as far as to admit that one of the aims of the use of booby traps is to dissuade Afghan refugees currently living in Pakistan from returning to their native villages and cities. Who, if not the Afghan armed opposition, backed by Washington and Islamabad, is trying to thwart the policy of national reconciliation proclaimed by the Afghan Government, which has opened the door for all refugees to return home?

The appearance in the U.S. press of this kind of article is taking place against the backdrop of a massive buildup of U.S. military aid to the formations of Afghan rebels whom Washington has "strongly advised" to set up a so-called "transitional government." It is difficult to interpret all this as anything but a direct effort to undermine the process of settling the situation around Afghanistan and the implementation of the Geneva agreements.

Air Force Secretary's Upcoming Visit Announced
PM2806123188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "In Connection With the Upcoming Visit"]

[Text] In connection with an agreement reached earlier, E. Aldridge, U.S. secretary of the Air Force, will visit the Soviet Union on an official visit at the invitation of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the first half of July this year.

China

Commentary on PRC Disarmament Stand at UN Talks
OW2906132388 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 20 Jun 88

[Mulatov commentary]

[Text] The third special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament opened on 31 May and will end on 25 June. During the general debate at the session, delegates of many countries highly praised the recent Soviet-U.S. summit. Australian Foreign Minister Hayden said that the Moscow meeting marked the end of a cold winter, thanks to the efforts for nuclear disarmament. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said: The destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles by the Soviet Union and the United States is an important achievement. Although this is only a beginning, it has brought hope to all people who want disarmament. After the first step taken in nuclear disarmament, the second and more steps will be taken in this regard. Station observer Mulatov writes in this connection:

Such thinking can be clearly understood from the stand taken by the Chinese and other delegations. The Soviet Union fully agrees that it is necessary now to consolidate the positive results achieved at the recent Soviet-U.S. summit and to continuously advance toward reducing 50 percent of the Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive weapons.

Dear listeners, we know that the Soviet Union and China do not have any major differences as to their stands on nuclear disarmament. As the Chinese delegation pointed out at the special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, the ultimate aim should be to completely ban and destroy all nuclear weapons. As everyone knows, it is with this aim in mind that the Soviet Union has put forward a plan for the stage-by-stage destruction of all nuclear weapons before the end of this century. It should be pointed out that the stands of Moscow and Beijing on a series of concrete issues regarding the prevention of nuclear war, a common task for the people of all countries, are close to each other or identical. For example, their attitudes toward the serious issue of dismantling military bases on the territories of other countries is also close to each other or identical.

At the present disarmament session, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for extensive negotiations so that all countries will make joint efforts to solve the problem of dismantling military bases on the territories of other countries before the year 2000. I think that this specific concept is very close to China's stand. China has stated on several occasions that it is opposed to military presence in other countries. On the question of establishing nuclear-free zones in Asia and other regions, the Soviet Union and China do not agree with the Western big nuclear powers and resolutely support concrete plans.

The third special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament will soon come to a close. An international conference for the establishment of nuclear-free zones was held this week in Berlin, the capital of Democratic Germany. More than 100 countries were represented at the international conference. I think what is particularly important is that the two big socialist nuclear powers, with firm determination, are striving for practical progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Bilateral Cooperation in Asia-Pacific Needed

OW2906050688 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 23 Jun 88

[Nikolayev commentary]

[Text] The new Soviet political guideline for shaping foreign policy includes improvement in international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. This is also one of the concepts included in the outline submitted by the CPSU Central Committee to the 19th all-union party conference. This party conference will be held in Moscow on 28 June. Our station commentator Nikolayev writes in this connection as follows:

I believe reforms should be aimed at promoting relations among all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. However, today I would like to talk about relations between the Soviet Union and China. Perhaps some will deny the significant role of our two big countries in the Asia-Pacific region. History has made the Soviet Union and China shoulder special responsibilities in ensuring peace and security in Asia. The reason is: Both the Soviet Union and China are socialist countries, and safeguarding peace is an important part of their foreign policy. Both the Soviet Union and China have nuclear weapons. It is perhaps unnecessary for me to say that all this has increased their sense of responsibility to the peoples of other countries. I would like to point out that both the Soviet Union and China have realized their own responsibilities and accepted the obligation of not using nuclear weapons first. Both countries have maintained close ties with all parts of the world and shown comprehensive interest in the Asia-Pacific Region and the entire world. Both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Therefore, without their participation, it is impossible to objectively solve complicated international issues, including the mediation of regional conflicts. In a narrow sense, USSR-PRC relations will directly affect the development of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the past several years, USSR-PRC relations have markedly improved. Naturally, this has made us very happy. However, all these achievements are a preliminary to fostering mutual trust. There is still plenty of room for promoting bilateral cooperation. This involves not only all the realms of bilateral relations, but also coordination in the international arena. Currently, we can only refer to the joint steps taken by the Soviet Union and China in ensuring international peace and security. During an interview with a "LIAOWANG" journal reporter, Soviet leader Comrade Gorbachev emphatically pointed out: We hope to cooperate with China. In world affairs, many things depend on China's policies.

Role of Private Enterprises in PRC Noted

PM2806101188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "How Many Private Operators in China?]

[Text] Beijing, 25 Jun—It has been officially announced here that, according to figures from the State Industrial and Trade Administration, there are currently 225,000 private enterprises in China employing 3.6 million hired hands. These enterprises account for almost 1 percent of the country's industrial output.

Chinese economists believe that the private enterprises in the PRC will help solve the employment problem and will make it possible to more efficiently utilize the population's available funds as well as equipment that is

not used at state or cooperative enterprises. In the assessment of the Chinese press, private enterprises have become a very dynamic factor in the development of the PRC economy.

Radio, Film, TV Vice Minister Interviewed

OW2906012988 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 21 Jun 88

[Text] Listeners, a delegation of the Chinese Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television, led by Vice Minister Nie Dajiang, is on an official visit to the Soviet Union. Sokolov, our Kiev correspondent, interviewed the vice minister on his impression of the Soviet Union. The vice minister said:

[Begin Nie recording] Our delegation has visited Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. We have seen and heard a lot of interesting things during our tour. For example, we have seen that our Soviet counterparts are actively, consciously campaigning for the current reform. They have made tremendous efforts to improve the contents of radio and television broadcasts and have carried out, I believe, spectacular reform. We have also learned about programs such as "Problems, Search, Solutions," "Restructuring Spotlight," "Opinion of the Public," and a number of programs for young people.

We have known for a long time the important role played by the Ukraine in the Soviet economy. We have also come into contact with the rich Ukrainian culture, such as its performing arts. As the saying goes, it is better to see once than hear a hundred times. By coming here and observing through our own eyes, we deeply feel that the Ukraine is a beautiful and richly endowed place of rich cultural heritage. It has given us very good and deep impressions.

I have said that we learned a lot of interesting things in our contact and conversation with our Soviet counterparts. One of the things concerns the Soviet reform. I feel that our Soviet counterparts are deeply aware of their role in their country's economic and political reform and have made valuable contributions. Another thing concerns macro-control. We feel that there are many things in common between our two countries as far as macro-control of radio, films, and television is concerned. We believe that both sides will benefit if we increase these exchanges. [end recording]

Ovchinnikov-Led Delegation Visits Beijing

OW2806062788 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 19 Jun 88

[Text] The delegation of activists of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries and the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society continued its visit in China. The delegation is headed by Ovchinnikov, a PRAVDA political observer.

On 18 June, the delegation visited a Sino-Soviet friendship people's commune in the western outskirts of Beijing. In talking with the commune director Wu Yikang, the Soviet guests noted the tremendous improvement in the Chinese people's livelihood in recent years. Before the delegation visited the commune, Ovchinnikov had a discussion with Du Ying, a representative of the China Agricultural Development Research Center, on the development of agriculture in China and the Soviet Union.

On the same day, actors and actresses of the Soviet delegation gave a concert at the Beijing Exhibition Center music hall; some 2,000 attended. The Soviet performers gave a second concert because many people were unable to attend the first one. Soviet actor Deyashev, actress Gorikova, and other well-known Soviet actors and actresses took part in the concert.

Amur Oblast To Trade With Liaoning Province

PM2706142988 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Neighbors Must Trade"]

[Text] The development of direct economic, scientific, and technical ties between Amur Oblast and China's Liaoning Province have been discussed at talks between delegations of representatives from the two administrative territories which ended yesterday in Blagoveshchensk. The parties arrived at the conviction that such contacts are highly desirable, and now, in addition to Heilongjiang Province, which directly adjoins the Soviet Amur region, the more distant neighbor can also become a partner of Amur enterprises and firms in border trade.

The participants in the talks familiarized themselves with the products list for mutual exchange. The Chinese comrades invited the Soviet partners to visit the city of Shenyang, the province capital, to familiarize themselves with product samples. They also expressed interest in creating joint enterprises.

Delegation in Irkutsk To Discuss Trade

LD2706010588 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2230 GMT 26 Jun 88

[Text] A Chinese delegation visiting Angara is holding talks with trade enterprises in Irkutsk Oblast about developing border trade. There is also a proposal to set up in Irkutsk a public catering enterprise for Chinese cuisine.

Heilongjiang Trade Delegation Visits Khabarovsk

OW2906002588 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 20 Jun 88

[Text] Dear listeners: In the south of the region of Khabarovsk bordering China's Heilongjiang Province is a village called Leninskoye. It is not the first time the

village has been visited by a Heilongjiang trade delegation. This time, the delegation was led by Comrade (Ma Wangda), chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tongjiang City Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Corporation. In an interview with our reporter (Kovto), he made the following remarks:

[Begin (Ma) recording] The purpose of our present visit is to strengthen border trade, as well as economic and technical cooperation, between Leninskoye and Tongjiang City. Our negotiations have been very successful. All negotiations have proceeded in a friendly, vigorous, and dynamic atmosphere. To make the trade negotiations still better, our Soviet comrades made arrangements for us to visit Birobidzhan in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Some members of our present delegation are from Jiamusi City. This will further strengthen the cooperation between Jiamusi City and Birobidzhan. In Birobidzhan, we visited the downtown district and a music club and were received by leaders of the oblast obkom. We have had a happy time during our several days's stay in Leninskoye and while visiting Birobidzhan. In particular, the negotiations we held today reflected the sincerity on both sides and will further our trade development. [end recording]

The following is indicative of the expansion of our border trade:

Among the members of the Chinese delegation is Comrade (Yu Weiming), chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jiamusi City Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Corporation. This corporation's plan includes the signing of a trade contract with Birobidzhan City, near Leninskoye Village. In his remarks, Comrade (Yu Weiming) revealed that this is his first visit to Leninskoye Village. He said:

[Begin (Yu) recording] The purpose of our current visit is to discuss with the representatives of Khabarovsk's consumer cooperative the reestablishment of trade relations, which we had in the 1950's and 1960's. During those years, Khabarovsk and Jiamusi had small trade transactions, benefiting the people of both sides. We believe that restoring the trade relations of the 1950's and 1960's is necessary at this time and conforms to the wishes of the people of both sides. We have advised the representatives of Khabarovsk's consumer cooperative of this opinion, and they have agreed with us and expressed interest in the proposals we have made. Meanwhile, we have another objective, and that is to develop border trade with Leninskoye and Birobidzhan. We have put forward relevant opinions and suggestions, which both sides have agreed to study further. The suggestions have met with approval from both sides. [end recording]

Trade negotiations between the two sides lasted for several days and ended with the signing of contracts, covering a total trade of more than 2 million Swiss francs.

Northeast Asia

Rogachev Meets Japanese Foreign Minister

OW2806124288 Tokyo KYODO in English 1222 GMT 28 Jun 88

[Text] Tokyo, June 28 KYODO—Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno briefly met Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev Monday at Moscow airport where he stopped en route home from a tour of four Mideast countries, a top-level Foreign Ministry official said Tuesday.

The official, who talked with reporters on condition of anonymity, quoted Rogachev as telling Uno that the Soviet Union appreciates a just ended high-level bilateral meeting which he described as deepening Soviet-Japan dialogue.

Rogachev and Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama discussed bilateral and international affairs in a three-day meeting in Moscow which ended Monday.

Rogachev conveyed Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's pledge to meet Uno while the two ministers are attending a session of the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Uno briefed Rogachev about the outcomes of a series of talks with leaders of Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Israel on which he made a round of calls after attending the Toronto summit of seven major advanced democracies, the official said.

Uno returned home Tuesday morning from a trip to the four Mideast countries.

Japanese Leaders' Stand on Defense Criticized

OW2306225588 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 17 Jun 88

[(Mondorikov) commentary]

[Excerpts] A feature of the third UN special session on disarmament held in New York may be the surrounding atmosphere of awareness that nuclear disarmament, which is the reason for calling the session, may no longer be just a utopian ideal. The Soviet Union and the United States have arrived at an agreement to abolish intermediate-range nuclear—INF—missiles, and have also started to negotiate a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear missiles.

Through the UN special session, this favorable mood can be given the endorsement of world society and be encouraged to develop further. Before the session started, there was a view expressed by ASAHI SHIMBUN that other countries as well as the United States and the Soviet Union should participate in the disarmament process. I agree with this view completely.

It apparently was meaningful that the practical and constructive USSR-U.S. summit was in progress in Moscow when the UN special session was starting in New York. The summit contributed to creating a good atmosphere at the session. For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita's speech was delivered at the UN session while ratification instruments for the INF Treaty were being exchanged in Moscow.

Prime Minister Takeshita welcomed the accomplishments made at the Moscow summit, called for abolition of nuclear weapons, and made an interesting proposal on verification of nuclear tests. Prime Minister Takeshita at the same time voiced support for the concept of nuclear deterrence. His stand—contradicting the purpose of abolishing nuclear weapons—met with criticism from Nagasaki Mayor Motoshima.

Foreign Minister Shevardnazde's position, too, was squarely against Mr Takeshita's. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union is convinced that security is possible without nuclear capability. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's speech contained a series of concrete proposals which have direct bearing on the safety of Japan. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze emphasized that the security of Asia should be handled separately. His proposal on negotiations with respect to naval activities should be of direct concern to Japan, too. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze recalled a proposal made by General Secretary Gorbachev in Vladivostok in July 1986. It was a proposal to limit naval activities in the Pacific.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, in his speech at the UN session, proposed to begin with measures to create and foster mutual trust in the naval sphere. The measures include giving advance notice of fleet moves and exercises, setting limitations to naval exercises, and inviting observers. His proposals on the measures are believed to correspond to the non-nuclear interests of Japan. [passage omitted]

Coming now to the topic of military bases, the Japanese leadership is taking actions aimed at making their presence permanent. Its agreement to increase Japan's share of costs to maintain the bases cannot but be interpreted as an action for just such a purpose. Meanwhile, U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci, visiting Japan recently, made it clear that he has no plan to withdraw or reduce U.S. troops in Asia. This military presence continues to be justified by the Soviet threat, which does not even exist. Similar fabricated stories are used by the Japanese Diet in justifying the Japanese military buildup.

Before leaving for New York to attend the UN special session on disarmament, Prime Minister Takeshita made a statement that Japan's defense capability should be brought up to a level that is commensurate with Japan's economic power. In consideration of the position held by Japan in the world economy, it is only natural that such remarks have always invited the concern of the nation.

The Japanese leadership does not appear satisfied with Japan being third among the advanced nations in spending the highest amounts for military expenditures, even though this inclination clearly runs counter to the world trend moving toward an improved environment.

DPRK's Kim Il-song on U.S. Troops in South

LD2406050688 Moscow TASS in English 1941 GMT 23 Jun 88

[Text] Pyongyang June 23 TASS—General secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea, President of the DPRK Kim Il-song met here today with national chairman of the Communist Party of the USA Gus Hall who heads a delegation of the Communist Party of the USA that arrived for a visit in the DPRK at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea. Welcoming the guests, Kim Il-song said that the Korean people expresses firm solidarity with the Communist Party of the USA which is waging in a difficult situation the struggle in defence of democratic rights and vital interest of the working masses, for peace and security in the world, against aggression and war.

Dwelling on the situation in Korea, Kim Il-song noted that the occupation of South Korea by U.S. troops is the main obstacle to the unification of Korea. The occupation of South Korea by U.S. troops and the split of Korea into two parts bring uncounted hardships and suffering to the South Korean population and create huge obstacles to socialist construction in the DPRK. Blaming the U.S. Government for the present state of relations between the two countries the leader of the DPRK said: "If the U.S. Government withdraws its troops from South Korea and stops interference in the internal affairs of our country, we are prepared to normalise relations with the United States".

U.S. imperialism is the main obstacle to the struggle for the elimination of all nuclear armaments everywhere, the main force backing counterrevolutionary bands in Nicaragua, Angola, Salvador, Afghanistan, the racist regime in South Africa and the fascist regime in Chile. Gus Hall expressed support for the proposals of the DPRK aimed at the unification of Korea and at turning the Korean peninsula into a peaceful, nuclear weapons free zone. He emphasized that the Communist Party of the USA intends to step up the struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.

South Korean Economic, Political Scene Viewed

PM2406153788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 5

[First part of special correspondent S. Agafonov report: "From the Seoul Notebook"]

[Excerpts] Seoul-Tokyo—These notes are extracts from my notebook in which I stored names, figures, and certain observations acquired during 7 days spent in

South Korea, which I visited to familiarize myself with the progress of the preparations for the 24th Olympic Games (as is well known, the Soviet Union is taking part in them). A week is an extremely short period even to acquire a cursory knowledge, so the conclusions and assessments may appear superficial. But I think that having made these provisos there are grounds for sharing my impressions with the readers.

The regime set up in the postwar years in the south of the Korean peninsula was characterized by a series of military coups, repressions against the opposition, tyranny by the secret police, and other actions that were far from democratic. Now South Korea is making great propagandist efforts to change these negative ideas and present a different, more attractive, and more civilized face to the world. This year the administration in the Blue House—the South Korean president's residence—changed for the first time without bloodshed. No Tae-u, who is also a military man, although he abandoned the uniform of four-star general 7 years ago, became the new master there. Last year's national election, in which he did not gain a majority (little more than 30 percent of the vote), brought him to power in Seoul but he managed to get around the opposition leaders, who were squabbling among themselves.

A limited amnesty, which opened the doors of certain opposition representatives' prison cells, was declared in the country, the most rigid restrictions on the activity of the mass media removed, and freedom of speech and assembly declared pro forma, but rallies are still curtailed and demonstrations under the most radical slogans nipped in the bud, so to speak, since the local custodians of order have a great deal of experience in this matter. The list of so-called innovations could go on and on. At the same time one must acknowledge that definite progress is taking place in South Korea under powerful pressure from the democratic movement.

Owing to merciless exploitation of the working people and financial support from the United States and Japan the country's GNP has doubled in the last 7 years, but the foreign debt has reached the astronomical figure of $40 billion.

South Korean corporations impetuously rushed onto foreign markets, offering not only cheap consumer goods (textiles, footwear, toys, and so on), but also high-tech articles—electronics, computers, automobiles, and machine-building equipment. And records of a kind were broken by certain sectors.

Let us not make hasty judgments of the "new economic miracle" type, which fill Western press articles on South Korea. Especially since this "miracle" is, in the opinion of experts, based on "three roses" which are wilting before our eyes—the cheap national currency, cheap raw materials, and the cheap work force have already rallied all their resources and become too unsteady a prop to guarantee optimism in economic forecasts.

The upshot is that the prevailing situation is such that the South Korean economy is in a tight spot—with the colossal debt, even the rapid development of export sectors is hardly making it possible to make ends meet. Add to this its partners' protectionism, social tension on the labor front, and the very heavy burden of military expenditure, which swallows up 40 percent of the state budget and 6 percent of the GNP. (The annual "Team Spirit" military maneuvers are a vivid example of this). Deduct the advantages of cheap labor and the low-valued won of yesteryear—and after this calculation, you will agree that the prosperity presented by the statistics fades and the delight rapidly wanes. The country needs radical industrial reform and the elimination of imbalances, but the situation does not allow time for this. The regime needs economic stability, yet the situation remains unstable.

What is the answer? Most people whom I met in Seoul see the answer as lying in immediately diversifying sources of raw materials, technology, and export channels, above all by emerging onto new markets.

The fact that Seoul will host the summer Olympics in 2 and ½ months must also be included in this brief digression. [passage omitted]

Today all the Olympic amenities are virtually ready. Many underwent their run-in at the 1986 Asian Games. Most of them have been sited in two parts of Seoul which are only 4 km apart—at the Olympic Park and the city's sports complex. Officially the buildings are open to visitors from the public but the admissions check procedure is exceptionally strict there. As I was able to see for myself there were few people who would willingly pass yet again through a metal detector and submit to yet another frisking.

Kang Pyong-su, Seoul's deputy mayor, singled out transport, sanitary, and linguistic problems as being among the remaining unresolved problems linked with the games. [passage omitted]

However, all these are individual questions, the deputy mayor pointed out, but there was and still is one main question: security. The official did not elaborate on this but stressed that the "authorities will not allow any excesses."

I had a kind of illustration of this terse wording literally an hour later when representatives from the organizational committee showed me the rowing course for the Olympic regatta. The site was glorious and picturesque, the sun shone, and parachutists in full rig poured like so many peas from two camouflaged military helicopters flying high in the sky, evidently rehearsing "struggle against excesses." They landed with enviable precision but landing maneuvers are not part of the official schedule for the Seoul games....

This may possibly be a biased view but I thought that the Olympic theme proper is not as popular in Seoul as discussions on the significance of the Olympics for the future of South Korea. The public here are extremely heartened by forecasts on this score based on the experience of Japan, for whom the Tokyo Games of 1964 heralded the start of a mighty economic spurt.

Parallels are hardly appropriate here, although there is no question of Japan and South Korea being identical. [This sentence appears to make sense only if "parallels" are read as a punning reference to the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea] And from this viewpoint it is worth talking about certain characteristic traits of the South Korean political situation, which are of crucial interest.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Australian Party Delegation Visits 14-23 Jun

PM2806114188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Jun 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Guests From Australia"]

[Text] A delegation of leading workers of the Australian Democrats Party [ADP] headed by Senator M. Macklin, deputy leader of the ADP, visited the Soviet Union 14 through 23 June at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee. The delegation was received by A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and by A.E. Voss, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, and had meetings and talks at the USSR Foreign Ministry, the USSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, the Soviet Peace Defense Committee, the Soviet Women's Committee, and the USSR Youth Organizations Committee. The ADP delegation visited the Uzbek SSR, where it was received at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, and Leningrad. The Australian guests familiarized themselves with the work of party organizations and the activity of soviets of people's deputies and visited industrial and agricultural enterprises and cultural establishments.

The delegation members pointed out that the current processes of restructuring in the USSR economy and of the democratization of political and social life in the Soviet Union arouse broad interest in Australia and elicit a positive response. They wished the 19th all-union party conference success. The visit to the USSR by the delegation of Australian Democrats showed the proximity of the approaches of the ADP and the CPSU to problems of disarmament and the strengthening of international peace, security, and confidence in the Asia and Pacific region.

Vietnamese TU Chief Outlines Plans, Problems

PM2806102588 Moscow TRUD in Russian
12 Jun 88 p 3

[Own correspondent A. Kalashnikov "TRUD Interview" with Pham The Duyet, secretary of the CPV Central Committee and chairman of the Confederation of Vietnam Trade Unions: "Following the Path of Construction"; date not given—first two paragraphs are correspondent's introduction]

[Text] Hanoi, June—"Everything must proceed from the people"—this is the phrase that Vietnamese Communists use today to designate the vital problem of how to shift from bureaucratic to democratic methods of management both in the economy and in politics. Broad democratization is viewed in the SRV as the key question in the renewal of society.

My interlocutor—Pham The Duyet—comes from a peasant family and was a miner in the recent past. He is now secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] and chairman of the Confederation of Vietnam Trade Unions. There are six people in his family. He travels around the country a great deal, meets with labor collectives, and so can say a great deal about the formation of the Vietnamese working class and its contribution to strengthening the motherland. But at the beginning of the conversation Pham The Duyet warned me right away that he is prone to say more about unresolved problems.

[Kalashnikov] People in Vietnam are now talking boldly and openly about difficulties and shortcomings. This probably already illustrates great changes in society.

[Pham] This was the tone set by the sixth party congress. It gave a truthful analysis of the path that had been covered. Along with our indisputable achievements we have made many mistakes—mistakes in understanding the essence of the period of transition and mistakes in questions of the implementation of industrialization and capital investment policy. An unwieldy management apparatus was set up that operated using bureaucratic methods. Our cadre policy led to many posts and positions being occupied by people who could not think innovatively or lead effectively. As a result the country found itself in a very complex situation. There is now an acute shortage of foodstuffs, necessities, raw materials, and electrical power. There are many difficulties in people's lives. Prices are constantly rising and real wages are falling. It is not yet possible to limit the rate of inflation and the growth of the budget deficit. Poor use is being made of the capacities of existing enterprises.

[Kalashnikov] I heard that even today, 1 year after the Sixth CPV Congress, little has changed. People's lives have not become easier and the optimism aroused by the ideas of renewal is gradually dying away.

[Pham] I don't agree with that. Yes, the economic situation remains complex and the standard of living is low. But working people believe in the implementation of the congress' ideas and demand that they be resolutely and very speedily carried out. Everyone must understand that so many problems have accumulated of such gravity that they cannot be resolved overnight.

[Kalashnikov] What can trade unions do to help rectify the situation?

[Pham] A lot. They must start with themselves above all. Trade unions are also distinguished by an administrative bureaucratic style of work. We must get closer to people and find out their expectations and their sentiments. Trade unions must transfer the center of gravity in their activity to primary organizations and labor collectives. Only then will it be possible to normalize the atmosphere at enterprises and establish glasnost, criticism, and self-criticism.

The trade union structure must be renewed at all levels. Some subdivisions work inefficiently and so they must be reorganized or eliminated altogether.

The main thing is that we must amplify trade unions' functions in Vietnamese life today. The sixth party congress defined our time as the initial stage in the period of transition. Proceeding on this premise, the main tasks must be singled out without voluntarism or undue haste. Having acknowledged the right to exist and the usefulness of all socioeconomic structures in the country, we must elaborate a flexible policy. How can an influential, strong trade union committee be set up at a private capital enterprise or at one under foreign ownership? How can the working class and the peasantry be united justly? How can socialist competition be organized skillfully in the state sector? The Sixth Vietnamese Trade Union Congress, which will take place this fall, must answer these and many other questions.

We also want to review the statutes of SRV trade unions. It is obvious that given the present serious situation in the republic trade unions' most important function is to defend working people's interests.

[Kalashnikov] Quite harsh assessments of the work of trade union organizations and the course of the election-report campaign were made at the Confederation of Vietnam Trade Unions plenum held recently....

[Pham] Yes, it was pointed out at the plenum that Vietnam's trade unions have by and large not yet restructured themselves in accordance with the new demands. Many trade union committees and organizations are not coping with the role imposed on them as authoritative representatives of the working class. Trade union organizations are still making an insignificant contribution to the development of the processes of democratization and glasnost and to the introduction of economic accountability [khozraschet] and the expansion of economic production independence.

But there are already signs of renewal. They can be seen in the expansion of democracy in production and rights of workers and employees. Therefore, many enterprises have reserves for improving matters notwithstanding the present serious conditions. Labor collective councils are being set up where all questions are discussed publicly and directors are elected. Trade union organizations are bolder in demanding punishment for those leaders who violate the law.

Trade unions play a great role in the struggle against the negative phenomena that have become widespread in society—corruption, bribery, embezzlements of state property, and abuses of official position. Worker control has become more active—both at enterprises and in the distribution sphere.

[Kalashnikov] You mentioned that trade unions' protective function is a priority. What does this work mainly consist of?

[Pham] Strict observance of the principles of social justice. Stabilizing and then boosting working people's standard of living. Trade unions must defend their own position on questions of labor remuneration, bonuses, and social insurance and must take part in resolving problems of employment, vocational training, and redistribution of the work force.

We are following the changes in your country's life attentively and we wish it success. I would like to take this opportunity to express gratitude to Soviet trade unions and working people for their assistance in cadre training and the valuable exchange of work experience.

U.S. Military Bases in Philippines Viewed

OW2906012788 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to Asia-Pacific Region 1300 GMT 16 Jun 88

[Text] Controvery over the future of U.S. military bases in the Philippines has continued in recent months. Anti-base sentiments in the Philippines are expected to rise further as 1991, the year the lease agreement expires, approaches. The military bases in question are Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. These are two of the largest U.S. military bases abroad. Because it is very likely that nuclear weapons may have been deployed in these two bases, their presence is extremely dangerous.

The Philippines is the only ASEAN country with foreign military bases. This is an embarrassment to Manila in its relations with its ASEAN allies, which have tried to make Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone. Thus, a number of notable political activists in the Philippines have repeatedly stressed that U.S. military bases in the Philippines are out of keeping with the times when military confrontation between the two superpowers in the Asia-Pacific region is decreasing, especially in the wake of the signing of the INF Treaty.

Various political figures have pointed out that keeping U.S. military bases will cause social discontent and create a feeling among Filipinos that the country is dependent on the United States. Today, a great majority of the Philippine people is critical of the presence of U.S. military bases. As some social activists have pointed out, their presence is a reason why prostitution flourishes. Tens of thousands of Americans and Filipinos in cities near the bases contract (?venereal disease) each year. Cases of AIDS are also increasing.

It should be pointed out that differences have appeared between the United States and the Philippines ever since they started the negotiations on the status of U.S. military bases on 5 April. The Philippine delegation emphatically pointed out that the country has no internal or external threat requiring foreign military bases, and that it is the United States which wants to keep the bases. The Philippine side raised a question of principle. It put forward a proposal to limit the United States' extraterritoriality within its military bases through a revision of the existing agreement. The revision would give the Philippines the power to control the bases. As expected, the United States has taken an opposing position. General Snyder, commander of U.S. Clark Air Base, declared that the United States must have a military presence in the Philippines on a long-term basis in order to ensure regional stability. At the same time, the United States has refused to make concessions on the question of the status of the U.S. forces.

During the negotiations, serious differences also occurred on the question of leasing fees for the U.S. bases. Manila expressed dissatisfaction over the meager amount. To protect its strategic interests in the region, the United States is inclined to meet Manila's monetary demands. Apparently, Washington plans to buy the right of using the military bases. For this purpose, the White House has drawn up a so-called mini-Marshall Plan involving an aid package of $10 billion in several years. The negotiation is still in progress, and it is difficult to predict the final outcome. However, sources indicate that the Philippine Government, which badly needs foreign aid, has indicated its willingness to accept the mini-Marshall Plan. On the other hand, the Philippine public demands that the total withdrawal of the U.S. bases, not the Pentagon's use of them under new terms, should be negotiated. They believe that the total withdrawal of the bases alone is in the security interests of the Philippines as well as that of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Near East & South Asia

Afghan National Council on Accords Observance

PM2806122188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Jun 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Islamabad's Dangerous Game. Afghan National Council Session"]

[Text] Kabul, 27 Jun.—A session of the National Council of the Republic of Afghanistan was held here today to examine and discuss the government's report on observance of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan.

Addressing the session participants, Afghan Foreign Minister 'Abdul Wakil emphasized that the Geneva agreements have taken the form of a major test at the international level of the new diplomacy based on the policy of national reconciliation, which now occupies the chief place among the Afghan people's national tasks. This policy, he said, helped to achieve the agreements in Geneva and directed the Geneva process toward the chief goal of ending external interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Unfortunately, the minister continued, following the Junejo government's resignation, the military authorities in Pakistan took over the country's foreign policy and began a dangerous game, over which they have obviously lost control. They are wrecking the results of 6 years of hard work in Geneva. Pakistan has shown no appreciable signs of wishing to implement the agreements that were reached. Islamabad is in fact following the same directions to which it was adhering even before Geneva. The situation is now taking shape as follows—on one side there are the USSR and Afghanistan, which are observing their commitments with regard to the Geneva agreements, while on the other side there is, above all, Pakistan, which is ignoring them.

'Abdul Wakil emphasized that since 16 May, right after the agreements came into force, 33 notes have been submitted to Pakistan via the UN Goodwill Mission (UNGOMAP) relating to 215 violations of the provisions of the accords. The Pakistani side, the minister emphasized, is acting as though the Geneva agreements were signed with the sole aim of securing the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops, while openly violating all the other points of that document. He enumerated in detail facts and instances of such violations, also pointing out that Islamabad is creating serious obstacles to the UNGOMAP's inspection activity on its territory.

Taking account of the intransigent opposition's continuing actions against Afghanistan and Pakistan's nonobservance of the Geneva agreements, the minister declared, our Armed Forces will resolutely oppose the extremist groups' sallies. We will make every effort to ensure the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Afghanistan as an Islamic, nonaligned, and neutral state. If Pakistan continues not to observe the agreements, we will take counter steps in accordance with the circumstances which arise. Giving an assurance that Afghanistan intends to continue following the provisions worked out in Geneva, 'Abdul Wakil voiced the hope that the UNGOMAP will put a stop to Pakistan's violations of them in the future and will play an effective and constructive role in settling the situation around Afghanistan.

Those who spoke in the debate sharply criticized Islamabad's policy aimed at undermining the Geneva agreements.

The session participants adopted a resolution which points out, in particular, that real opportunities have now been created to end the bloodshed and normalize the situation in the country. The Afghan Government, the document emphasizes, is taking active measures to fulfill the Geneva agreements and is ensuring all-round cooperation with international organizations to accommodate the refugees who have returned to the motherland.

Afghanistan and the USSR are strictly observing the Geneva agreements, having taken a whole number of specific steps to realize them. On behalf of the Afghan people, the resolution states, the National Council demands that the country's government continue the efforts to realize the Geneva agreements in full in order to stop external interference, prevent the Pakistani side's violations of their provisions, and draw the UN observers' attention to these violations. Our people, the document emphasizes, want to live in peace and good-neighborliness with neighboring countries, including Pakistan, Iran, and the PRC.

In messages sent to the peoples and parliaments of the world and to the UN secretary general, deputies of both chambers of parliament evaluated the Geneva agreements as the only way to a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan and as a guarantee of lasting peace and security in the region. The documents pointed out that Pakistan is maintaining armed opposition organizations on its territory and increasing military aid to the extremists, thereby increasingly fanning bloodshed. Pakistan's actions suggest that that country's government regards the fulfillment of the agreements as something earmarked exclusively for Afghanistan, whereas it demands the participation of the two sides. The messages contain a request for high international authority and moral influence to be brought to bear on the Pakistani authorities with a view to their rigorous observance of the letter and spirit of Geneva.

Soviet Initiative To Reconcile Egypt, Libya

JN2806143288 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 27 Jun 88 p 1

[Text] AL-ITTIHAD has learned that the USSR proposed a new initiative designed to bring about a reconciliation between Egypt and Libya a few days ago and that the Soviet ambassador in Cairo informed Egyptian officials of the contents of this initiative.

Informed political sources in Cairo told AL-ITTIHAD that the Soviet initiative is based on respect for international and regional conventions pertaining to good-neighborliness, respect for international borders, and noninterference of both states in each other's internal and external affairs. The sources added that the initiative also calls for the holding of a meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers in a country to be agreed upon by both states through Arab-Soviet contacts. According to the initiative, such a meeting would be followed by the restoration of diplomatic relations. The sources added that Vladimir Polyakov, chief of the Near Eastern and North African Countries Administration at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, has sounded out the views of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak on a possible Soviet role in bringing about an Egyptian-Libyan reconciliation during their recent meeting in Cairo.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Government Sends Drought Aid to Ethiopia

LD2406203388 Moscow TASS in English 1940 GMT 24 Jun 88

[Text] Assab, Ethiopia June 24 TASS—TASS correspondent Yegor Kuznetsov reports:

Rows of bales with wheat marked in red lettering "USSR" on each bale are clearly seen on wharves of the Ethiopian port of Assab on the coast of the Red Sea. The wharves are cramped with cargoes. The unloading of grain provided by the Soviet Union to the republic hit by drought is in full swing.

"The Land of Soviets has always come to Ethiopia's assistance at the times of trial", said representative of the commission for relief and restoration in Assab, Haile-Michael Kebebe. He accepted the cargoes of grain. "We have been put in a desperate position by drought. Just as at the times of the natural calamity for 1984-1985, the USSR promptly responded to the call for aid. 250 thousand tons of grain is nearly a quarter of the volume of food needed to prevent the perishing of masses of people from famine".

Beams of powerful cranes constantly move over the deck of the dry cargo ship "Novodruzhesk" which delivered another consignment of [word indistinct] thousand tons of wheat. "We sailed out on this run with particular enthusiasm," the TASS correspondent was told by shipmaster Nikolay Vaidayev. "We knew well how much this wheat is needed in Ethiopia. The crew realised that thousands of lives depend on our work. The motorship "Avdeyevka" with 24 thousand tons of grain on board is next to be unloaded. A vessel with 16 thousand tons of grain is approaching the harbour. It is recorded in the agreement on deliveries that grain from the USSR is a cargo of priority importance. But we have to wait for unloading for a long time. The port cannot handle the cargoes promptly. One wishes to believe that the Ethiopian side will cope with this problem". Food is part of urgent relief that the USSR gives to Ethiopia. The duration of the stay of a group of Aeroflot in Ethiopia has been extended. Soviet geologists are prospecting for water in arid districts. The total volume of aid in combating the natural disasters made up 40.5 million dollars.

ANC Issues National Protest Day Statement

LD2606120288 Moscow TASS in English 0644 GMT 26 Jun 88

[Text] Addis Ababa June 26 TASS—The refusal of the Botha regime to meet just demands of the African majority leads to the escalation of the conflict which is tearing the country apart. This is pointed out in a statement of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa circulated here on the occasion of the 38th anniversary of the National Protest Day. Our people are determined to continue the struggle against the apartheid system, for the putting into practice of the "Charter of Freedom", the statement said.

The purpose of this program document of ANC is to turn South Africa into a country where democracy, peace and friendship would reign. This is in line with the interests of all the countries of southern Africa. The statement denounced the recent act of aggression staged by the racists against independent Botswana and expressed gratitude to socialist countries, "frontline" countries and north European countries for their solidarity with the struggle against the shameful system of racial discrimination.

PRAVDA Correspondent Meets Somalian Leader

PM2806145188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 88 Second Edition p 7

[Special correspondent I. Tarutin dispatch under the "Travel Notes" rubric: "At the Edge of the Horn of Africa"]

[Excerpts] Mogadishu, Jun—The runway at Mogadishu Airport lay right along the very shore of the Indian Ocean. The ocean was choppy and even in the aircraft which had halted on the runway, one could hear the mighty threatening roar of the surf. Raising a great swell, the storm raged uninvitingly. You could not help thinking: What kind of reception awaits me in Somalia? For 11 years no Soviet journalist had been here, since the time when relations with our country were sharply severed and a time of protracted alienation set in following the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977. That is why it was necessary to, as it were, reopen up the country that has become an unknown entity to the reader. [passage omitted]

It is no coincidence that absolutely everyone whom I met in Somalia said that they were truly delighted at the resumption of diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and the start of the process of settling disagreements. Mohamed Siad Barre, the republic's president and general secretary of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, whom I met in his residence, also talked in detail about the establishment of a stable peace in the region.

"We want to live in friendship with our neighbors so that there is no more hostility," he said. "Somalia now has no claims to their territory, threatens no one, and proposes to seek just solutions, taking into consideration mutual interests. We advocate political settlement of existing problems. Our country sincerely wants to continue dialogue with Ethiopia."

"We need," the president continued, "to concentrate our efforts on boosting the economy and the social sphere and this is very important for the Somali people. We have achieved definite success here in education."

M. Siad Barre said that the resumption of cooperation with the USSR could have a positive effect here. Our disagreements were not provoked by hostility toward the Soviet people, the president stressed. It was a question of national interests. We are grateful to the Soviet Union for the help it offered us at one time and we want to renew the ties that were disrupted during the period of chill.

Somalis raised these topics constantly. There are many people here who were educated in the Soviet Union and they spoke warmly of our country. They were interested in everything taking place in our country, especially in the processes of restructuring. Many of these people hold senior posts in the party and administrative apparatus and in the Army. My interlocutors said that they view the situation realistically and realize that one can hardly achieve the level of cooperation of the seventies rapidly. But they pointed to the desire to lay the foundations for rapprochement.

The changes taking place in the Horn of Africa are indeed opening up new prospects in Soviet-Somali relations. Admittedly, I believe that there are also opponents of such friendship in Somalia. The West also has substantial levers for pressure. In short, various factors will have an effect although Somalia's more balanced foreign policy undoubtedly accords with the national interests of this country's people.

Supreme Soviet Presidium Cables Seychelles Leader

PM2806111588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Exchange of Telegrams"]

[Text] To mark the Seychelles national holiday—the 11th anniversary of liberation—the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has sent Seychelles President France Albert Rene a telegram conveying to him and the friendly Seychelles people sincere congratulations and best wishes on behalf of the Soviet people for further successes in national building, prosperity, and good fortune.

In an answering telegram, France Albert Rene expressed on behalf of the government and people of the Seychelles warm thanks for the congratulations.

Text of Greetings to Rwandan Party Congress

PM2806133188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 88 First Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee greetings to Rwandan party congress]

[Text] To the Sixth Congress of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development [MRND] (Republic of Rwanda)

The CPSU Central Committee greets the delegates to the latest, Sixth MRND Congress.

Soviet people follow with great sympathy and interest the efforts of the Rwandan people and their party—the MRND—in the cause of national building, strengthening political independence, and achieving the country's economic independence.

People in the Soviet Union value the relations of friendship and cooperation between the CPSU and the MRND and between the USSR and the Republic of Rwanda and advocate their further development on the basis of mutual respect, equality of rights, and solidarity. We note with satisfaction the proximity of the positions of the CPSU and the MRND on questions of the struggle for a nuclear-free and nonviolent world, against colonialism, racism, and apartheid, and for the establishment of a new international economic order.

The revolutionary restructuring which has developed in the Soviet Union in the interests of the qualitative renewal and improvement of socialism is having a beneficial impact on the situation in the world. The ideas and principles of the new thinking are receiving growing support in the international arena. Important positive changes are occurring in Soviet-U.S. relations. The age of real nuclear disarmament has begun with the entry into force of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The world is becoming safer, and all peoples—large and small—benefit from this.

We wish the latest, Sixth MRND Congress successful and fruitful work.

CPSU Central Committee

Briefs

Forestry Accord With Cameroon

Yaounde, 23 Jun (TASS)—The Soviet Union will assist Cameroon in modernizing its forestry engineering school in Mbalmayo and in building an institute for engineers specializing in water resources and forestry. This is provided for by a protocol on cooperation between the Governments of the USSR and Cameroon on training cadres for Cameroon's forestry. Guided by the provisions of the 12 April 1963 Soviet-Cameroon agreement on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, the governments of the two countries have agreed that Soviet organizations will carry out planning and surveying work, deliver equipment and materials, and send specialists to assist in carrying out building, assembly, start up, and adjustment work on the construction of the project provided for in the protocol. [Excerpt] [*LD2406023488 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0955 GMT 23 Jun 88*]

East Europe

Budapest, Bucharest Meetings on Nationalities

LD2806210088 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Jun 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Hungarian agency MTI reports that a peaceful demonstration was held in Budapest on the evening of 27 June by a group of citizens. Its participants, numbering 25-30,000, listened to an appeal and a memorandum that protested the measures planned by Romania to alter the territorial and administrative structure, in particular by eliminating small villages where citizens of Hungarian, German, and Romanian nationality live, and transferring them to larger settlements. The demonstration's participants, the agency notes, tried to make it clear that the action was not targeted against the Socialist Republic of Romania or the Romanian people, and that they were speaking out against a policy that puts obstacles in the way of observance of the rights of national minorities and that destroys the long-established culture of settlement. The participants in the demonstration intended to hand the relevant documents to representatives of the Romanian Embassy in Hungary, but they were not accepted.

The Romanian AGERPRES agency has reported that on 27 June in Bucharest, plenary meetings of the Hungarian Nationality Working People's Council and of the German Nationality Working People's Council were held. The meetings noted the consistency of the policy of the Romanian Communist Party and of the Romanian state to rationally deploy territorially the forces of production, and to economically and socially raise all the judets [territorial divisions in Romania] and zones of Romania, including those where Romanian citizens of Hungarian and German nationality live and work; also noted was the unfaltering concern to ensure equal working and living conditions for all of the country's citizens. Participants in the plenary meetings, AGERPRES notes, spoke of the consistent implementation of equality in the sociopolitical sense, and in the spheres of educational, cultural, and spiritual life. They also criticized material in the foreign press that tries to deny Romania's achievements in the years of socialism.

Paper Cites Ceausescu on Discipline, Democracy
PM2806132188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "For Criticism and Self-Criticism"]

[Text] Bucharest, 25 Jun—A working conference of the aktiv and leading cadres in the field of party organization and political ideological work has been held here. Members and candidate members of the RCP Central Committee Political Executive Committee, secretaries of the RCP Central Committee, secretaries of judet party committees, and other leading workers took part in it.

Addressing the conference, N. Ceausescu, secretary general of the RCP, pointed to the importance of strengthening party discipline, extensively discussing all social problems within the party, developing democracy, and creating conditions in which all Communists can openly state their opinions. It is necessary to launch a struggle against manifestations of careerism, parasitism, dishonesty, and other phenomena alien to socialism, the speaker noted. The RCP must ensure the most serious study and explanation of the new objective problems of socialism, worker-revolutionary democracy, the role of working people and the people's masses in running the state, and the problems of the present-day international situation. N. Ceausescu also advocated the further development of criticism and self-criticism within party ranks.

PRAVDA Describes Report on MSZMP Plenum
PM2806134388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "MSZMP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Budapest, 25 Jun—An information report on the MSZMP Central Committee Plenum held on 23 June this year under the chairmanship of Janos Kadar has been published here. It discussed and approved a working plan to fulfill the resolution of the All-Hungarian Party Conference and examined the questions of glasnost in the work of leading party organs, the results of the fulfillment of the law on elections and the amendments to it, and information on topical international issues and foreign policy tasks.

The report notes that responsible work and united action by the party and all Communists are needed in order to achieve the goals outlined in the All-Hungarian Party Conference resolution.

The document outlines a whole series of measures aimed at examining the level of information available to party members and the entire public on the work of MSZMP leading organs.

The plenum expressed the need to propose a number of changes to the law on elections with a view to expanding and deepening the democratization process in the country, and proposed that the changes to the law be submitted for public discussion.

The plenum examined the question of an exchange of letters between the MSZMP and the RCP and of the delineation of relations between the two countries.

The plenum adopted a resolution that makes a high assessment of the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow. The resolution states that the results of the summit have promoted the further easing of the international climate, the deepening of East-West cooperation, and thereby the improvement of the external conditions for the Hungarian people's creative labor. Mutual confidence has been strengthened as a result of the summit. The MSZMP Central Committee expressed support for Soviet initiatives—above all the proposals aimed at conventional armed forces and arms reduction in central Europe, in whose implementation Hungary is directly interested. The achievement of results in the development of USSR-U.S. bilateral cooperation will have a favorable impact on the shaping of the international situation as a whole.

Lushev Returns From Official Visit to Hungary
PM2806141188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Return to Moscow"]

[Text] On 24 June Army General P.G. Lushev, USSR first deputy minister of defense, returned to Moscow from Budapest after an official visit to Hungary.

At Sheremetyevo Airport, Army General P.G. Lushev was met by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, and Army General M.I. Sorokin, USSR deputy minister of defense.

Ryzhkov To Visit CSSR in Early Jul
LD2706154288 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Jun 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At the invitation of the CPCZ Central Committee and Government of the CSSR, Comrade Ryzhkov will make an official friendly visit to that country at the beginning of July.

Zaykov Meets With Prague City Party Leader

LD2806150988 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jun 88 p 1

[MOSTASS, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA report: "Foundation of Cooperation"]

[Text] The unity of the CPSU and the CPCZ and the unbreakable friendship of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia provide the firm foundation of fruitful cooperation between Communists and working people from the two fraternal capitals.

This was emphasized on 7 June during a meeting between L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, and M. Stepan, member of the CPCZ Central Committee Secretariat and first secretary of the Prague City Party Committee. During a frank and friendly conversation, they discussed the prospects for further development of collaboration between party and public organizations and labor collectives and the establishment of direct ties between enterprises and organizations from Moscow and Prague.

CSSR Ambassador to the USSR J. Rehorek took part in the meeting.

On the same day the visitor from Prague, who is in our capital at the Moscow CPSU Gorkom's invitation, visited the Sokolnicheskiy Railroad Car Repair Plant.

The first secretary of the Prague City Party Committee visited the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and laid a wreath. A wreath was also laid at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

The visitor from Prague departed for home in the afternoon. At Sheremetyevo Airport he was seen off by Yu.A. Belyakov, second secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, senior officials of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, and staff members of the CSSR Embassy in Moscow.

Bilak Greets Yasir 'Arafat on Arrival in Prague

LD2806080488 Moscow TASS in English 0656 GMT 28 Jun 88

[Text] Prague June 28 TASS—Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), arrived in Czechoslovakia on Monday for an official friendly visit.

At Prague Airport he was met by Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Tomas Travnicek, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front of Czechoslovakia, and by other officials.

Jaruzelski, Honecker Address Youth Rally

PM2806132988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meeting the Generations' Aspirations. Polish and German Youth Friendship Rally"]

[Text] Warsaw, 25 Jun—The prospects of a world without nuclear weapons—a world in which people will live in security—is currently crystallizing. This was stated by W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and chairman of the Polish Council of State, at a Polish and German youth friendship rally in Wroclaw in which E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, took part. The socialist countries, the speaker continued, are making a wide range of proposals in the sphere of cooperation and arms limitation. The CPSU's important initiatives are acquiring real outlines. They are giving a boost to new thinking in international politics and make it possible for young people to build the future with hope. A stable Poland with secure borders makes a constructive contribution to building a common European home. This is served by the Polish plan to reduce arms and strengthen confidence in central Europe—a plan whose goals are similar to the initiatives undertaken by the GDR Government and other socialist countries.

The rally was addressed by E. Honecker. Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact's coordinated foreign policy the GDR and Poland are pursuing an active course of ensuring peace and constructive cooperation in Europe, he said. That is why it is quite natural that we assess the results of the Moscow summit between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan as promising and inspiring. They strengthen us in our policy of pursuing a political dialogue and developing mutually advantageous cooperation. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is an important step on the road to a world without nuclear weapons. It accords with the interests of all peoples, as well as the aspirations of the young generation, who want to grow up in a world free from the nuclear or any other threat. The speaker noted the great importance of the international meeting on nuclear-free zones that ended in Berlin a few days ago.

W. Jaruzelski and E. Honecker, together with the leaders of the Polish and GDR socialist youth unions, signed a treaty of friendship between the two countries' young people.

Ambassador Presents Awards to SFRY Figures

LD2406055188 Moscow in Serbo-Croatian to Yugoslavia 1600 GMT 23 Jun 88

[Text] The jubilee medal, 70 years of the USSR Armed Forces, was presented at the Soviet Embassy in the SFRY today to a large group of Yugoslav People's Army generals, officers, and veterans of the national liberation

war against fascist invaders. This order was awarded to them for their meritorious service in the joint struggle against the common enemy during World War II, and for their active contribution to the development of cooperation and friendship between the people and armies of the two countries.

The recipients of the order include: People's Hero of Yugoslavia Nikola Ljubicic, a member of the Yugoslav Presidency; People's Hero of Yugoslavia Petar Gracanin, president of the Serbia SR Presidency; Colonel General Veljko Kadijevic, the Yugoslav federal secretary of national defense; Colonel General Stevan Mirkovic, Yugoslav People's Army chief of staff; and Vice Admiral Petar Simic, president of the LCY Organization Committee Presidium in the Yugoslav People's Army. The orders were presented by Viktor Maltsev, USSR ambassador to Yugoslavia.

West Europe

Gusev, FRG Businessmen Discuss Cooperation

LD2306224788 Moscow TASS in English 1922 GMT 23 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS—Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir Gusev today received president of Bison Werke firm Berndt Greten and president of Grecon firm, G. Greten.

Questions of the development of cooperation between Soviet enterprises and FRG firms in the manufacture of fiber boards, building materials, furniture and equipment for their manufacture, including the possibility of setting up joint ventures, were discussed during the meeting.

V. Gusev also received L. Jeschke, president of UHDE firm of the FRG. They discussed a wide range of questions of the development of cooperation, including the creation of new productions and reconstruction of the existing equipment on the basis of the latest world achievements in the area of chemical technologies.

Paper Views New FRG Defense Minister

PM2806110188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 4

[S. Guk "Rejoinder": "Rupert Scholz' Criterion"]

[Text] It has already become established that any defense minister of a West European NATO country must to a greater or lesser degree "emulate the Pentagon."

Rupert Scholz, the new head of the FRG military department, is no exception. Immediately after taking up office he made his first visit to the United States. There was no lack of public assurances of complete harmony and mutual understanding between him and his U.S. counterpart F. Carlucci. R. Scholz wholeheartedly supports NATO's present plans for modernization. Modernization planned on a grand scale: It provides for the replacement of a broad range of both nuclear and conventional arms.

But let us note that at the same time R. Scholz—fully in accordance with the spirit of the times—also advocates the speediest progress in Vienna, where the mandate for European disarmament talks is now being elaborated. This is indeed understandable: The sentiments of the public must be taken into consideration.

So, modernization on one hand and progress in Vienna on the other—a clear contradiction. But the minister does not trouble to seek arguments to explain it. Like M. Woerner, his predecessor, he spouts tirades of the type: "Soviet military doctrine continues to pursue the aim of making war possible." Or: The USSR "is continuing to expand" its "offensive potential." R. Scholz sees the idea of a common European home as a trap behind which lurk "anti-U.S. calculations." In general R. Scholz believes that the USSR's policy must be assessed not by words but "by actions."

Well, the FRG and its allies have a mass of opportunities for this. Take the following: The Soviet proposal to bring NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives to the negotiating table. Let them meet, exchange data, voice mutual claims and misgivings, and discuss how to finally rid Europe's inhabitants of the oppressive sense of mutual mistrust. This would be much better than filling the air with useless accusations of "threats" or "aggression." At the same time R. Scholz would be offered the longed-for opportunity of personally seeing whether Soviet proposals are sincere or whether they are sheer propaganda.

We are assured by people in the West that NATO does not oppose such a meeting in general. Yet as soon as it comes to concrete times for holding a meeting, something always gets in the way for NATO members. A strange situation, isn't it, especially if you take into consideration the FRG defense minister's burning desire to assess policy exclusively "by actions." However, perhaps R. Scholz extends his strict criterion only to the USSR in the belief that the principle of words according with actions is an unnecessary luxury for the West itself? In that case that approach explains a lot....

Discussion With FRG on Asia-Pacific Problems

PM2706115988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] USSR-FRG consultations on questions regarding the situation in the Asia and Pacific region were held at the USSR Foreign Ministry 20-21 June. They were conducted by G.V. Kireyev, chief of the USSR Foreign

Ministry Administration for the Socialist Countries of Asia, and Klaus Zeller, FRG Foreign Ministry representative on the problems of Asia.

The participants in the consultations were received by I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister.

Human Rights Consultations With UK Officials

PM2806141388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] In accordance with the agreement reached between the Soviet and British foreign ministers, consultations took place 23-24 June in Moscow between A.L. Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister, and D. Ratford, assistant under secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs for humanitarian problems and human rights.

Several proposals for setting up cooperation among specialists, scientists, and practical experts, as well as among public organizations, in these spheres were discussed in a constructive atmosphere.

Political & Social

19th All-Union CPSU Conference Proceedings

For coverage of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, see the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT Supplement published on 29 June and subsequent supplements.

Stepanakert Party Chief Claims Work Resuming

PM2806110388 Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Jun 88 p 4

[Own correspondent T. Kasumova report: "Stepanakert: People Returning to Work"]

[Text] Azerbaijan SSR—Numerous rallies were held in Stepanakert last Saturday and Sunday. Party workers and economic leaders speaking to them urged the city's working people to start work. This appeal, despite opposition from those who dislike the normalization of the situation in the city, was met with understanding.

On Monday morning, as promised the day before, many drivers of the Stepanakert Passenger Motor Transport Association took their busses out on the road. People ready to start work assembled at factory gates. A considerable number of them began work after a citywide rally and assemblies at enterprises.

A. Mikaelyan, secretary of the Stepanakert party gorkom, informed me by telephone that public and freight transport have started up, that almost half the workers in the footwear factory and construction administration have resumed work, and that the consumer service is functioning.

It is expected that the collectives of the remaining city enterprises—the Karabakh Silk Combine, the electrical equipment plant, garment and furniture factories, and a number of others—will start work on 28 June. There is much work ahead. A lot of effort is required to make up the difference.

Aliyev, Bagirov 'Bad Mistakes'

LD2706162988 Moscow TASS in English 1559 GMT 27 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow June 27 TASS—"The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are doing everything in their power to defuse tensions around Nagorno-Karabakh, to find the sole correct decision that would meet the interests of all the working people in that autonomous region, Armenia and Azerbaijan." A statement to this effect has been made today by Vyacheslav Mikhailov, deputy head of the department of the organizational-party work of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of inter-ethnic relations in the USSR. He met with newsmen in the press centre of the 19th all-union party conference.

A volitional resolution of national problems is unacceptable, Mikhailov believes. It can only do damage and result in a sharpening of inter-ethnic relations with grave consequences.

Recalling the history of establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, Vyacheslav Mikhailov admitted that at a certain stage in the development of that autonomous region, the local leaders, including Aliyev and Bagirov, the former first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan SSR, made bad mistakes, above all, of the national-cultural character. The complex of serious miscalculations created a socio-psychological climate, which adversely affected the frame of mind among the population, which then went out of control and assumed the character of mass actions, rallies and demonstrations, in which up to a hundred thousand people took part. Today's leadership is carrying out work among the masses to put an end to the strikes and return life to normal. Yet these efforts have been unsuccessful so far, he said.

"Now the examination of the issues around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region has been placed on the constitutional basis", Vyacheslav Mikhailov noted. Sessions of the Supreme Soviets of Armenia and Azerbaijan were held and most vigorous steps have been taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government. Thus the special decision on the socio-economic development of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region provides for the appropriation of 500 million roubles. These funds will be chiefly channelled to developing culture and eliminating economic deformations. Mikhailov recalled that a relay station of the Armenian television has been built and its programmes are now regularly watched in Nagorno-Karabakh. Measures have been taken for restoring monuments of architecture and developing public education.

Asked about the ways of resolving the problem, Vyacheslav Mikhailov noted that "Karabakh is a single whole, an integral entity. There are roughly 15-16 per cent of people in mixed wedlock between Armenians and Azerbaijanians. Partitioning Karabakh is tantamount to cutting in two parts a living organism."

At the request of newsmen Mikhailov spoke on the activities of the subdivision of inter-ethnic relations of the CPSU Central Committee, whose representative he is. He recalled that after the victory of the October Revolution there was the people's commissariat for the affairs of the nationalities, the party bodies had respective subdivisions, bureaus and sections. They acted effectively, made it possible to follow the real processes in that field and react to them timely. Yet later these institutions were closed. Now in the conditions of the drive for more democracy and glasnost, of the revolutionary renovation of the society, the CPSU Central

Committee has drawn the concluion that it is necessary to restore such institutions in the field of inter-ethnic relations, Vyacheslav Mikhailov emphasized.

Further on Work Resumption

LD2806114788 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 28 Jun 88

[Text] At the administrative center of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert, many plants and factories have begun to function again. Public transport and services resume their work. The activity of local facilities was disrupted by strikes and demonstrations. The participants called for annexing the autonomous region, populated mostly by Armenians, from Azerbiajan and for unifying it with neighboring Armenia. The council of Nagorno-Karabakh asked the Supreme Soviet to take the area under its own jurisdiction till it issues its final decision on the future status of the autonomous region.

Stepanakert Gorkom Secretary Visits Yerevan

LD2906061188 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 2030 GMT 28 Jun 88

[Text] A delegation from Stepanakert recently spent several days in Yerevan. It was headed by Hasmik Mikaelyan, secretary of the Stepanakert Gorkom, and included the following: Amalya Aghadzhanyan, weaver at the silk combine and a delegate to the 19th all-union party congress; Galya Peklaryan, a weaver at the same combine; Laura Gharayan, chairman of the oblast committee of the trade union of cultural workers; and Vardges Baghryan, senior editor of the oblast radio committee.

The delegation from Karabakh was entertained by workers collectives; it met and spoke with representatives of the workers of Yerevan, Leninakan, and Kirovakan.

Interviewed by our correspondent, Hasmik Mikaelyan said: For decades, the economic, cultural, and spiritual ties of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the motherland were broken. The people of Karabakh, in their very ancestral land, were deprived of even their written word and literature in their mother tongue. The Kevorkovian morass [reference to Boris Kevorkov, first secretary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Obkom until the February-March Karabakh events] left its mark on the oblast's educational system. Armenian schools were being closed one after another; the teaching of Armenian history was taken out of the school curricula; and Armenian children had no books in their mother tongue.

The well-known decision by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 24 March wrested away the black curtain that had for years kept us apart and had kept the Armenian man in the street and the Armenian intellectuals from sharing the pains that ailed the people of Karabakh. It exposed as lies the fraudulent assurance that the last few decades had been years of steady upsurge, flourishment, and development for Karabakh, assurances that there was not a single problem in the oblast and that both its national economy and its culture were developing, that the living standards were at an all time high.

Thanks to this decision—and through the efforts of Armenia—our children will have, as of the school year ahead of us, an assured supply of the necessary textbooks, a history and map of Nagorno-Karabakh. They will have everything they have been deprived of for decades.

The Nagorno-Karabakh delegation leader then said: I wish to note that we have gone through many emotions in recent months. Attempts were made by moral and administrative pressures to put down the first shoots of democracy and glasnost that had just begun budding and that are the will of the people of Karabakh. But the resolution by the 15 June Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet session on the unification of the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast with Armenia gave us new vigor, a new lease on life for what we are to do in the future. No one can now stand as an obstacle between us; no one can break—however they may try—the aspirations of the people of Karabakh. The resolution by the session in question satisfied the first part of the just demand of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and will prove to be a precious historic document, not only for those living today, but for generations to come.

Azerbaijan Resolution on NKAO Transfer Call

PM2806134088 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 18 Jun 88 p 1

["Resolution of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet: On the Petition of Deputies of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Soviet of Peoples Deputies for the Transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast From the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR" adopted at 17 June session of Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Having examined, in accordance with Article 78 of the USSR Constitution and Article 70 of the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution, the petition of deputies of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] Soviet of People's Deputies for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To approve the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolution of 13 June 1988 on the unacceptability of the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR. In this connection the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet is proceeding on the basis of international interests, the Leninist principles of strengthening the friendship and fraternal ties between the USSR's peoples, and the need to preserve the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR.

The resolution adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on 24 March 1988 "On Measures To Accelerate the Socioeconomic Development of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR in 1988-1995" and the measures being implemented by the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers create favorable conditions for accelerating the development of production forces and satisfying the economic and spiritual needs both of the Armenian and Azerbaijani population and of other nationalities in the autonomous oblast.

2. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, in response to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet's appeal and on the basis of the interests of preserving the country's established national territorial structure, which is enshrined in the USSR Constitution, guided by the principles of socialist internationalism, considers it impossible to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR, since this is contrary to the interests of the Azerbaijani and Armenian populations and other nations and ethnic groups of the oblast and republic and does not accord with the goals of strengthening the friendship of our country's peoples or the tasks of restructuring.

S. Tatliyev, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

R. Kaziyeva, secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Baku, 17 June 1988

Press Center Official Speaks on Nagorno-Karabakh

PM2906111388 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jun 88 p 8

[Report by "our special correspondents" R. Guseynov and A. Drozdov from 19th all-union party conference international press center: "Glasnost, Truth, Objectivity"—boldface as published]

[Excerpts] The atmosphere at international press centers changes surprisingly before and after the event in whose anticipation journalists gather. Rumors and speculation, suggestions and forecasts, are forgotten. Central Television is broadcasting direct from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses and the TASS teletypes are tapping out in various languages M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the conference. The paper tapes are being torn off before they have time to cool, so to speak. [passage omitted]

An earlier meeting with V. Mikhaylov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department, generated great interest among journalists and the press center's guests. And that was no accident. By virtue of his job, V. Mikhaylov heads the recently created party Central Committee subdivision which is concerned with national relations. Incidentally, in the first years of Soviet power in our country there existed a people's commissariat in charge of these problems, and a subdepartment and sectors existed in the party Central Committee, obkoms, and even large gorkoms. Right now, V. Mikhaylov indicated, similar subdepartments have already been created in several large party organizations, and they should probably be created in local soviets. A CPSU Central Committee plenum will soon examine important questions of national relations.

Answering a question about the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the reasons which gave rise to it, and the possibilities of finding a way out of the prevailing situation, V. Mikhaylov said:

"The situation which has taken shape in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has today grown beyond the framework of the two republics. It perturbs the Soviet people and many people in the world. Where are the roots of the inter-nation [mezhnatsionalnyy] conflict? A single answer would be wrong. It is essential to proceed from historical, economic, social, cultural, and legal roots. At a certain stage the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast became a nexus of contradictions, which merged into the conflict with which everyone is familiar.

Azerbaijan's former party and soviet leadership committed serious errors of a sociocultural order with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Not everything was done in the sphere of the economy, culture, and the conservation of monuments. The package of serious blunders created a certain sociopolitical climate which was reflected in the national self-awareness.

This led to the arousal of public opinion. The need for vigorous steps emerged, but that was not done. Public opinion turned into the channel of the idea of the oblast's secession and entry into Armenia. Strikes and demonstrations began. Today they are of an organized nature.

It is well known that this question has been placed on a constitutional path. Sessions of the Armenian and Azerbaijan Supreme Soviets have been held and their results have been reported in the press.

Right now vigorous steps have been taken by the central organs to resolve tasks of the socioeconomic sphere. State investments in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast's development total R500 million. It is necessary to create the material base for the development of the cultural and educational sphere.

Is there a way out of the existing situation?

"I am convinced," V. Mikhaylov said, "that the solution of the question can be seen in ensuring conditions and guarantees for the development of both the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples living in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The rights of any people should be

defended, wherever they may live. It is essential to perceive Nagorno-Karabakh as a unique corner of the intermingling of Western and Eastern cultures. For millenia the population of this region has intermingled and a unique culture has been created here. Today Nagorno-Karabakh is a single whole, a single organism. It cannot be sundered, cut up, or divided into two pieces."

Answering a question from AFP on the trials in Sumgait, V. Mikhaylov said that the investigations and trials in Sumgait will be continued. Sentences have now been passed in four cases. [passage omitted]

Bromley Views Nationalities Issues, Restructuring
PM2806101088 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 25 Jun 88 p 8

[Article by Academician Yulian Vladimirovich Bromley, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ethnography Institute, under the rubric "Nationalities Problems and Restructuring": "To Be a Cementing Force"]

[Text] Only recently, the idea that nationalities problems were losing their significance in the life of contemporary society was current both among theorists and in the mass consciousness. But real life demonstrated that these views are incorrect. The acceleration of the process of the peoples' economic, social, and spiritual development, the intensification of their contacts, and the exchange of information and values lead to the growth of national (ethnic) self-awareness. And that is a global phenomenon.

Our country has not remained unaffected by processes of this kind. In fact, in the sphere of the life of the nationalities, acute clashes have recently made themselves felt quite clearly (the Alma-Ata events, the demands of the Crimean Tatars, the demonstrations in the Baltic republics, events in and around Nagorno-Karabakh). This naturally could not fail to shock our social consciousness, giving rise to attempts to reinterpret the established ideas on nationalities processes in our country. And here we did not avoid extremes.

One extreme is the desire to deny the real achievements of the Leninist nationalities policy. True, it is not so easy to dispute such concrete gains as the historically unprecedented rate of the overcoming of socioeconomic backwardness by many nations and ethnic groups, the selfless assistance given by peoples more advanced in economic and sociocultural terms to the population of the country's formerly backward outlying districts, the progress of the culture of all nationalities, and the establishment of the socialist way of life. Since all this is obvious, doubt is cast on the cohesion of the nations, ethnic groups, and national groups inhabiting the USSR and on the very fact of the formation of the Soviet people as an integrated community of people.

The following explanation of the causes of the complex situations observed recently in the sphere of national relations can also be encountered: Restructuring, people say, is to blame; without it, such clashes would not happen. A dangerous delusion. The point is that before restructuring started, before there was glasnost, many negative phenomena in our society's life, including some in the sphere of nationalities, simply remained unknown to the broad public.

Today's problems in the sphere of national relations have historical roots that date largely from the era of I.V. Stalin's personality cult, when there were gross violations of the principles of democracy and internationalism and deviations from the fundamentals of Leninist nationalities policy. Remember the mass unjustified repressions in the republics, the forcible resettlement of a number of peoples, and so forth. While speaking the language of an opponent of assimilation, Stalin displayed in practice a patent desire to "simplify" the country's nationalities structure, a desire accompanied by a negative attitude to the very existence of national groups. A characteristic illustration of this is his assertion in the report on the draft USSR Constitution of 1936 that only 60 national communities exist in the country (whereas even today there are at least twice that number). It is no accident that it was at around that time that such forms of national administrative division as national rayons and national village soviets were abolished, whereas in the late twenties and early thirties there were more than 5,000 of them in various parts of the USSR.

Many of the difficulties of today's socioeconomic development of various regions of the country were caused by the command-and-administer, pancentrist management methods which became established back in the prewar years and took no account of specific national features, sometimes lacked elementary respect for the history, traditions, and needs of a particular nation or ethnic group, and were sometimes downright arbitrary in resolving nationalities questions. All this happened, there is no point denying it.

These problems were exacerbated during the period of Brezhnevism. In the seventies and early eighties the contribution of a number of republics to the country's economic development began to decline, and in some regions parasitic sentiments were manifested. The differentiation between republics in the development of the sociocultural infrastructure was intensified. Trends toward using the nationalities factor to obtain privileges were strengthened. A negative effect was exerted on national relations by unresolved social and consumer problems, the spread of favoritism and corruption, and violations of socialist legality. The departure from the principles of internationalism on questions of the training, education, and placing of cadres had its effect. In some republics, local "chiefs" ["vozhdi"], taking advantage of the special favor of the central leadership, to the accompaniment of toasts to the great and indissoluble friendship of peoples, created a climate that promoted sentiments of national exclusivity and privilege for representatives of one people to the detriment of another.

Restructuring exposed the deformations in society's life, many of which are manifested in the sphere of national relations. The process of democratization brought out into the open the formerly concealed seats of tension in relations between nations. At the same time the interests of people who had taken advantage of the former situation in the nationalities sphere were affected, which aroused their resistance.

Restructuring is called upon to guarantee the more active involvement of representatives of all regions and all peoples of our country in the process of its revolutionary transformation and to strengthen social justice in relations between peoples and between people of different nationalities. In this connection considerable significance is attached to the radical economic reform, which opens up wide opportunities for ensuring the best possible combination of the interests of the country as a whole and the individual republics. Here, of course, we must eliminate the excessive centralization of production contacts, extend the republics' autonomy in the use of local resources, and eliminate interrepublican barriers, ensuring a direct link between how much is produced and how much is consumed in each republic. In general, it is time to think about making the transition to the development of the sociocultural infrastructure of republics and oblasts on the basis of principles defined not by the status of the territorial administrative unit (union or autonomous republic, oblast, kray, and so forth), but by its real contribution to the country's national economy.

As the CPSU Central Committee Theses stress, "in practical terms there is a need to galvanize those institutions in the political system by means of which national interests should be revealed and coordinated." In this connection it seems expedient to revive, within the organs of legislative and executive power, special subunits in charge of questions of national relations, at both all-union and republican levels. In particular, it would be important to ensure that the commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, both standing and ad hoc commissions, do not duplicate the work of the commissions of the Soviet of the Union. I believe they should first and foremost review and resolve urgent questions of national life.

I think it is expedient to set up commissions or even chambers of nationalities in the Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics, which would discuss and resolve questions connected with satisfying the interests of the entire population living in a given territory. That would help restore Leninist norms of internationalism.

In my view the country's national state structure should be endowed with greater flexibility. Thought should be given, in particular, to the possibility of reviving national rayons and national village soviets. In any event, we need a special constitutional definition of the status of national groups (including their representation on legislative and executive organs, their right to education in the native language, the development of national culture, and so forth) forming the minority in a given republic or autonomous oblast and not belonging to the people which gave its name to the given republic or autonomous oblast. (In all, these groups comprise more than 55 million people—one-fifth of the country's entire population.)

A new, more flexible system of national administrative division of the USSR should be supplemented by various measures aimed at the development of the multinational population in the cities. Population groups in cities belonging to a different ethnic group from the main bulk of the city's population sometimes consist of tens or even hundreds of thousands of people, and such groups are most typical of the capitals of union republics and the majority of other large cities. One form of realizing the national cultural life of different national groups of the urban population could be corresponding cultural centers. The work of such associations could be organized on a self-financing basis (clubs, cafes specializing in national cuisine, folklore ensembles, and so forth) or could be supported by organizational and financial assistance from the union or autonomous republic in question.

It is important to elaborate constitutional provisions and corresponding legal acts aimed at establishing the equality of representatives of different nationalities and ensuring legal guarantees and the established principles of internationalism and intolerance of all national discord.

The practice of specifying nationality should also be more democratic and take account of people's actual self-awareness and the objective conditions of their education. I think the notorious entry on the questionnaire is far from obligatory. In any case, this entry is not always justified on all the documents where it features today.

In today's conditions exceptional significance is attached to the development of national and Russian bilingualism in the country. And one would have thought that this had been generally acknowledged long ago. There would be no need to dwell on the subject, were it not for the emergence of certain attempts, very worrying in my view, to scientifically substantiate, so to speak, the harmfulness of bilingualism, especially for children. Yet in reality the mastery of a second language (and even several languages) by children at an early age only promotes, as a rule, the development of their cognitive capacities (provided, of course, that the necessary standard of teaching in the languages is ensured). In this connection it is necessary to seek a radical improvement in the training of Russian language teachers from among representatives of non-Russian nationalites. Another factor of great importance is the study of the second (local) language by representatives of nonindigenous peoples living in a national republic (where the national composition so requires, of course), and this applies particularly to party aktiv workers, doctors, teachers, workers in the service sphere, and so forth.

A very important role in further rallying our country's peoples should be played by internationalist education, to which due attention should be devoted, from early childhood. Here, it must be admitted frankly, we suffer considerably from a dogmatic, mechanical, simplistic approach. It is necessary to seriously tackle the training of teaching cadres with specialized knowledge and a taste for educational work in precisely this area. Such education should be based on concrete knowledge of the culture, history, and language of our country's peoples. Here ethnographic and regional life museums are called upon to play an important role. It would be particularly timely to create such a museum in Moscow, so that all the diversity of the traditional cultures of the peoples living in our motherland are represented in its capital (incidentally, plans for the creation of such a museum were drawn up long ago, high authorities made decisions on founding it, and several times it was planned to allocate a special site, but all this still remains on paper).

A.V. Lunacharskiy noted, not without reason, that although mankind is moving toward the internationalization of culture, internationalism does not presuppose "the elimination of national motifs in the symphony of mankind, but only their rich and free harmonization."

Attempts to reduce internationalism merely to the question of the peoples' equality lead to a clear distortion of its essence. In reality the most important component of true internationalism is the idea of the close unification of peoples. "Proletarians of all countries, unite!"—that extremely succinct formula expressed the basic idea of internationalism. As V.I. Lenin stressed, petty bourgeois nationalism "regards internationalism as the recognition of the nations' equality and nothing more, while (to say nothing of the purely verbal nature of that recognition) national egotism remains inviolate."

Basically the tendency, mentioned at the beginning of this article, to deny the very fact of the rallying of all the nationalities living in the country into a special community—the Soviet people—in the years of Soviet power constitutes an attack on the idea of socialist internationalism. Either it is claimed that this community has yet to develop, or else belonging to the Soviet people is interpreted as meaning merely citizenship of the USSR. Yet it is hardly necessary to produce special evidence to prove that the Soviet people, along with their state political unity, are united by their way of life, unity of political views, and identity of ideological positions and sociopsychological features. The commonality of our views, interests, and moral principles is manifested not only in the sphere of professional art and literature, but also in day-to-day spiritual life, from the common Soviet revolutionary traditions, festivals, rites, and customs to ethical rules. Alongside their national self-awareness, Soviet people also have a common Soviet self-awareness, an important component of which is the idea of the special commonality of their historical fate in the Soviet era. It is no accident that all our people, irrespective of nationality, are now so keenly concerned for the truthful publicizing of Soviet society's history. The material basis for this unity of Soviet people, as the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th party conference stress, is a successfully operating, integrated national economic complex.

I think a negative role was played in the emergence of a certain skepticism about the reality of the Soviet people as a new community by the trend, characteristic of our social sciences literature, to attach absolute significance to the uniqueness of this community, and also by a rather oversimplified definition of its essential features. The fact that many similar international or, more accurately, metaethnic communities are well known in mankind's many thousand years of history is virtually ignored. Such communities also exist today in a number of developing countries (for instance, the Indian people, the Indonesian people, and so forth) and in capitalist countries—the Swiss people, for instance. The Soviet people as a metaethnic community is not an extraordinary phenomenon, but an entirely natural one. And, like all its analogues, far from precluding, it presupposes the preservation of the main ethnic subdivisions, in this case nations. As a metaethnic community, the Soviet people is distinguished by fundamentally different social (socialist) parameters. And when we say that the Soviet people is a new community, we mean not only that this community did not formerly exist, we also refer to its social nature, which had no precedent among similar formations. Thus from the moment of the emergence of other socialist metaethnic communities (for instance, the Yugoslav people, the Vietnamese people), the Soviet people belongs to the same historical and typological class as them in terms of its social parameters too.

It is necessary to dwell particularly on all this because the denial of the real unity of more than 100 nationalities, which has withstood the severest tests both in the war years and in peacetime, by no means fits in with restructuring. It is no accident that the opponents of socialism gamble on the attempt to weaken our cohesion and unity. That is why the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference contain an appeal to Communists of all nationalities to continue to be a "cementing force, the soul of the great socialist union of our country's peoples."

There are no irreconcilable contradictions between our country's peoples. The deformations in the sphere of national relations were caused to a significant degree by mistakes and stagnation phenomena in the sphere of the economy, the underestimation of the significance of social policy, and the violation of the principles of social justice, democracy, and internationalism. Therefore for the further harmonious development of national relations in the USSR paramount significance is attached to the CPSU's revolutionary renewal of Soviet society: the acceleration of its socioeconomic development, the restructuring of public life, a strong social policy, and the

expansion of democracy. In other words, the resolution of precisely those tasks whose active implementation should be promoted by the 19th party conference.

Restructuring Exacerbates Nationality Problems
PM2306111188 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jun 88 p 2

[Interview with Professor R.I. Khasbulatov by special correspondent Stanislav Oganyan under the "Social Portrait of a Phenomenon" rubric: "The Nationalities Question"; date and place not given—first paragraph is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction; boldface as published]

[Text] "Our 5-year plans are Lenin's policy of friendship among the peoples translated into the language of the economy." Until quite recently, such slogans were proudly sported in many cities. But it has now suddenly become clear that the language of our economy is not very plain and that relations among the nationalities are not so impeccable.... Our special correspondent Stanislav Oganyan here discusses the causes of these phenomena with Professor R.I. Khasbulatov, doctor of economic sciences.

[Oganyan] Ruslan Imranovich, it is already clear today that we were too hasty in drawing the conclusion that harmony had been achieved in national relations. This has been shown by recent incidents. You are an economist. Let us discuss this difficult topic from an economist's standpoint....

[Khasbulatov] I am far from appreciating the "subtleties" and "nuances" of the question as deeply as I would like. I accept your suggestion that I discuss the problem as an economist, since I see primarily an economic aspect in the trend toward a certain increase in national clashes.

[Oganyan] Is it correct to see the economic aspect as the determining factor? Should not the "national factor" be regarded as an independent force?

[Khasbulatov] "Nothing comes from nothing".... Everything has a beginning. It is well known that wherever real, actual equality of people exists—and economic equality is the prime basis and foundation of all equality—there are few conflicts. There you mostly observe a harmony of interests. Why? Because everyone's interests are served to the same degree. It is not important what sort of collective this is, whether it is composed of one or many nationalities. In a multinational collective, however, the element of inequality is made worse and further complicated by suspicions and national discrimination. And if the problem is not fundamentally solved, that is, if genuine equality for all is not ensured in practice, the national factor, acquiring additional layers, contradictions, and complications, turns into a really independent, self-sufficient, autonomous force, quite often confusing the very nature of the question.

[Oganyan] It would be good if you could illustrate this situation by means of a specific example....

[Khasbulatov] If I may, I'll use the example of my own life. My childhood was spent in the extreme north of Kazakhstan, in the small village of Poludino, where we Chechens were resettled in February 1944 with the status of "special migrants." The village was inevitably an international one. Aside from our family—my mother and two of my elder brothers and sisters—several other families of our relatives, former fellow villagers, around 3 dozen families from the former Volga German ASSR, Koreans, and Tatars took up residence there. With an absolute preponderance of the Russian population.

We lived there about 10 years. And I do not remember a single nationally motivated incident or insult. And yet we were "special migrants".... Why in this case was there a disparity between the official state position, as embodied in the violence done to us, and public opinion in this small, Godforsaken village? I find the answer precisely in our actual equality with all the inhabitants of the village.

Judge for yourself. From the age of 5 or 6, I, like other boys, helped my mother as much as I could. My mother worked as a kolkhoz milkmaid and I (like, I repeat, others) did what I could: I fetched water from the deep well, gave water to the cows, cleaned the cowsheds in winter, and tended the calves at temperatures of 40 below zero. I carted the hay, traveled to the forest for wood, and so forth. Everyone in the village was in the same situation—equally poor. Everyone experienced shortages, particularly of bread—labor-day credits were basically meaningless....

The mothers of the other kids—Russians, Kazakhs, Germans, Koreans....—also worked alongside my own mother until they were utterly exhausted. My first teacher, Vera Vladimirovna, came to our home almost every day, tramping a good 5 km. Why did she take trouble over a boy from a family of criminals? She could easily have left me out. I think about her and am aware that it was on her part a lesson in genuine internationalism and human kindness.

In my mind, I associate the authorities with 2 or 3 team leaders and the kolkhoz chairman. They were strict but fair people. They worked alongside kolkhoz members when the situation demanded it. My mother was not insulted, but, on the contrary, was encouraged and received the accolade of best milkmaid. Of course, this was "equality of the poor." But it was equality for everyone and by its very nature excluded grounds for national conflicts.

[Oganyan] I may be oversimplifying, but is it not the case that distortions in people's national consciousness begin as soon as a certain material level is achieved?

[Khasbulatov] The following question is fundamental: What are the sources of material prosperity? If someone achieves everything by honest labor, he, as a rule, obtains a genuine material base for development and self-improvement, acquires mental self-assurance, and becomes

more decisive and bold in social life. But if this prosperity comes to him as a result of intrigues, speculation, and corruption, such a person, who was previously poor and downtrodden does not become spiritually rich. The danger of such people is that they inevitably sow evil around them. The nouveaux riches have the material potential to reproduce on an increasing scale their own moral worthlessness in others, spreading and expanding this process in every possible way.

Here, it seems to me, is one of the reasons why the "zones of corruption" spread so rapidly in the seventies. Dishonest, unprincipled people not only wielded power, but amassed large fortunes. It was the combination of power and wealth in the hands of unprincipled people that led to the formation of a powerful shock force consisting of a large number of the most diverse figures organizationally united by ramified informal ties and common, if you wish, political and economic goals (retaining power and ensuring the functioning of clandestine channels for pumping out money and assets). This "shock force" struck heavy blows not only against the country's economy (it should not be thought we are talking about trivial damage) but also against society's moral well-being by corrupting, depraving, and debasing thousands upon thousands of people.

[Oganyan] If we may digress a little from the purely economic aspect of the problem, what, in your opinion, is causing the outbreaks of nationalism? What is the nature of them?

[Khasbulatov] There are many reasons. I do not intend to talk about all of them. However, the Leninist methodological approach in analyzing such situations is important. It amounts to the following: Never seek under any circumstances to make a people a scapegoat. This Leninist method has been well and truly discarded by our "provincial Dantons and republican Robespierres," who shift all the blame on to the people while placing the "leadership," whose senseless actions are responsible for offending national pride and self-esteem, beyond criticism.

Right, let's leaf through the 26 January 1988 issue of the newspaper GROZNENSKIY RABOCHIY. A party obkom plenum is in progress. The leadership of restructuring is on the agenda. But what do we have? Instead of analyzing the present-day situation, the keynote speaker returns to the "troubled" times of that tragic year of 1944 and begins dilating on how the enemies (to wit, the Chechens and the Ingushes) foully stabbed the Red Army in the back, on how many gangs there were, their numbers, armaments, equipment, and so forth. Indeed, even to me, who has never lived in the republic, it is unpleasant to read all this. So what must it be like for the inhabitants of Chechen-Ingushetia?

However, let us get to the bottom of these "gangs." They "appeared" as a result of forgeries produced by Beriya, Stalin, and their local hangers-on. The criminal idea of the "guilt" of the people and of their aiding and abetting the enemy was cooked up. But the truth triumphed. The people were completely rehabilitated, and almost 30 years have elapsed since then. But talk about "gangs" has developed a life of its own and roams freely abroad, bent on wreaking vengeance on the whole people and "executing" them. From time to time, local figures also manage to slip their mendacious trashy articles into the central press. One wonders what is behind the "broadside"? I think that what we have here is a recrudescence of "local Stalinism"—attempts to intimidate and put everyone "in their place": "You are guilty nevertheless...." Is this not the cause of local Chechen and Ingush leaders' unusual, indeed pathological, fear of being called "nationalists"? They cannot and do not want to employ their own native language on television or in the local press. They are even proud of this. And as for leaders of Russian extraction, most of them know the language of the native people even worse. Indeed, you might suppose that Comrade Kolbin, who learned the Georgian language while working in Georgia and has now learned Kazakh, is less busy than certain officials from Chechen-Ingushetia.

It is no wonder that this republic was criticized on many counts at the CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum. No wonder. And the aforementioned obkom plenum, judging by the speeches by its participants carried in the newspaper, developed into a heated exchange among obkom members on secondary issues. The main questions worrying the population—the real progess of restructuring in the republic, malfunctions in its economy, the worsening environmental situation, social, cultural, and consumer affairs, and so forth—were not discussed. All this has its own explanation. All this stems from certain motives and specific interests....

[Oganyan] You have begun talking about "interests." I see the crux of the problem in even more concrete terms—as residing in economic interest, which the local leader can realize only by holding on to real power. It is becoming increasingly difficult to do this: The party is firmly demanding the democratization of all spheres of life, including such an important aspect as the decision-making process. Local personnel are seeking to monopolize this right and restrict it to a narrow range of people. This can easily lead many people to corruption—it provides access to undeserved material benefits, makes it possible to carry out actions incompatible with the law, and exempts them from punishment. We are talking here, as I understand it, about those who are resisting, those who are not suited by the aims of restructuring.

[Khasbulatov] The CPSU Central Committee general secretary constantly reminds us that restructuring has to be fought for. Against whom? There would obviously be no need to fight if there were no opposition. Marxism teaches that no one ever voluntarily gives up power. And, after all, the struggle is essentially being waged for power. Between whom? Between a bureaucracy that wants no checks on itself and the healthy forces of society roused by the party to seek the return of Leninist norms of life, true people's power, and self-management.

One should not wait for the automatic "introduction" of democratization. Such hopes are dangerous and induce a nonchalant attitude, an underestimation of the structure of real power and management that has developed over 6 decades, which I designate by the abbreviation ABS.

[Oganyan] Do you mean ABC?

[Khasbulatov] No. Simply ABS: The administrative-bureaucratic system. The term "administrative system" does not fully reflect the nature of the all-powerful mechanism that operates according to the classic canons of bureaucracy. This system will first set out to topple democracy and, second, will adapt itself to it. The ABS has a very highly developed talent for mimicry. I, however, am an optimist, I believe that our plans in the economic, social, scientific, and technical spheres will be implemented sooner or later. But there is a serious danger here. As these plans are implemented and the democratic process deepens, we must be prepared for the fact that we will increasingly be confronted by problems of national relations.

[Oganyan] Why? Surely the solution of the main tasks of restructuring is in the national interests of our peoples?

[Khasbulatov] The contradiction here is only apparent. I think that the very "schema" for managing national relations, which has been distorted by deviations from Leninist approaches, inevitably leads to a contradiction with the present-day practice of deepening the democratic foundations of our society. Constitutions are just constitutions, but the procedure for managing the national republics operating from the time of Stalin has consisted of the following. A narrow circle of people enjoying the "special trust" of the curators from the center emerges in the republics. And it is through these "proxies" that the management of national republics is essentially carried out. That, incidentally, is why the removal of these people from the scope of monitoring signified the removal of whole oblasts, krays, and republics from the "sphere of criticism."

The prevailing procedure is increasingly coming into conflict with the demands of the country's new political course. And the local bureaucracy is afraid of losing the time-tested levers of power and influence. And it will fight to hold on to its positions. To be precise, it will not fight, it is already fighting. And this struggle is taking on a national, nationalist hue.

[Oganyan] How, incidentally, do you explain the fact that nationalist excesses particularly manifest themselves among the young? Can this be put down to their age? Or to inadequacies in international education? Your account of the circumstances of your childhood is undoubtedly instructive, but this "scheme" scarcely explains all the complexity of the question.

[Khasbulatov] A sense of national pride should be characteristic of everyone—as an indispensable element of patriotic and international education in general. People's formation begins with love for the land where they were born, their street, their fellow countrymen. The development of such a humanist apprehension of the world basically begins with local and national elements and then becomes more complex and develops into something international. It is important that young people's apprehension of actual reality should not be deformed at any stage. It is important that the environment in which people grow up should possess a correct world outlook and accurate social guidelines; if not, excesses, above all among young people, who are the most unstable and most active section of the people and nation, are inevitable. Here we should also say something about "great nation" nationalism, that is to say, chauvinism.

[Oganyan] Do you consider that there are any grounds for this?

[Khasbulatov] Our whole discussion about nationalism is simply inconceivable unless it is linked with chauvinism. What is chauvinism? It is the nationalism of a large nation toward a smaller one. Furthermore, any nation can find itself in this role. It is a question of dialectics. We have already spoken about my native Chechen-Ingushetia. Well, the Chechens, who are the largest national community in the republic, act to some extent from chauvinist positions with regard to other national minorities. That includes the local Russian population, too. Purely because of this complex combination of a large number of aspects, the character of chauvinist and nationalist phenomena in the republic cannot be assessed according to some simplified "scheme," as, unfortunately, local "specialists" do.

Lenin showed merciless intolerance toward chauvinist phenomena on the part of leaders. "Comrade Kamenev! I declare war on Great Russian chauvinism...." He wrote in a note soon after the well-known "Georgian incident." He was outraged by the conduct of Stalin, who connived with chauvinists. Lenin was also correct in his observation on those people from the "minor" nations who were marked by heightened revolutionariness. As for "overdoing" the nationalities question, Lenin pointed out, these people sometimes become even greater chauvinists than the most diehard Russian chauvinists. His observation has lost none of its value today. Bureaucracy in the national republics is particularly dangerous and its consequences can be catastrophic. Some forms of its extreme manifestations were revealed recently in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, where for many years special zones exempt from control or criticism had operated. What do these facts show us first and foremost? That the local, national bureaucracy can operate and be constituted solely with the support of its comrades from the "center." Such a closing of ranks in years gone by enabled that bureaucracy to hold sway totally and with impunity, and now it is trying to block restructuring.

[Oganyan] It is said that there is a threat to restructuring from another direction, too. What I have in mind is the situation related to Nagorno-Karabakh. But people know that events like the current ones also happened in the past. We know about the situation in the Baltic and Yakutia. Remember how in 1973 the Ingushes actively demonstrated to demand the return of the rayon in North Osetia which had been their traditional home right up to their deportation in February 1944. True, the press could not report those facts then.

[Khasbulatov] It is self-evident that nationalities questions should not be reduced to purely "economic interest" and economic relations. But nevertheless, these events do establish an open and direct link between the concepts of the "national" and the "economic" and their interdependence.

If these complex processes are assessed correctly, the political decisions will be that much more correct, too—in the sense that each people must be given a real opportunity to live in accordance with their national aspirations. Otherwise, pressure "from above" will cause strong resistance "from below." Such a "scheme" for resolving national problems is contradicted by present day reality. Restructuring in this case may be dangerously "afflicted" with a throwback to the past, which still has quite a few active supporters.

[Oganyan] Does this not explain the talk about a certain impasse supposedly created in national relations?

[Khasbulatov] I foresee neither an impasse nor a crisis for the new course. The recent past is a different matter. In the Political Report to the 27th party congress, it was characterized as pre-crisis. It would be wrong to link this situation solely with the economy. It also exists in the sphere of nationalities policy. Thus to speak about an impasse or a threat to restructuring in connection with, for example, Karabakh, is to turn the problem upside down.

The situation in Karabakh reflects the policy of past years, when nationalities questions and problems were resolved by administrative-bureaucratic methods and by pressure. That is why I believe that the search for a solution to the questions raised by Karabakh (and not only Karabakh) should not be linked directly with the events there. The most important thing is the actual course of democratization and the tasks of reforming the state's political system—that is, those problems which will be discussed at the 19th party conference.

Under present-day conditions the administrative-bureaucratic system by itself stimulates national discontent. It seems to provoke people of its own accord and wounds their national feelings. Thus, the path of democratizing state institutions is the main direction for rebuilding the national relations distorted in the past.

[Oganyan] How did Lenin and Stalin differ in their definition of the national "portrait" of the Soviet state?

[Khasbulatov] Briefly, Lenin saw the new state as a union of republics with absolutely equal rights. Stalin defended the idea of "autonomization," that is, the entry of the present union republics into the RSFSR as autonomous republics with "reduced" rights. In this respect Stalin was literally obsessed with this idea—taking advantage of Lenin's illness, he tried to speed up the "passage" of the relevant documents through the official channels. It took Lenin's vigorous intervention to ensure that the principle of a union of members with equal rights prevailed. The atmosphere of those days is shown to a certain extent by the following two notes.

Kamenev to Stalin: "Ilich went to war to defend independence." Stalin to Kamenev: "I think that firmness against Ilich is necessary."

Previously he had not spoken in those terms.

Lenin wrote at that time: "Obviously, the whole business of 'autonomization' was radically wrong and badly timed.... I think Stalin's haste and enthusiasm for pure administration as well as his spite against the notorious 'social nationalism' played a fatal role here. Spite as a rule is a very bad thing in politics."

Stalin, of course, had no intention of revising his views on the nationalities question—what for? His idea of "autonomization," officially rejected by the constitution, triumphed in practice. Many elements of the old "tsarist" model of management through placemen were effectively restored, placemen who, like puppets, were replaced and appointed on the orders of the supreme administrator and transferred from republic to republic until they bored him. They usually ended their lives in camps. Meanwhile a great game was in progress. Borders were redrawn, peoples were resettled. Thus many decades ago the foundations of those selfsame "complications" on the national question which we are meeting today were laid.

The model created in Stalin's day for the management of the national republics accurately reflected the principles of action and the spirit of the administrative-bureaucratic system itself and the regime of personal power. The instruments of policy were coercion and harsh suppression of even the hint of dissatisfaction. In such a system there were and could be no "contradictions." But they suddenly surfaced as soon as the regime began to acquire liberal nuances—even during Khrushchev's time. Under conditions of the present-day democratization and our attempts to return to Lenin's norms of life those old contradictions are coming to light. There is nothing abnormal in that.

Lenin's constant appeals for caution on the nationalities question, for consideration of people's mood and wishes, and for "no haste" had nothing in common with the "national liberalism" which Stalin wanted to impute to him.

[Oganyan] But he did not do that—instead he rewrote Lenin's behests. The result is what we have today. Which is primarily what you called the administrative-bureaucratic system, which must be destroyed. After all, that system itself has already caused so much harm....

[Khasbulatov] Take, for example, the notorious policy of the concentration of the population. We can see its consequences everywhere. But especially in the RSFSR's non-Chernozem zone. The abandoned homes and construction sites, the decay of economic life, the old people living out their lives in the desolation of once large and wealthy villages. People are being driven off the land. And what is being done with that land, with nature? Look at the tragedy of Kara-Bogaz-Gol, the Aral Sea, the Caspian region, the Karakalpak ASSR, Lake Sevan, Georgia's mountain villages, the "battles" for Lake Baykal, the threat to Lake Balkhash, the Dnepr region, the Kurshskaya sand bank in the Baltic....

When these "local" and "global" projects were being carried out, no one took any interest in the opinion of the peoples who had inhabited those lands for centuries. The idea of "autonomization," which led to people being completely pushed aside and to the disregarding of the "national factor" in such questions as the decisionmaking process, freed our administrators from that "chimera." All this greatly distorts the very process of molding people's national consciousness, it "programs distortions" and causes a loss of trust in the authorities from "Moscow." The deformation of socioeconomic relations cannot fail to deform national relations, too.

[Oganyan] Ruslan Imranovich! Much has been written in the West in recent years about the powerful influence of the "religious factor" on a section of the population in the national republics, including young people. How justified is all this?

[Khasbulatov] It is possible that religion has some influence, but I am not sure that it is so substantial as to classify it a "factor." When the Polish prelate Wojtyla became pope, people began talking about a growth of Catholicism in the Baltic. The fact is that some workers and even researchers do try to form something of a direct link between emerging "distortions" and problems in national relations and the concept of "religious fanaticism." This, of course, is an oversimplification of the problem.

Nationalism is by no means always correctly linked with religion or the system of religious views. Incidentally, true believers—Christians, Muslims, Jews, and so forth—are tolerant toward other faiths and, accordingly, toward those who profess those faiths—people of different nationalities. Religion is often merely a form of expression for particular social processes and tendencies.

Many people seek in religion a solace for pain and suffering. Perhaps some do not like that explanation. But this is the reality, which must be overcome, as is being done now in the difficult battles for the democratization of our state and public life. In my opinion, therefore, some representatives of the national republics should not try to link the relative increase in the number of believers with nationalist or chauvinist manifestations. It is futile to try to explain these processes in terms of the "nonsocialist nature" of their people, their particular adherence to "religion," "rites," "traditions," and so forth. All these negative processes reflect the low standard of work of local organs of power, the consequences of their lack of intellect and intelligence, genuine goodness and conscientiousness. All other assessments divert us from the root of the problem and complicate the search for a solution.

Some who seek to overthrow religion even demand in their administrative zeal the abolition of funeral ceremonies, marriage rites (this is not a question of kalym [Turkic bride price] of course), and of national traditions sanctified over centuries. The traditions without which, as Rasul Gamzatov said, a republic is like a procurement office.

[Oganyan] Our conversation is coming to an end. Its theme is truly immense. We could talk about how the distortions of planning led to certain republics developing in a one-sided way, toward monoculture. The problem of how to conduct referendums which would give a clear idea of the people's will and opinion on the most important aspects of the state's activity is also interesting. But to close, I would like to ask you the following question: Restructuring is in progress in the republics—what trends are coming to light in this process?

[Khasbulatov] Paradoxical trends: Restructuring is taking place against a background of ever-increasing administrative pressure from the "center"—which is necessary at the moment. Otherwise the administrative-bureaucratic system which has formed will not be broken. As for the periphery, I see the following situation taking shape. The "center," acting on the party's political guidelines, is trying to reject—in my view somewhat prematurely—management methods based on "pressure." The "periphery," while interpreting with satisfaction the "center's" new attitude as an expansion of its rights, is at the same time in no hurry to make the next "move"—to transfer greater rights to grassroots links. Thereby it demonstrates a lack of desire in general to put into practice the whole complex of large-scale changes corresponding to the tasks of restructuring. This conceals a great danger: Since the local authorities see a relaxation of the pressure "from above," they acquire more opportunities to block actions within the framework of restructuring which in their view are undesirable.

I would not like these tendencies to go unnoticed at the "center." Otherwise the "provinces", in alliance with the administrative-bureaucratic system, may really become the vendee of our restructuring. At the present transitional stage, there must be no weakening of the political pressure on the national republics and oblasts—at any rate, not on questions of national relations, democracy, and cadre policy. Quite the reverse, it is necessary to intensify that pressure and to rigidly monitor the implementation of measures which ensure the fulfillment of party decisions. But after the "transitional period," when new, democratic institutions begin to operate on a par with the new economic mechanism, all pressure from the "center" will be simply superfluous.

[Oganyan] Thank you for talking to me.

Warning Against 'Class Hatred', Intolerance Cited

PM2106144388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 6

[A. Nikolayeva translation of interview with Bengali poet R. Tagore under the heading "On Freedom, Disagreement, and Different Opinions" and the rubric "First Publication of Interview With R. Tagore Given to IZVESTIYA 58 Years Ago" with introduction (first paragraph) by S. Serebryanyy, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.M. Gorkiy World Literature Institute]

[Excerpts] The great Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) visited our country in September 1930. He spent two weeks in Moscow, met with literary figures, diplomats, artists, musicians, teachers, scientists, Pioneers, and peasants, and also visited theaters, exhibitions, and concerts. On the day of his departure from Moscow, 25 September, Tagore gave an interview to an IZVESTIYA correspondent. But it was not published in Russian either in 1930 or later. The reasons? You can perhaps divine them after reading this interview. [passage omitted]

Answering a question about his general impressions from his stay in the Soviet Union, Rabindranath Tagore said:

I would like to point out how deeply I have been struck by the amazing concentration of your efforts to spread education among the masses, by the extremely sensible directions in which you are leading this work, and also by the variety of opportunities available to improve the mind, soul, and body. I value this particularly highly because I belong to a country where millions of my compatriots are denied the light which could give them an education. For people all other advantages which have to be introduced or imposed from outside and are superficial are like paints and patches, which never reflect glowing health but merely conceal the pallor of the skin without enriching the blood. You have grasped the truth that to eradicate all social ills you have to pull them up by the roots, which can only be achieved through education and not by police truncheons and military oppression.

However, I have found here certain contradictions with the great mission you have undertaken. A way of thinking is being cultivated which is at variance with your ideal.

I must ask you this: Are you helping your ideal by inciting anger, class hatred, and a desire to wreak vengeance against anyone who does not share your ideal and against those you regard as your enemies in the minds of the people whom you instruct? It is true that you have to struggle against difficulties and overcome ignorance and a lack of sympathy, even constant, malicious antagonism. However, your mission is not confined to your own country or party—it lies in improving mankind in the spirit of your light. But does mankind not also include people who do not agree with your goal? Just as you are trying to help peasants who hold views different to your own in religion, the economy, and social life by patiently teaching them and showing them the source of evil, without any deadly malice, should you not conduct your mission similarly in respect of those other people whose ideals differ from your own? You may feel these ideals are wrong, but they are rooted in history and have become inevitable by force of the confluence of circumstances. You may consider a person who defines these ideas as being on the wrong path. However all the more must it become part of your task to reconvince him by your participation and love, coming from a knowledge that they, like the peasants whom you serve, are a part of mankind.

If you begin to focus excessive attention on some mistaken theses in the positions of your opponents and take the position that they have inherited them by their human nature and deserve eternal damnation, you will come to a manner of thinking which in its hatred and vengefulness can one day harm your own ideal and extinguish it. You are serving a great cause. Therefore you must be great in your thoughts, in your mercy, your understanding and patience. I am deeply enraptured by the greatness of what you are trying to do. Therefore I cannot but expect that the moving force of it is love and an atmosphere of philanthropic understanding.

There must be disagreement wherever there is freedom of thought. If all our opinions were forcibly made the same, it would not only be an uninteresting world but a sterile world of mechanical regulation. If you are faced with a task which includes all mankind, you must recognize the existence of different opinions for the sake of this living humanity. Opinions are constantly changing simply as a result of the free movement of intellectual forces and moral persuasion. Violence generates violence

and blind stupidity. Freedom of thought is necessary to comprehend the truth; terror inevitably kills it. An animal cannot subjugate another animal. Only man can do this.

Before leaving your country, allow me to assure you once again that I admire everything you are doing to liberate those who were enslaved and uplift those who were belittled and despised and your efforts to assist those who are extremely helpless throughout the world by reminding them that the path to their salvation lies in a proper education and their ability to combine their human resources. Consequently, for the sake of humanity, I hope that you will never perpetrate an evil which would bring about an endless chain of violence and brutality. You have already inherited a great deal of this from the tsarist regime. This is the worst possible legacy you could inherit. You have tried to put an end to many of the other evils of the old regime. Why not try to destroy this also? I have learned a great deal from you, such as the way you are skillfully cultivating success and overcoming helplessness, weakness, and ignorance. Your ideal is a great one and that is why I beg perfection from you in its service and the creation of broad freedom to lay its immutable foundations.

Latvian Bureau Warns of 'Extremist Elements'

LD2406124488 Riga in Latvian to Europe 1950 GMT 22 Jun 88

[Text] A regular meeting of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau discussed a report by Okherin, secretary of the Central Committee, on how the tasks and recommendations of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on raising the efficiency of industrial production and construction and paying increased attention to social questions—which he expressed while staying in the republic—were being implemented.

Okherin, together with the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee, has been charged with the tasks of preparing and carrying out additional measures to ensure the elimination of shortcomings in raising the efficiency of the republic's socio-economic development and in fulfilling the tasks of the outlined plans. A proposal was endorsed to form a group of consultants at the Central Committee on questions dealing with better provisions of food for the inhabitants. Questions connected with materials on the plenum of the board of the Union of Writers and on the participation of leaders of other creative unions of the republic were examined.

Coupled with positive aspects, the Central Committee Bureau noted that in some speeches, important questions of the republic's socio-economic development and history were interpreted from subjectivist positions. In the plenum resolution, several contentious theses are included which party organizations, labor collectives, and inhabitants do not comprehend in an identical manner. These demand comprehensive additional analysis in which the interests of all the social groups and nationalities living in the republic would be taken into account.

In political and ideological work, party organizations must clearly separate the stand of the creative intelligentsia, whose essence is to support the party course directed toward deepening restructuring, from the attempts of extremist elements pretending to be supporters of this stand and speculatively making use of some debatable conclusions of the materials of the plenum of the board of the Union of Writers. Only that which has been proposed on the basis of socialism and in the name of socialism must be supported.

The meeting of the Central Committee Bureau also discussed other questions of party life.

Churbanov Linked to Uzbek Corruption

PM1906184588 Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Jun 88 p 2

[A. Komarov "Postscript to the Sentence": "Black Crystal"]

[Text] Two men sit facing one another on the video screen. They are talking peaceably. They address one another respectfully by name and patronymic. They are calm. It looks like an idyllic picture of a friendly meeting. But.... When you listen to what they are saying, you can scarcely credit it. Both your mind and heart refuse to accept it. The conversation is about bribes. Who gave how much to whom. And in return for what.

"Then I gave you R10,000 in a parcel...."

"Yes, yes. I remember. I counted them at the time—you're right...."

Stop!

The court sentenced Rakhimov to the supreme penalty and Sattarov to 7 years' imprisonment.

Is the case closed? No, there are many loose ends.... The investigators are continuing their work and are continuing to unravel the web of machination, blackmail, and violence that enveloped Uzbekistan. Confrontations are continuing, incriminating documents and material evidence are being brought to light, and more and more new names are being added to the thick volumes of the case file. Excuse me! Is it really a web? Perhaps it is something else? A web may be sticky and clinging, but it is not so difficult to remove. But this.... The investigation continues.

What is also continuing is reflection on the crimes and the quest for an answer to the following question: How could this have happened in a place where the people and the mass of workers prize honesty and love of freedom more highly than any gold or silver? Today we need to ponder the crimes and seek an answer to difficult

questions not merely to satisfy idle curiosity but to uncover the roots of the phenomenon. For the criminals did not merely engage in bribery and overreporting—they discredited our society day in day out for many years.... Today we also need to understand what happened in order to understand the working of criminal mechanism and its social background. Only then will it be possible to painlessly and speedily detect and institute proceedings against the culprits and at the same time make no mistakes or taint honest people with even a shadow of suspicion!

This is not easy to do. The investigators do not write about the human heart and psychological and other niceties in the weighty tomes of the case file; they prefer not to dilate on such matters. Nonetheless....

Rakhimov was not specially talented. He was a schoolteacher. Quite a good one, judging by the fact that he had a good knowledge of his subject.

However, sowing seeds of "the rational, good, and eternal" was not to his liking. That did not produce the right kind of shoots. Material shoots. And so he moved with exceptional ease to the post of kolkhoz chairman. No, he was not elected, he was appointed, as was the custom at that time, "from above." This undemocratic action authorized him, as it were, not to take the collective and people into consideration. He realized this and did not take them into consideration. Lies in the name of alleged "higher interests" taught him yet another lesson—the end justifies the means. The end was there, so were the means, but there was just no suitable opportunity to start out. Rakhimov dreamed that his time would come. And it did, it could not fail to come because the ground for this was prepared by Rashidov's emerging omnipotence.

In 1978 the "boss" visited Bukhara. Within a few days Rakhimov became chairman of a rayispolkom. In return for what great services? M. Makhmudov, former member of the party raykom bureau, explains it as follows: "Rakhimov made a speech at the meeting. He talked about the great successes of the kolkhoz that he led. Rashidov asked how he had achieved them. Rakhimov answered that he did everything according to Comrade Rashidov's instructions—and the result was...."

This swift leap from a minor post to a bigger and more prestigious one is explained, of course, not only by the fact that Rakhimov knew how to kowtow to the "right people" at the right time. No! Although the "boss" did indeed adore flatterers. In this case Rashidov felt—and he was an astute judge—that this kolkhoz chairman was rather like him and so was the man for the job. He would be a point—one of many—on which one of the corners of the mechanism that Rashidov was creating to suppress his own people could rest. Moreover, he would be a pocket Rashidov and would set up a similar mechanism under himself. The "boss" was not mistaken....

After 6 months Rakhimov became first secretary of Gizhduvanskiy party raykom. Admittedly, he paid for these posts not only with his conscience and his honor but also in "filthy lucre." Each promotion cost him tens of thousands of rubles, which he gave to Karimov, first secretary of Bukhara party obkom. That was the going rate in that criminal mechanism. Incidentally, titles, orders, and degrees also had their price.... The monolith was bonded together by money. And... intimidation. The embryonic criminal system forced people either to live according to its laws or alienated them and dragged them through the dirt, destroying and humiliating them not only morally but also physically. This was done both covertly and overtly. In the latter case it was demagogically disguised as an uncompromising attitude to shortcomings. Kolkhoz Chairman Takhtayev attests: "Rakhimov constantly picked on me—he didn't like me because I didn't play by his rules. And so one day... This was in 1981. He picked on me yet again and expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of land cultivation. He ordered me to lift a clod of earth above my head and hold it there until I felt bad..."

Such "leadership" methods were demonstrated publicly in various circumstances—and on numerous occasions. Everyone drew their own conclusions from this. Some people handed in their notice, while some, D. Zhamolov, for instance, gave Rakhimov thousands of rubles so as to stay on his good side. He took the money. Lots of it. In the course of the investigation it turned out that hundreds of thousands of rubles found their way into his pockets in that way.

The total license has a "stimulant" effect. Soon, very soon, Rakhimov had erected a "pyramid" under him like the one above him, by selecting the "right" people and getting rid of honest people. He learned how to build it and set it up thanks to the atmosphere and the "shining" example of the people whose names were constantly dropped in the press and from lofty rostrums. Those who were on the lower rungs of the ladder aped these all-powerful infallible "statesmen" and fashioned themselves in their image.

...The peoples of the East worship diamonds. A diamond's purity is likened to the heart of an honest man, its regularity with straightforwardness of character, and its hardness with incorruptibility. There is another stone in the mountains of the East—the smoky quartz, a black crystal. It does not have the properties of the diamond—neither the purity, the regularity, nor the hardness. However, if it is cut and polished, then.... When you look at it under artificial light—it looks like a diamond of the first order. But you only have to take it out into the sunlight to see that it is cloudy and has dark spots. We are the same: We looked at this clan cut and polished by our period of stagnation, we looked and thought that this is almost a diamond of "pure democracy." But no, we brought it out into the light of glasnost and we saw through it... This stone is like the clan not only because

of its dark spots and cloudiness. It is also like it in its crystalline structure. There is an apex resting on four lower points, which in turn rests on sixteen lower ones, and so on.

Rakhimov had points both above and below him.... Militia General I. Sattarov, former chief of the Tashkent Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Administration, was another point in the "dark crystal." It was he that we saw on the video screen. He and Yu. Churbanov, former USSR first deputy minister of internal affairs. Yes, the investigation has proved that one gave and the other took. An investigation is under way as to why and how the deputy minister took bribes, but why did Sattarov give them?..

...Lieutenant Colonel Yuldashev, chief of the highway patrol service department, was killed in broad daylight in the middle of the city. The investigation was fruitless. With Sattarov's knowledge, the murder was staged... as a traffic accident.

...Inspector Ismailov beat up citizen F. Biryukov at a militia training post, as a result of which the latter died.

...Criminal Investigation Inspector Iskiyayev raped a minor at a music school hostel, after which she committed suicide...

...Rakhmatov, a militia worker, carried out a raid on a savings bank together with other people...

No. This is not a simple list of crimes. Sattarov was involved with each one of them. Not directly, but indirectly. It was his subordinates who carried out the killings, robberies, and violence. This all indicates that the internal affairs administration was doing a bad, a very bad job of cadre selection, educational work, and crime prevention, and the clear-up rate was extremely low. It is primarily the leader who bears responsibility for this. A small fraction of all these crimes is sufficient reason to leave the post. But he did not want to leave. He did not want to give up the post, the apartments, the automobiles, and the orders and medals that he had obtained undeservedly. What was he to do? The law of the "black crystal" proclaimed: "You have to pay to maintain your position." He was told the selfsame thing by Ergashev, then republic minister of internal affairs: "All the chiefs of the oblast administrations have given the 'chief' gifts. But what about you?" The militia general offered a bribe—a guarantee of his devotion and the clan's promissory note to Deputy Minister Churbanov.

He gave guarantees of his devotion when meeting Rashidov and certain other lofty guests at the airport... He has a whole bundle of photographs. These pictures are like evidence of overreporting. About action. Which was replaced by splendid rituals.

Why did he behave in this way? Why did he allow himself to be ordered around? The answer to these questions can easily be found in Sattarov's biography. He was an outsider in MVD organs. He graduated from a school of fine arts. For a long time after he held secondary posts in the militia. The clan dragged him out and forced him to work for them. Professional duty turned into duty to his patrons. Sattarov had a simple view of his promotion: You have to adapt to the "system" and pay back what has been put your way. Feeling unsure in himself, he could not combat the protectionism, abuses, and crime which increasingly extensively became the norm of life for all Tashkent Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Administration services....

The court has passed sentence. But the investigation is continues. The criminal crystal can be seen from various angles. Despite the opposition and pressure often still exerted on the investigation group.

Government Abolishes Kirghiz Teaching Institute

LD2506142188 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decision concerning grave shortcomings in the work of Przhevalsk Teacher Training Institute. The document notes that the overwhelming majority of its graduates do not possess the necessary know-how and are not ready to work independently. Manifestations of stagnation in the work of the higher educational establishment have become the ground for the development of negative tendencies such as the favoring of local people, cliquishness, and nepotism.

The USSR Council of Ministers has agreed to a proposal by the country's State Committee for National Education, the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, and the Kirghiz SSR Government on the abolition of this higher educational establishment. A proposal has been adopted on the organization of a Przhevalsk branch of the Kirghiz 50th Anniversary of the USSR State University.

Parochialism, Nepotism Cited

LD2506163588 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow June 25 TASS—Serious shortcomings in the activities of the Przhevalsk Pedagogical Institute are pointed out in a Soviet Government resolution issued here today.

The document says that the USSR State Committee for Public Education, during an evaluation of the work of the Przhevalsk Pedagogical Institute, revealed an unsatisfactory state of affairs in all sectors of the activities of this institution of higher learning of Kirghizia, a Soviet republic in Central Asia. Stagnant phenomena in the institute's pedagogical and scientific activities had prepared the ground for the development of negative trends: parochialism and nepotism. This created conditions for mutual protection, for violations of state discipline, including those during the enrollment of students. Serious deficiencies were also found in the ideological and internationalist education of students.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR agreed with a proposal by the USSR State Committee for Public Education, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia and the republic's Government to close down the Przhevalsk Pedagogocial Institute. The Government of Kirghizia has been instructed to render assistance in the employment of the institute's staff as well as in rational distribution of its students. A branch of Kirghiz State University will be set up in Przhevalsk to meet to the full the requirements of the republic's public education sector for highly qualified specialists.

Abalkin Interviewed on Reform Problems

PM2806090188 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 26, 25 Jun-1 Jul 88 (Signed to Press 23 Jun 88) pp 1-2

[Interview with Academician L.I. Abalkin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, by N. Zhelnorova: "You Must Reap What You Have Sown"; date and place not given—first two paragraphs are ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction]

[Text] Why is the economic reform "not working"? What must be done to ensure that the changes about which we are talking so much finally happen?

Today we publish the opinion of Academician L.I. Abalkin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and delegate to the 19th party conference.

[Zhelnorova] We were warned that the reform would not take effect straightaway, but all the same everyone was expecting favorable changes. Why have the first shoots turned out so weak and not sturdy?

[Abalkin] Yes, the country's economy is in a very grave state today. We have not known such a thing for a long time. It has been dealt three blows, and it has withstood them, albeit with difficulty. The first was Chernobyl. Chernobyl cost R8 billion—approximately 1.5 percent of the country's national income. Further. The start of our restructuring coincided with a sharp exacerbation of the situation on the world market and a fall in the prices for traditional Soviet goods. The USSR's foreign trade turnover fell 10 percent in the space of 2 years. It fell overall from R143 billion to R128 billion. That is, we lost a further 2.5 percent of the national income in this way. This naturally makes us economize on everything. We are beginning to try feverishly to close these breaches, and we are economizing on coffee and consumer goods.

And again. The start of the 5-year plan coincided with the mass struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism. A measure that was socially necessary and urgent was resolved in the way that we are accustomed to resolving many things—by storm, onslaught, and reporting the plan's ahead-of-schedule fulfillment. The result was that we fulfilled the plan for reducing sales of alcoholic beverages in "the best traditions"—in the space of 2 years. And yet it had been proposed to reduce production and sales of alcoholic beverages evenly: by 10 percent a year with a view to halving them over 5 years. While gradually creating compensation in commodity turnover, replacing these goods by others, organizing people's free time.... But we reduced the production volume by 49 percent over 2 years—which also led to a colossal breach.

These three factors coincided in time and fitted within the space of 2 years, creating an extremely strained situation. In addition to our subjective mistakes and miscalculations, let us also add our inability to regulate these processes. We did not fulfill the plan with regard to national income, retail commodity turnover, paid services, or social labor productivity. On the other hand, we overfulfilled the plan with regard to wages growth, labor remuneration for kolkhoz members, payments from social consumption funds, and group A. The economy continued to develop in the horizontal regime which had taken shape and exacerbated the situation on the consumer market. Cash circulation slowed down, and the problem of paying wages arose. And it could not be otherwise, since monetary incomes had grown, while the plan for retail commodity turnover was not fulfilled to the tune of R12.6 billion last year alone, that is, this sum was not returned from the population to cash offices. But money also has to be paid on an increasing scale! This is the situation which is complicating the implementation of many progressive initiatives and creating a nervous atmosphere.

[Zhelnorova] The quite firm impression is being created that two reforms exist in the country: one on paper that is bold and sometimes even daring, and the other in life that is flabby and bound hand and foot. Where is the force of the reforms being lost? Are the decisions of state organs fully founded on the recommendations of science?

[Abalkin] Indeed, what we are doing in practice is very unlike what is written. The state order is a classic example. The state order used in 1988 does not conform to the guidelines defined by the June plenum. When we criticize the state order, we must understand what we are criticizing: the actual practice of 1988 or the principle laid down when this system was formed?

What is a state order? A state order is, above all, an order proceeding from a consumer. A ministry must not issue a state order to its own enterprise. The client must be a consumer, but a priority consumer who defends the interest of the whole state and priority needs and who possesses the rights and financial resources for this. An order, say, for production of agricultural equipment must be approved not by the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building but by the consumer of this product, the Agro-Industrial Committee. Then the sides' responsibility and real competition are possible.

In general, the situation is very complex. Despite the fact that people seem to listen to economists and involve them in work, nonetheless a decision is frequently adopted contrary to our recommendations. Here are two examples. The Council of Ministers adopts a decision to create state industrial associations without consulting scientists or heeding their comments. And 6 weeks later it rescinds that resolution. This is reported quietly in the press. A new system of a progressive tax on cooperatives is adopted without consulting economists and is introduced, but then, 2 months later, under pressure from public opinion, including criticism from economists, it is repealed. Also quietly.

Scientists are now included on all sorts of commissions and groups for preparing documents, and all seems to be well. But science plays subsidiary, auxiliary roles there and becomes an adjunct to the state apparatus.

[Zhelnorova] But what can be done within the framework of our political system? Your suggestions?

[Abalkin] In my view, it is now necessary to create within the framework of a one-party system a mechanism for a struggle of opinions and for the advancement and comparison of alternative options. Without this it is impossible to work. If higher political organs receive a single draft without variations, this means the political leadership is entirely in the power of the apparatus. The leadership has no choice. It can criticize something and amend the details, but it is controlled by the apparatus. It is possible to lead only if there is an opportunity to compare, evaluate, and select options. There must be alternative solutions, and science is obliged to act as an opponent. Suppose that reports on the state plan or budget are heard, and, at the same time, a coreport by the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics Department. Let the deputies think and weigh things up.

[Zhelnorova] Many people now see as the chief enemy of restructuring exclusively the bureaucratic apparatus, which is ruining the reform. Where does its strength lie?

[Abalkin] There are also many people in the apparatus who are concerned about the good of our society and want to strengthen socialism. But they also have their own understanding of how and in the name of what this is to be done.

The management apparatus has now been reduced by 30-40 percent. But what has changed? In my opinion, nothing, so it is not a question of personalities. If the question were resolved only by a cadre change, that would be simple. There is something in the very system of management that we cannot manage without blowing up this system and breaking it. I have known excellent directors who demanded rights and independence, and I have seen them 6 months later, when they have ended up in the ministry. They were totally different people. And yet it is impossible to change so quickly! What had happened? They had willy-nilly been incorporated in the existing system, and this system "grinds" people down. So we will change nothing without breaking this system.

There is a more or less clear strategy of how and which way to move, but it is hard to promise whether or not it will be fulfilled. It is hard to promise a happy life in 3 years' time, particularly as the struggle is not yet over and the question of who will win has not yet been decided.

[Zhelnorova] To judge from your words, the main braking forces are precisely in the central apparatus.

[Abalkin] I have a very cautious attitude toward newspaper cliches: Here are bureaucrats sitting in the central apparatus and stifling everything, while all the rest are great guys. We have now come up against the fact that colossal resistance to the reforms and to restructuring is coming from below because of the inertia of many labor collectives. There are social analyses of different sections and groups which show that many people are not interested in transformation and do not want to change their work style. And even when there is an opportunity to earn, they do not want this. Their wages suit them, and they do not intend to work differently. There are many contradictions in the consciousness of each of us. We too bear the imprint of the past. But there is also a desire for change.

If we take a wider view, a struggle is now taking place between the forces of renewal—those who seek to impart dynamism and a modern aspect to our socialist society and to make it worthy and attractive in all respects—and the forces of inertia and stagnation, which exist at all levels. These forces adhere to the opinion that what we had really was socialism. We may have less of one thing or another, they say, but everyone has equal shares.

It must not be said that the entire intelligentsia is only "for" or only "against." There are conservative forces among the intelligentsia too. Can it really be said that all writers or all scientists are "for"?

Those who are "against" are frequently indignant: "Where are you leading the country? Sooner or later you will have to answer to the people for the restoration of bourgeois customs!" And anonymous letters are sent.

[Zhelnorova] We probably need an organ to monitor the fulfillment of party decisions. Otherwise the ideas of restructuring might be smashed to pieces and destroyed.

[Abalkin] Of course, any process must be organized and must have a definite management structure. However, a system of "pulling in different directions" [sistema "raznotyka"] now predominates, and there exists a procedure which runs totally counter to the logic of management—a procedure whereby each link of this structure prepares changes for itself. The Gossnab, let us say,

has been entrusted with preparing a proposal to restructure the Gossnab's work, and the Ministry of Finance is to radically change financial activity in the country. This runs counter to the logic of management. The existing commission for restructuring appears quite authoritative, but it has been put together by mechanically uniting leaders of central economic departments, where everyone defends his own interests and the decisions adopted are, at best, the result of compromises among departments. This system cannot produce high results.

...We have now ended up with a quite different system to the one we had proposed to attain. It is far from clear how it will behave, for it will have its problems, but there is no development without them. Moreover, a totally new, nontraditional conception of centralism has been laid down, which does not exist in life and for which it is still necessary to struggle, for no one will hand it to us on a plate. Nothing happens of its own accord. It does not happen that clever uncles sit there, do everything, and create conditions, while we reap the fruits of that labor. We will reap what we ourselves sow.

Professor Emphasizes Need To Combat Bureaucracy
PM2706141588 Moscow NEDELYA in Russian
No 24, 13-19 Jun 88 (Signed to Press 15 Jun 88) pp 2, 3

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Anatoliy Butenko under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "The Braking Syndrome: Banking on Fear. Management Pyramid of Power and Prosperity. Restructuring Is Trust in People"—boldface as published]

[Text] **History loves paradoxes. It conceals the obvious and reveals its secrets. It combines the uncombinable and brings the distant nearer. The deeper Soviet society gets into the second stage of restructuring, the more clearly we perceive the hidden meaning of this stage: It is impossible to solve the tasks of economic reform and democratization without the restructuring of political structures, without the destruction and removal of the administrative edict system of management.**

A Little History [subhead]

The administrative edict model of economic management took its first steps back in the period of "war communism." At that time, in conditions of universal enthusiasm, it was held that, adhering to Marx, socialism must be built without commodity-money relations and with direct product exchange. Relying on the enthusiasm of the masses, the bolshevik party hoped to organize statewide production and distribution by means of instructions from the center and commands by the proletarian state.

Only later did it become obvious that the desire "to organize state production and state distribution of products by means of direct commands by the proletarian state," as Lenin wrote, is a desire to run the country's economy by administrative edict methods, ignoring the working people's political and economic interests. This approach produced no results. Lenin was to say: "Life has proved our mistake."

Realization of the mistake led to the New Economic Policy [NEP], which attached paramount importance to economic methods of the management of economic life. The party groped for ways to combine social, collective, and personal interests, and the main point was that it banked on the initiative of working people and collectives and the enterprise of leaders. It would, however, be an exaggeration to hold that an integral method of economic management had already been fully elaborated and practically tested in Soviet society in the early twenties. V.I. Lenin did not manage to comprehensively elaborate all details. Much remained unclear. Furthermore, the economic methods of management, which demanded a certain amount of knowledge and general culture, were assimilated by grassroots party and state cadres with difficulty. They found it easier to revert to the more familiar edict methods. Nor should we discount the fact that, in the conditions of acute class struggle, the ongoing revolutionary transformations were inseparable from elements of compulsion and command, and this helped to maintain administrative edict techniques and habits in management.

Even so, objective conditions were not the main factor. Had the bolshevik party continued to follow Lenin's course, it would have been possible to expect the creation of an integral model for the economic management of production.

But history is not like the Nevskiy Prospekt, without any turns or zigzags. By the late twenties, in advancing toward socialism, Soviet society had run up against economic and political difficulties. I.V. Stalin decided to overcome them by consolidating his personal power, departing further and further from Leninism, overthrowing the NEP, and offering broad scope to the command method, which is now so familiar.

People's enthusiasm and their readiness to make any sacrifices for the sake of building socialism, for the sake of the future, provided fertile social and psychological ground for the consolidation of such management methods. Stalin added to all this rigid centralization, mobilization methods for solving economic tasks, and a system of harsh administrative measures and penalties for the slightest failure to obey.

Under the prevailing conditions, the command methods and administrative management produced certain positive results. An illusion was created that this was not only the swiftest but also the most effective method of solving any task. But the process of the further development of this rigid system, applied on an increasingly broad scale in various spheres, including the collectivization, increasingly revealed its sinister aspects, which were graphically manifested in the illegalities and mass repressions.

Therefore, there is every reason to assert that the thirties—the years when "the personality cult and its consequences" flourished—were the culmination of the administrative edict system of management.

But the inherent defectiveness of such management methods became increasingly evident after I.V. Stalin's death in 1953, the end of mass repressions and Stalin's demagoguery, and the advent of N.S. Khrushchev in the leadership. But the incipient "Khrushchev" reforms were halted since they came up against the interests of a stratum of people who were organically linked with the ideas and practices of past years. It is precisely here, and not in "the state of his health," that the prime causes of N.S. Khrushchev's removal from the leadership of the party and the state lie. It is also here that the attempts by the nomenklatura bureaucracy, backed by L.I. Brezhnev and K.U. Chernenko, to fully restore the administrative edict model of management are rooted. This was the system that the new Soviet party and state leadership ran up against in April 1985.

No matter how many times we turn back to the origins of the system and explain who engendered it, no matter how much we argue whether the "cart" or the "horse" came first, there is something that is more important: The social nature of the system and its innermost meaning.

In my view, the meaning of the administrative edict model for the management of the national economy and all social life that developed under Stalin is to ensure in reality total power and to keep the levers of management in society in the hands of the nomenklatura bureaucracy, which is not accountable to the people, while proclaiming aloud the subordination of all production to social interests and the satisfaction of the working people's growing demands. Everything detrimental to the bureaucracy's interests—the development of independence and unauthorized initiative—was immediately eradicated and anathematized. As it developed further, this system—created in the name of the "great goal" and the state's benefit—became more and more self-perpetuating.

The nomenklatura principle, in other words the appointment and transfer of leadership cadres at the will of the "elite" of the party and state hierarchy and, more often than not, directly at the will of the "leader [vozhd] and teacher," is the main antidemocratic core of the administrative edict system of management. This principle guarantees that appointed cadres are personally dependent on the tip of the management pyramid and that these cadres are totally unaccountable to the working people. In other words, to those whom they manage. Figuratively speaking, this is the magic wand, with its gilding of power and icing of privileges, which is the dream of all who yearn for power and prosperity and who are in return prepared to be unquestioningly obedient and unquestioningly subordinate to the higher echelons.

There is no need to delve into history, because this offers a rational explanation of the "mysterious" phenomenon of the "personality cult." A superstitiously religious worship of the "genius" of the leader or of a leader standing on one of the top rungs of the ladder or at the summit of the hierarchy invariably stems from the very essence of the state-administrative model of socialism and its nomenklatura system of management and appointment based on commands and edicts. This worship is, after all, a logical result of the fact that all subordinates are directly and personally dependent not on the results of their work but on the good graces of the leader or their chief, who punishes or favors his appointees as he wishes and arbitrarily determines their fate and the ups and downs of their careers.

When such a system exists and operates, any appeals "not to deify" the leader and not to institute a cult of the leader are as ludicrous and as pointless as any appeals not to abuse power when there is no control over "the powers that be." Real history has offered incontrovertible proof of this. The root of the evil does not lie in the good or ill will of the leader himself; **the personality cult is rooted in the system itself.** Only by demolishing this antidemocratic and maybe even antisocialist system can we expect to overcome such a disgraceful phenomenon as the superstitious worship of the leader and of leaders, the personality cult.

It was within the framework of this management system profoundly contradicting the principles of socialism and socialist democracy, contrary to the post-October experience of development, and in defiance of this experience that a system of views, guidlines, and relations transforming the ordinary person from an independent asset and goal of socialism into a cog, an appendage of the bureuacratic machine, began to take shape and put down roots under Stalin.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, we should agree once and for all on **what and who** is meant when we talk about the nomenklatura bureaucracy. This term does not encompass the entire party and state leadership, as falsifiers and enemies of socialism are trying to assert. It means a certain corporate stratum of party and state functionaries, a stratum that is out of touch with the working people. It means those who, despite their social calling to manage and accelerate social progress, take advantage of their position and power to pursue selfish interests, thus inhibiting and obstructing social progress.

Of course, the entire nomenklatura bureaucracy is part of the apparatus. But by no means all officials in the party and state apparatus are bureaucrats, because membership of the bureaucracy, as Lenin repeatedly stressed, is determined not only by social position but primarily by a person's real social role and the interests he pursues. Yesterday's conscientious official or party worker, having ceased to serve the cause, having attached paramount importance to either personal goals or career interests, or simply being in the grip of indolence, turns into a bureaucrat without at times being aware of the metamorphosis which is taking place. Just as a drunkard who reports every day for work at the plant and produces

nothing but defective output does not realize that he has ceased to be a worker and has turned into a dangerous declasse element, a functionary who has ceased to serve the real cause does not immediately and suddenly turn into a socially dangerous bureaucrat, and often spends the rest of his life unaware of the degeneration which has taken place.

Aren't there many such bureaucrats around us today? Aren't there many people whose own folly, inability to work, or simple indolence in management do not accelerate but inhibit social progress?

But regardless of how the bureaucracy functioned in Stalin's time, it was well aware: Its total domination was best guaranteed when society was relatively stable, which is possible only at a tolerable level of satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the broad masses of working people and when there are no forms for direct expression of their interests. This demanded successful fulfillment of set economic growth plans and, on the other hand, restriction of democracy and glasnost. They were both achieved through administrative measures.

The damoclean sword of the most severe punishment for disobedience hung above every state and party official under Stalin, but in the last few decades, when the former nomenklatura system whose members were appointed almost for life, recreated and consolidated after Khrushchev, was still in existence, nonfulfillment of orders from above threatened loss of all benefits and even expulsion from the nomenklatura itself. To the extent that power and management were concentrated in the managers' hands, the working people themselves were deprived of management functions, they were deprived of people's power.

An innate defect of the administrative edict model of management is the dominance of antediluvian extra-economic coercion with regard to fulfilling economic plans and orders. Material and moral incentives are essentially reduced to encouraging workers' assiduity regardless of the social significance of the results of their labor. You can have squandered the peoples' assets and labor resources to manufacture a huge mass of totally unnecessary output, and yet you have receive your bonus for having fulfilled the directive plan "sent down" from above.

Changes in the System and the Onset of Its Demolition [subhead]

All is flux, all is change, as Heraclitus said. Changes did not bypass the administrative edict system, either. In the period between the thirties and the fifties it was an embodiment of the "soullessness of the state" of which K. Marx wrote. Although any corruption within it was most harshly eradicated and bureaucratic sluggishness was severely punished, it— Stalin's system— actually turned into a kind of incubator for bureaucrats, for those "not very literate," pompous, and incompetent people, increasingly unable and unwilling to consider the people, and often driven by nothing but a lackey's servility to the "leader" and his authority.

It was this nomenklatura bureaucracy that was the social mainstay of Stalin's despotism. For his part, the leader himself was an ideal head of the bureaucracy and spokesman for its interests: By simplifying the theory of socialism and adapting it to his own level and the level of those whom he had promoted, he "cleansed" management of all forms of interference by the masses and "removed" the control of management by objective economic laws. Keeping everybody in fear of his arbitrariness, he created exceptional conditions for his loyal stooges to enable them to successfully conduct social affairs and to laud him to high heaven.

The successes of those years, achieved despite all the flaws of the authoritarian management system, stemmed primarily from people's sincere faith in socialism, their enthusiasm born out of October, and their readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of building the first socialist society in history. But the dread of punishment and the fear of authority played by no means a minor role. This is why it is necessary to accurately differentiate between light and dark. The growth rate successes of the thirties are inseparable from the faith of the masses in the socialist ideals. But this period is also inseparable from mass repressions and illegality, from the low level of political culture which made it possible to sincerely believe in promises and to obey without complaining.

The former system certainly did not die following Stalin's death. But when his cult was exposed and the mass repressions were condemned, the bureaucratic "model of socialism" was deprived of the main conditions enabling it to achieve its set goals using its characteristic methods.

I have already said that Khrushchev's actions only undermined and did not demolish either the former model or its management system. Its cadres largely remained in position. This was why, having removed Khrushchev from power, the pro-Stalinist forces did everything under Brezhnev and Chernenko to retain, if not fully restore, the former model of political power with its administrative edict methods of management. Their hopes were based on nostalgia for the lost "order," even though this order itself was primarily based on fear.

Despite all the substantial differences and appreciable dissimilarities between the positions of Stalin and Brezhnev, the public and social forces which in both cases stood for the administrative edict model were essentially the same—the "all-powerful nonentities," as Nikolay Ivanovich Vavilov described the bureaucrats. Their approaches to socialism (or rather to the distortions and deformations of socialism) differed not in principle—their principles actually coincided—but in specific means.

Much is explained by the coinciding principles of the "Stalin-Brezhnev" model of socialism. In particular, it explains why today's Soviet social thinking, while struggling against the stagnation and crisis elements of the seventies and early eighties, so persistently reverts to criticism of Stalin and of everything that was called "the personality cult and its consequences." After all, while criticizing deformation and stagnation during "Brezhnev's" period in the seventies, it is impossible not to address their sources, "Stalin's" period between the thirties and the fifties, the time of the establishment of the management mechanism which turned into the braking mechanism in the seventies, when stagnation phenomena began to clearly emerge and elements of crisis development began to accumulate. This is why anyone who today complains about criticism of Stalin is, wittingly or unwittingly, objectively taking a stand against overcoming the perversions of past years and is obstructing the success of restructuring.

Clearly realizing the sheer complexity of the tasks to be solved at the second stage of restructuring and the essence of all the difficulties in replacing the administrative edict system of management with a democratic economic system of management, the CPSU is approaching the 19th party conference armed with the ideology of restructuring and aware of the fact that the necessary turnabout in the political system cannot be effected without a social struggle against those who are unwilling to part with old views and with bureaucratic habits and methods.

The CPSU leadership, having elaborated the concept and ideology of restructuring, having suggested and approved a package of laws laying down the rights of enterprises and associations and the role of ministries and departments in social life, is leading Soviet society step by step toward the affirmation of organizational forms meeting the demands of full economic accountability, toward the economic methods of management, and toward the enhancement of working people's activeness by democratizing all spheres of life and implementing radical economic reform.

The tasks facing us today are particularly great in the sphere of culture, the spiritual sphere. Given that we resolutely reject administrative edict methods in the economy, the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum said, such methods are still less acceptable in society's spiritual progress. Democratism, trust in people, tolerance of what is unaccustomed and of questing, competence, benevolence, encouragement of initiative and innovation, support for talent— these are the key principles of party work in the sphere of culture, in the spiritual sphere of restructuring.

Of course, a thorny path of considered practical actions lies between the opportunity to accomplish restructuring by crushing the resistance of its worst enemy, bureaucratism, and its true implementation. But the clear idea of the difficulties along this path which is given by the ideology of renewal is an important guarantee of its success.

Full Exposure of CPSU History Advocated

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["Party Historian's Reflections" by Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor P. Rodionov, consultant at the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute: "How To Repay the Loan of Trust"]

[Text] Our press is increasingly loud in reproaching professional historians. We are also being reproached for lagging behind publicists and writers. Here we have philosophers, economists, and sociologists already rushing to the forefront in the struggle for restructuring, and historians are apparently still taking their time, still afraid to tackle controversial issues. They either keep silent, or "shoot" at literary and artistic works on historical topics. In short, as one newspaper put it, the public is summoning Soviet historical science to "trial" and demanding that it "account for the work it has done."

Indeed, the reproach is understandable. The people, and primarily young people, want—and are perfectly entitled!—to know everything about their country's past, about the struggle waged by the party and the people for socialism, about its complexities, contradictions, and dramas. Not just for the sake of idle curiosity, but for the sake of the present and the future, for the sake of society's moral health, for the sake of learning from history's lessons which are at times harsh and cruel. This is why readers react so sharply to attempts by newly hatched "saviors of socialism" to cover up the past. It is a matter of profound regret that a certain section of social scientists, including historians, rank among the "saviors." This has been demonstrated with sufficient clarity in the course of the newspaper debate.

It is foolish to look for vindication in these circumstances, but some things have to be explained for fairness' sake. What are the causes of this situation in historical science? In contrast with writers and playwrights, historians have now prepared manuscripts, written 20 years ago, to fill the vacuum in our knowledge of the past. Historical science, and party history in particular, has suffered the most cruel blows of fate. It was the sector that suffered most from such grave vices as dogmatism, bias, and the embellishment of reality. The coverups and omissions engendered by political time-serving invariably led to deviations from historical truth and seriously damaged the prestige of science.

The beginning of these prophets ["prorokam"; presumably a misprint for "porokam," meaning vices] was marked by Stalin's letter to the editorial office of the journal PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA in which he laid down his views on the most important questions of history and offered them as axioms, followed by the catechismal "Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)."

This code of ultimate truths revealed with perfect clarity the "two leaders" theory and the disparagement of the role played by V.I. Lenin, the role played by the party itself, by the people's masses, and by prominent fighters for the victory of the revolution and for socialist transformations in society, many of whom had already fallen victim to Stalin's terror by that time. The party's history, Lenin's teaching, and primarily Lenin's concept of socialism were subjected to grave distortions. Despite oaths of loyalty to Leninism, Lenin—to use his own words—was turned into a harmless icon.

As a matter of fact, to this very day we still come across a desire to canonize Lenin and turn him into something like a "Bolshevik Christ." Surely such attempts run contrary to Ilich's actual image and character? Iconography cannot be reconciled with Lenin's strictly creative approach to revolutionary teaching and to Marxist-Leninist theory. After all, as one reader of the journal ZNAMYA correctly noted, icons are primarily needed by those whose greatest fear is that the people will start showing a serious interest in Lenin's works and will start reading original materials and stenographic records of party congresses and conferences, that people will start arguing about Lenin and socialism, thus proving that these values are still alive and that they are regaining their lofty social status.

Stalin's "Short Course" was indeed notable for serious deviations from the revolutionary essence and creative nature of Leninism. The canonization of its ideas and postulates resulted in scriptural usage and quotation-mongering. Under these circumstances, scientific thinking was not just fettered, but was actually mortified.

The 20th CPSU Congress, which is likened to a thunderstorm which clears the air, also boosted the revival of creative scientific thinking in social sciences, including party history. Research workers were given easier access to archives, measures were taken to expand the source base, and debates were launched on the most topical problems of CPSU history. In short, it was a substantial step forward in the development of the science of party history. Nevertheless, following the CPSU Central Committee October (1964) Plenum, the brakes were applied across much of the social sciences sphere, primarily in the science of party history. There was an increasingly tangible effect from all sorts of "taboos" and a play-safe approach, and the wagging finger warning scientists against "willfulness" became increasingly evident.

Let me give two typical examples.

The historian R.A. Medvedev wrote the book "Let History Judge," which is an expose of the Stalin personality cult (it has now been published in many countries). Its contents were in conformity with the spirit of the 20th CPSU Congress. That was what the author banked on when the question of his party membership was being decided in 1969. But Grishin, first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom at the time, told him without beating around the bush: "Now we have a new line regarding Stalin"(?!).

It was also in 1969 that issue No 3 of the journal KOMMUNIST carried an article by a group of historians (the name of one of Brezhnev's aides was listed among them) under the promising headline "For Leninist Party-Mindedness in the Interpretation of CPSU History." But how were the principles of party-mindedness actually perceived? The basic line of the article was to totally ignore the ideas and spirit of the 20th congress (the "new line!"). Arrant dogmatism stood behind dialectical slogans. For all intents and purposes, the authors denied the existence of contradictions in the development of the party and society and reduced the history of the CPSU and its internal life to struggle between people rather than between ideas. The growth of the party's leading role was perceived as an automatic process, while all CPSU documents were seen as containing nothing but absolute truths.

The book market was flooded by a stream of mediocre historical literature steeped in dogmatism. By way of examples, one could mention the widely advertised works by S.P. Trapeznikov (or rather works published under his name), and in particular a book pretentiously titled "At the Turning Points of History" [Na Krutykh Povorotakh Istorii]. Some social scientists, and historians in particular, now write that S.P. Trapeznikov—who fate had decreed would become (as a former aide of L.I. Brezhnev) chief of the CPSU Central Committee Science and Education Establishments Department—was the chief perpetrator of the administrative blocking of creative quest in historical science. He was the perpetrator of prohibitions and persecution of scientists. Indeed, S.P. Trapeznikov was rather "inadequately armed" for the leadership of science, even from the viewpoint of conventional literacy. Nonetheless, it must be said in all honesty that the so-called "Trapeznikovshchina" was generated by the general line of the party leadership at the time, distinguished by the utmost conservatism. Speaking of specific persons, the bearer of this conservatism (and not only in the social sciences!) was primarily M.A. Suslov, who played the role of chief party ideologist, no less.

All this can serve as an explanation (but not a justification!) for the fact that, in the conditions of the restructuring now under way, historians have been unable to submit for the people's judgment works in line with the spirit of the time.

Many complaints have been made recently about the Marxism-Leninism Institute. Leaving aside certain polemical exaggerations I, as one of its recent leaders, cannot fail to recognize that they are justified. We cannot evade responsibility for the aforementioned grave shortcomings both in our own works and in party historical literature in general, because (the public at

large is possibly unaware of this) the CPSU Central Committee assigned to the Marxism-Leninism Institute the coordination of scientific research in the sphere of CPSU history and party building on a countrywide scale.

Another of our faults was the fact that we frequently adopted a play-safe approach when it came to reviewing manuscripts, including literary and artistic works depicting V.I. Lenin. An example is provided by the quite extensive review of M. Shatrov's play "This Is How We Will Win!" This review marked the beginning of a dramatic struggle which, according to the Italian newspaper L'UNITA, transformed an incident of theatrical life into a major political event. This struggle was waged between those who held that the play distorted Lenin's image and that the people (!), God forbid, might "misunderstand it," and those who wanted to liberate history and primarily Lenin's image from deep-rooted stereotypes and canons and present a living picture of Ilich. The former (including high-ranking functionaries), having actually gone to see the play and applauded together with the rest of the audience, exchanged the following sentences in the lobbies (I heard it myself): "This is well and truly ideological subversion!", "Had Suslov been alive the play would certainly not have been staged." Further comment is superfluous. Unfortunately, the practice of classified or anonymous reviews—a practice that is now a harmful anachronism, still prevails to this day (and not just in scientific institutions!).

It must be admitted that we failed to take full advantage of all the opportunities to publish new party history documents, and that for a long time research workers (including even scientific associates of the Marxism-Leninism Institute) found it difficult to gain access to party archives. In this regard we were like misers watching over their gold. The situation deteriorated after that same M.A. Suslov, in the course of a conversation with the director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, brushing aside some insignificant isolated incident, let it slip as if in passing: "Just be a bit more careful with archive documents." This warning resulted in actions that can be described in two words: "No access!" Of course, many shortcomings in the activity of the Marxism-Leninism Institute were attributed to the fact that, for a long time, its collective was essentially outside the scope of criticism.

But let me make one reservation: The necessary criticism must not obliterate the fruitful work done by the scientific collective of the Marxism-Leninism Institute on expanding the source base and creating numerous fundamental theoretical works, including works prepared jointly with collectives from other scientific institutions. Let alone the major advance in the sphere of studies on Marx and Lenin, which has been recognized and highly appraised by the Soviet and the international public alike.

Nevertheless, the question of how to cast off the mortifying fetters of Stalin's legacy remains topical. It must not be consigned to the archives because many party historians, still captives of the dogmas and tenets of the "Short Course," have done little to shape the people's awareness of history and to overcome their alienation from their country's history.

It is, after all, impossible not to perceive that schematism and timeserving were vividly displayed in many recent publications, including the textbook on CPSU history edited by Academician B.N. Ponomarev. And this is almost the only such textbook in the country. I recall the review published by a Yugoslav party journal at the time. It analyzed the several editions of this textbook. The conclusion was: In parallel with commitment to dogmas and peremptory judgments, the textbook also suffers from blatant timeserving. One and the same question was presented differently—depending on the year of publication. How, for example, was the assassination of S.M. Kirov covered?

The 1962 edition bluntly stated that Kirov's assassination was "a premeditated crime whose circumstances are still being investigated," that it was committed in the atmosphere of the personality cult, that Stalin took advantage of this tragic event to settle accounts with all persons whom he found unsuitable, and that it had a serious effect on the life of the party and the state. But later editions, published after the CPSU Central Committee October (1964) Plenum, spoke of S.M. Kirov's assassination as an event which brought the country to a state of revolutionary vigilance, in other words precisely what the "Short Course" had said. Generally speaking, any topics involving the cult of Stalin's personality became unpopular after that time.

This is why special importance attaches to the creation of a new textbook for the broadest readership, for Communists and nonparty members alike. The creation of "Studies in CPSU History" will also be assisted by the work of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission, set up in line with the the CPSU Central Committee October (1987) Plenum decision to examine many of the most complex questions of our history. It was noted at the 8 January 1988 meeting in the CPSU Central Committee that this important problem cannot be resolved without help from the Central Committee. Indeed, such help is extremely necessary at present, if for no other reason than that nobody else has the necessary documents, materials, and weighty information, especially on problems like Stalin's legacy and the roots of the stagnation phenomena.

But the main work, as the party leadership emphasizes, has to be done by scientists, by a collective of authors that would include creative, principled, and competent people. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed the idea that a CPSU Central Committee commission must evidently exist in parallel with the authors' collective. It will be of great help to historians. But I would like to voice an apprehension: If the book is published under the editorship of a CPSU Central Committee commission then, whether we like it or not, it will be perceived

as an official version, as a tablet, and this could damage the development of creative theoretical thinking. It is, after all, well known that the aforementioned textbook on CPSU history, despite all its obvious shortcomings, was never publicly criticized until very recently because the authors' collective had been headed not simply by a major scientist but by a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

It would be good if it were adopted as a rule that textbooks should be published only on a competitive [konkursnaya] basis. This would provide the creative competition [sostyazaniye] of minds and talents for which the party is calling. As a matter of fact, we are talking not only about textbooks but also about popular science works, including works on CPSU history and especially books for young people.

Now that the monopoly on truth, which dries up creativity, has been abolished, historians must be given all facilities for calm and businesslike work, and all barriers in the way of creative quest must be lifted. After all, the mass of historians are aware of their duty to the party and society. This can also be judged by the published materials (even though, if truth be told, still very scarce) and by the plans of scientific research institutions and publishing houses. As regards the Marxism-Leninism Institute, as a member of its scientific council I can say this: Intensive work is now under way on the creation of a whole series of works on the most topical problems. Particular attention is being given to the revival of Lenin's concept of socialism. This is why I think it necessary to back the suggestion, made in a letter from a group of historians to PRAVDA, that it is necessary to advance in the understanding of the full and genuine truth of history. But I cannot fail to observe that the publication of such letters with a long list of signatures is an anachronism. After all, this letter (one historian described it—and not without justification!—as "helpless and painfully labored") was signed not only by scientists who have proved their commitment to restructuring but also by some who, in the journals they edit and even in their own works (including school textbooks), still maintain their old positions.

Yes, historical science, the science of party history, is taking its first steps along the paths of restructuring. So far, however, these steps have been timid, not completely confident. It is no accident that no party historian has openly spoken out against the famous antirestructuring manifesto, against its erroneous and harmful tendencies. To put it briefly, tremendous work still remains to be done to reach new depth in analysis....

Exceptional urgency and topicality attach to the question of the organic interlinking of the science of party history and other social sciences, to the need to rely more and more on data and conclusions by political economy, philosophy, scientific communism, sociology, psychology, and other branches of the social sciences. And there must be a special debate about the contacts between history and literature and between scientists and writers, about the merger of the two mighty streams of truth—the historical and the artistic. The only important point is not to forget that both literature and history have their own laws, approaches, and rules. For example, while the "conditional tense" is out of the question for an historian, it is perfectly natural for artists provided, of course, that it does not contradict history's objective logic. By the way, I think it also worth bearing in mind the viewpoint that the analysis of alternatives and missed opportunities is not only acceptable but can even be useful in historical works. It is good that the history of the party and the Soviet state offers a lavish feast for such an analysis.

And here is where open, creative debates are required to help. These debates are already under way. They are distinguished by polemical sharpness and uncompromising approach. An example of this is offered by last year's debate in the Marxism-Leninism Institute on the problems of restructuring in the science of party history, with a large number of historians from other scientific institutions and VUZes in the capital taking part. It proved useful, if for no other reason than that it offered an opportunity to clarify the participants' positions and bring to light diametrically opposed viewpoints. Particularly clear lines were drawn on the problem of Stalin's legacy and its serious consequences and of attitudes to the figure of Stalin himself. This is natural, by the way, since similar debates are also going on among the broadest public.

Glasnost and democracy are very important here. It is time for us scientists to overcome the snobbish and haughty opinion of people who are not burdened by scientific degrees and titles or by the knowledge of methodology and methods (knowledge which, as a matter of fact, has failed to prevent so many of us from grossly violating the demands of Marxist-Leninist methodology). The only important point is to enhance the standards of debate and get rid of labeling and simplification. To learn to hear and to listen. After all, the main weapons in a dispute are neither emotions nor shouts but arguments conducive to the emergence of truth.

Finally, I cannot fail to touch on another major and very important question, whose solution would go a long way toward prompting fruitful work by historians and the development of the science of history and party history. I am talking about the archives. A colleague of mine writes in the press that the question of archives is a question of the standard of scientific work with existing documents. Can we agree with him? In order to cook a rabbit stew, you must at least have a rabbit. And so it is with archives. To start with, a research worker must be given access to archive materials, and only then can he work on them at the proper "standard." So far it has been difficult, at times even impossible to gain access to them. When will this question be resolved? After all, a huge volume of literature has been transferred from

special storage facilities to open access shelves in libraries—and it was done quite efficiently! So why are we taking our time here? Archives are the historian's daily bread. The lack of access to them is an acute and crying issue. Under these circumstances, how is it possible to fill in the blank spots in the science of party history, how is it possible to overcome its depersonalization? There is also an urgent need for new publications of party documents, including stenographic records of congresses. The people are waiting for science to produce results. The promissory note has been issued, so to speak. Now it is a matter of taking advantage of this loan of trust by the broad public. And to repay it in full. And this requires just one thing—absolute honesty and lofty responsibility.

Rally for 'De-Stalinization' Reported in Moscow

LD2506215788 Moscow World Service in English 2110 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Text] In Moscow there has been a rally in support of a call for what was described as the complete de-Stalinization of society and the whole truth about terror under Stalin. The rally also called for building a memorial in honor of the victims of Stalinism. The rally, held by the independent group calling itself Memorial, on Saturday brought together about 800 people. We now bring you some details of this event.

In the central event at the rally, an appeal to the upcoming party conference and the Supreme Soviet was handed to historian Yuriy Afanasyev and novelist Vitaliy Korotych, both elected to the party conference. A total of 37,000 people put their signatures to that appeal. More from a member of the Memorial group, Yelena Zhenkova, one of those who collected signatures and organized the rally:

[Begin Zhenkova recording in Russian, fading into English report] The appeal to the Supreme Soviet says it is necessary to build a memorial in honor of the victims of Stalinism, which would be not only a monument, but an information and research center. We believe that all archives must be opened and special work groups formed to inquire into the consequences of Stalinist terror. Besides, the group has called for social and other benefits to those who were subjected to repressions. The same proposal is being sent to the party conference because the group members believe it must make a decision on building the memorial without delay. There are many thousands of people who want to donate money to the memorial fund. When a favorable decision has been made there will be millions of such people.

Yuriy Afanasyev and Vitaliy Korotych, as well as columnist Yuriy Koryakin and novelist Alice Adamovich, who were also present at the rally, are some of the most popular figures in this country. They have been elected delegates to the party conference for their support of fundamental change and for unbiased articles about Stalinism and neo-Stalinism. They were of the first to have signed our appeal and among the 110 cultural workers and scientists who sent a message to Mikhail Gorbachev containing full support for the ideas of the appeal. Everybody who wanted to could speak at the rally. The only restriction there was on time.

The rally adopted a resolution urging the national legislature, the Supreme Soviet, to reconsider those laws that directly or indirectly contain notorious formulas of Stalinist times. The rally also demanded renaming those of Moscow districts and geographic places that still have the names of Stalin's associates. That cities and regions still bear their names is an insult to the memory of the victims of repression. De-Stalinization must be complete, that was the rally's key demand. [end recording]

Shafarevich on 'Thorough' Analysis of Stalinism

PM2306144088 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 24, 12 Jun 88 pp 12-13

[Article by Igor Shafarevich under general heading "Stalin and Stalinism: Two Viewpoints": "Logic of History?"—first paragraph is editorial introduction; italicized passages as published]

[Text] Mathematician Igor Shafarevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, sent an article to the "MN" editorial board with a covering letter expressing his doubts that "MN" would publish it. Here is his article together with a reply by historian Roy Medvedev.

The publication of Nina Andreyeva's notorious letter and the heated discussions that followed made me realize the importance of the issue I have been continually and even painfully preoccupied with of late. My question is *why such wide-scale inner resistance to all new reports about the cruelties and crimes of the Stalinist epoch?*

I have observed it in many very different people, in the old, who can't say they are unaware of what was happening at that time, and in the young, whom we can't exactly call scared.

One reason behind this is clear-fear of responsibility, reluctance to settle scores with one's conscience, fear of the fact that "the authorities" in general are condemned. But I think this is by no means all. The overwhelming majority of those whom I met are delighted to see how the language of the press is gradually becoming uninhibited, they wait and hope for changes in the economy and social life and are merciless in their appraisal of the closer past. Only stories about the bloody horrors of Stalin's 25-year rule are perceived with morbid bewilderment.

I'll take the risk of expressing my own hypothesis. *The reason lies in the discrepancy between the scope of the tragedy which is gradually being revealed and that of the explanations usually given.* In fact, it is nothing but a national disaster. The explanations are either not available or are all incorporated into the notion of the perfidy and cruelty of one personality, and the concurrence of

some unfortunate circumstances. This explanation is, first, not really clear and, second, an insult. You can hear old people say: did we really fight and make unimaginable sacrifices under the guidance of a malicious enemy of the people, his own people? The young say: "So we are a nation of slaves, if we can tolerate such rivers of bloodshed? Death in a grand disaster has some majestic spirit of tragedy." Our ancestors felt this: "All of them will die and none will return: they will lie there dead." But the picture we are facing is different. Even Don Quixote de la Mancha was puzzled: How is it that wandering knights destroyed in a few hours troops numbering 100,000? And he shared with Sancho his guess that these troops were probably sent by the evil spirit, these were not real people, their bodies were simply like those of slugs and spiders. The whole people destroyed by one villain is presented in a similar way-as a slug. A picture which is bound to repel those to whom this people is particularly close.

There can be no doubt that Stalin was a monster and that if there ever existed a real "enemy of the people", it was him. His crimes will be remembered forever and we need the entire concrete truth about the epoch of his omnipotence as much as we need air, and the same goes for all epochs. All this must be said to avoid repetition of these events, but it is not enough just to say it, we have to comprehend the tragedy. Will the most terrible details about how smallpox mows down masses of people prevent the next epidemic?

Journalists now frequently write about Stalinism as "a mass-scale vulgarity", as "slavish thirst for a strong hand", as "fear of reality", and about man today, who "cannot relax or sprawl in an armchair and have a cup of tea. He feels sad and uncomfortable; he is having a hard time". All these descriptions are taken from one article in MOSCOW NEWS, but this list could be continued. Have we really earned the right to such an elite stand, to contempt for "him" who was sticking with all his strength to comfortable stereotypes? Did "we" help "him" to at least sort out this great tragedy, some fragments of which are gradually revealing themselves? And not just him, but ourselves? Don't all these attempts to reduce a historical tragedy to the crimes committed by one personality reflect our reluctance to understand its deeper roots? And if so, don't we then face the same accusations: "fear of reality", "fear of renewal", "the desire to sprawl in an armchair and have a cup of tea", "stereotypes in blood"? Does this stand differ much from that of "Nina Andreyeva" (taking it as a collective name)? On the one hand, there is a demand to reveal fewer facts, on the other-the striving to replace explanation with primitive stereotypes. It's difficult to make out who is more "Stalinist". The answer to this will determine not only our assessment of the past but also what might happen to us in the future. How should we look at history (in particular that of our own country)? Is it an enormous accumulation of chance events the meaning of which it is pointless analyzing? Or has it a profound logic according to which there are fundamental reasons for all the grandiose events? I am a Christian and, consequently, no Marxist, but I respect Marx for the consistency with which he proceeded from the second concept. It is paradoxical that this concept is applied so rarely in our country at a time when we are looking into the most dramatic moments of its history! It is sad and awful to see how few attempts have been made to understand the Stalinist period and from what narrow foundations the published facts about this period are derived, and how few attempts are being made to expand them. In literature we have "The Eves" and "Peasant Men and Women", stories by Tendryakov. Are there many more? There have been only a few publicistic works in this direction and the most serious among them, I believe, is V. Kozhinov's article "The Truth and Justice", Nash Sovremennik (Our Contemporary, No. 4, 1988), in which the author makes a very interesting attempt at examining Stalinism as a world-historic phenomenon. But then, incredibly, this work was attacked by the very energetic publications which do a great deal to "overcome sterotypes" and "eliminate white spots" and "forbidden zones". At first Kozhinov's work was mentioned (Ogonk No. 19, 1988) only to provoke some form of reply (judging by the article's tone—a negative one), which it got (Moscow News, May 8, 1988). It was maintained that the work was in much the same vein as Nina Andreyeva's letter, that the striving to understand more profoundly the roots of Stalinism means: "There is no need to blame Stalin!" Doesn't this reply seem like an attempt (though maybe not a conscious one) at hindering the complete overcoming of Stalinism, as if saying: "Hang on in you Stalinists!" One of Kozhinov's major observations that Stalinism struck deep worldwide roots, that Stalin was extolled or, at any rate, protected from criticism by most leaders of Western liberalism, the author of the Moscow News article calls, without further commentary a "simple idea".

If only the situation were so "simple" for everybody! For me it is still a mystery, though it has tormented me from my youth. I recall the loathing caused by these hypocrites who could shut their eyes and ears so well when they so desired. In fact, the axe of fear did not hang over their heads! Who'll risk reproaching the miserable Mandelshtam, who wrote a poem extolling Stalin in a hopeless attempt to save his own life? But how can we forgive Lion Feuchtwanger, who described in his book Moscow 1937 the healthy appearance of the accused at the show trials, or how Stalin disliked the excessive number of his portraits and busts. Well, that's what these people are like! He finished the book with a quotation from Socrates: "All that I understood was fine, therefore, I think that what I did not understand is still better." When asked about the hunger in the early 1930s (which took the lives of millions of peasants) Bernard Shaw jokingly retorted that he had eaten the best meals of his life in the USSR. When in 1934 A. Tolstaya and American publicist Don Levine addressed a request to Albert Einstein to support the protest against the bloodbath

being organized by Stalin in Leningrad after the assassination of Kirov, Einstein refused, saying: "I am disappointed that Russian politicians have been carried away... Despite this I can't join your venture... I would like you to give it up..." Late in the 1940s Jean-Paul Sartre wrote that the rumours about "forced labour" in the USSR must be ignored since they could result in the despair of the French proletariat! How can you explain the fact that at that time nothing was heard about the violation of human rights in the USSR, and that the "violations" were noticed when the crunching of bones was no longer to be heard, and when the smell of blood no longer hung over our country? And Sartre, hurt by Khrushchev's report, found consolation in Mao's "Cultural Revolution"?

There is little doubt that Stalinism, rather than being the result of chance events, is connected with deep-rooted world-historic tendencies. Only realizing this can you understand and overcome its consequences. Hence, a broader view of it—the period of collectivization and war communism—is inevitable, especially in its international aspect and deeper roots. Only with this broader view can we remove the vexing shade of chance and absurdity which surrounds the disaster the country went through, shade which stops many people from trying to understand it.

Perhaps we won't be able to examine the situation thoroughly and come up with an answer. But we will be able to pass on this problem to our children in all its profundity. We have at least this chance! There will be no pardon for our generation if we do not undertake to analyze our past in all its aspects, not just the most dramatic. If we concentrate on the latter, we will miss the opportunity now open to us to understand the root causes. And there is the danger that an avalanche of exposures, descriptions of executions, beatings with rubber sticks, hanging women by their hair will all keep the reader in a permanent state of shock and that they won't have enough time to think over the main question: how did all this become possible, and why? People write as if the victims of Stalin are being killed a second time, and this allows authors to avoid delving into the deeper causes of their death. This threatens us with much more serious consequences than any statement like that of "Nina Andreyeva": it can kill any enthusiasm for renewal, precisely among those capable of becoming the driving force behind it.

Roy Medvedev Replies

PM2306144288 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 24, 12 Jun 88 pp 8-9

[Article by Roy Medvedev: "Roots of a Phenomenon"]

[Text] I think Igor Shafarevich is not too far from the truth when he maintains that new reports about the cruelties of the Stalinist epoch arouse in many people not only morbid bewilderment but also inner resistance. Perhaps he is right that Stalinism is a "national disaster" of world importance (and this makes it difficult to understand). Perhaps, one can equally accept his theory that a profound logic led us to Stalinism, that it had fundamental causes. It is also difficult to disagree with my opponents's initial theory about the inadequate explanations of the tragedy experienced by our people, compared to its scope. We have still to overcome this last phenomenon, although, it has to be admitted, we have already arrived at quite a few conclusions.

If we think over the philosophy of Stalinism, it is easy to conclude that it is simply a more horrific version of "war communism", the period which replaced the broad democratism of the first days following the October Revolution. The Civil War, the "white terror", the economic blockade and foreign intervention—did they leave the Bolsheviks any other choice? To save the Revolution and frustrate plans to divide our state it was necessary to concentrate all available strength, to compress our whole energy into one spring, subordinate everything to one aim. There was no other way. But if Lenin regarded the restrictions prompted by the situation as temporary and forced upon us, and concentrated on restoring democracy, making moves in this direction from 1921, Stalin saw his opportunity in the psychology and philosophy of the besieged fortress. It seemed to be his only chance, in the striving to take absolute power into his hands, to realize, under the guise of his own interpretation of Marxism, his own ideas about a system of "A new type", about society not divided into exploiters and the exploited.

We must acknowledge that the centralization and strict discipline which the Bolshevik Party was so proud of, and which ensured it victory over political opponents, also had its negative consequences, weakening inner-Party democracy and depriving ordinary Communists of the opportunity to control the behaviour and policy of Party leaders. With the promotion of Stalin to the first roles this Party discipline became ever more rigorous and led to a ban on discussions within the Party, a ban which turned into a norm of life, into a truncheon he could use to crush any opponents.

Studying the events of the first 15 years of Soviet power, the conclusion must be made that somewhere at the turn of the 1930s Stalin usurped power in the Party and the country, allegedly in the name of socialism. He claimed to be defending socialism from external and, still more, internal threats, which, according to his theory, increased along with the people's successes in building a new life. Under these circumstances it became a sort of natural demand to promote "strong personalities", "heroes", to establish barrack discipline everywhere.

In principle Stalin needed no Party. Rather it was in his way. Therefore he showed particular cruelty in dealing with its cadres. As a matter of fact, by the end of the 1930s, he had wiped out all Bolsheviks of the Leninist mentality. For his dictatorship, Stalin would have been perfectly content with the punitive bodies which had been set up by the Party and the

state in the years of the Civil War, on a temporary basis, to fight against undisguised enemies. Having placed these bodies under his personal control by launching a campaign of terror inside the GPU-NKVD and by promoting in that organization the leaders who were obedient to him, Stalin placed himself above the law and morality, the people and the Party, above common sense and objective necessity.

Stalin himself sowed discord in Party ranks, aroused personal enmity between Party leaders from lower ranks and made clever use of all he had done. In the same way, he played on the misunderstanding, confusion and fear that had gripped the Party after Kirov's assassination and the beginning of mass reprisals. Stalin demoralized and subordinated the section of the Party cadres he had not actually repressed. Blind subordination to the leader's will—this is how Stalin interpreted cohesion of Party ranks. He replaced the communist moral substance of the Bolsheviks, of all Soviet people, with the Stalin cult.

Much more could be said about the sources of Stalinism, about the gradual elimination of all Party and state control bodies, about the dismantling of the Leninist principles of Party unity, about the arbitrary oversimplification of Bolshevik slogans, dogmatization of the formulas of Marxism-out of context, the useless and harmful counterposing of class and human morality. But, in reality, Shafarevich is suggesting that we confine ourselves to a set of causes and that Kozhinov comes the closest to understanding these causes. He is recommended to us as the most fundamental analyst.

What makes him fundamental? The premise that "Stalin's cult is by no means the result of his own intrigues or of those of certain dubious assistants", but of a "worldwide phenomenon spreading from Madrid to Shanghai"? Or that the creators of Stalin the "Man-God" were not insignificant personalities like Yezhov, Beriya and Molotov, but such influential Western liberals as Henri Barbusse, Lion Feuchtwanger, Albert Einstein, Romain Rolland and many others?

According to Kozhinov, it was not Stalin's perfidy but rather the incomprehensible and shady intrigues, almost a plot by Western intelligentsia-mainly of French and Jewish origin, that presented and even imposed upon our country this brutal hangman and dictator. And inside the country, too, Stalin was extolled, as it turned out, not so much by Kirov or Kuibyshev as by Babel and Kaganovich. Forced collectivization and the death of millions of peasants were organized, according to Kozhinov, by another Jew-Yakov Epshtein-Yakovlev, who in 1929-1934 occupied the post of USSR People's Commissar for Agriculture. He apparently committed all the evil acts, dispossessing kulaks and starving the countryside without Stalin or the Politbureau knowing.

True, this could not be done without Kaganovich, Epshtein and other satraps. No leader can exist without the likes of them. But it is very difficult to enter into polemics with such fanatics of "Russian feeling" as Kozhinov. He only really grieves about the fate of Nicholas II and his family, and about old Russia, destroyed by the October Revolution. But it is much more difficult to argue with such "Christians" as Shafarevich, who is not only a well-known mathematician and Christian, but also a prolific publicist and historian.

As it follows from his truly "fundamental" work-Socialism as a Phenomenon of World History (Paris, 1977), for Shafarevich, a Christian thinker, socialism is an absolute evil and Stalinism one of the most adequate manifestations of the essence of socialism. "Understanding socialism as one of the manifestations of mankind's striving for self-destruction," Shafarevich maintains, "makes clear its hostility to individuality, and its tendency to annihilate the forces which back and strengthen human personality: religion, culture, family and individual property. Consonant with this is the striving to reduce the human being to the level of a cog in the state machinery...." Hence it is clear that our slogan "More Socialism!" is perceived by him as a call for "More Stalinism!" But for the vast majority of Soviet people, for their friends, the appeal "More Socialism!" sentences Stalinism, against which it is necessary to fight not with curses addressed to Stalin and not even with objective exposure of its root causes, but by perestroyka, glasnost, democratization and radical economic reform. This is what we are doing today.

Hence the conclusion: before we start discussion we must decide whether we want to give our debate a general meaning and strive for a common aim through common ideas on morality? Is there only one sun for all of us or are we going to worship different Gods?

Only by answering these questions it is possible to understand how sincere are the words which we pronounce, how consistent we are in our deeds. In conclusion, I must admit that having read Shafarevich's article I did not find replies suitable for the questions put by him. To my mind, he conceals from the readers what is he striving for, by renouncing Stalin and Stalinism.

Stalin's 'Ineptitude,' People's Heroism in War

PM2806135588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jun 88 Morning Edition p3

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev under the rubric "The Great Patriotic War Began 47 Years Ago": "What They Had in Store for Us"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The date 22 June 1941 was the first day of fascist Germany's slow fall into the abyss of total defeat.

When you think about why we stood our ground and won, you are filled again and again with a deep sense of gratitude to the ordinary Soviet soldier. Millions upon millions of them gave their blood and their lives to prevent the fascists from putting the "Barbarossa" Plan

into action by exploiting Stalin's fatal miscalculations and thereby plunging the Soviet Union into a "Blitzkrieg." It must be frankly said that the lack of preparation and ineptitude of Stalin and his closest associates with regard to the way the war was run during a critical period in our history—1941-1942—were compensated for by the unprecedented heroism and selflessness of the people. As a result our losses were 6-8 times greater than those incurred by the enemy. Yes, our victory cost us dear. But our sacrifices were truly not in vain if you measure them against the fate that would have awaited our people if Hitler and his generals had succeeded. [Passage omitted]

Publication of Yeltsin Plenum Speech Urged
LD2706080988 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 26, 25 Jun-1 Jul 88 (Signed to Press 23 Jun 88) p 3

[Letter from V. Sorokin of Moscow, CPSU member since 1966 and veteran of the USSR Armed Forces: "Secrets From Whom?"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses are very valuable material for preparing and holding the 19th party conference and for the further struggle for restructuring.

Thesis 1 states: "...The party will consistently pursue a policy of openness and glasnost, of free discussion of the problems of the past and the present...."

So why must we wait for the conference decisions to implement this thesis? B.N. Yeltsin's speech at the CPSU Central Committee October Plenum is classified material even for CPSU members. But a verbatim account of his speech is passing from hand to hand. If it is a fake, it is quite a skillful one. If it is genuine, there is nothing antiparty in it.

Or another point: Children of CPSU members and nonparty people are dying in Afghanistan and funds belonging to the whole people are being spent, but a closed letter has appeared, although "closed" data have already been published in the press, particularly in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY.

From whom are we hiding things and why?

Our whole press is devoting attention to coverage and criticism of the epoch of Stalinism, and this is very right.

But the period of stagnation, when people's souls were crippled and the country's economy was plundered, is still not receiving detailed coverage. Now is the very time to investigate how that stagnation came about. For it was not Brezhnev alone who was guilty, and members of the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee and other high leaders worked with him.

Brezhnev's Baku Mansion Becomes Wedding Palace
LD2406015988 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 23 Jun 88

[Text] Baku June 23 TASS—A mansion built specially for Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Soviet Azerbaijan in 1982 has been converted into a wedding palace by the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of this Transcaucasian republic announced today.

The handsome white-marble building in downtown Baku is well known to the city residents, but hardly any one of them ever had a chance to see it from the inside.

The guest-house, as it was known, had been vacant ever since the former Soviet leader visited the Azerbaijani capital.

Another guest-house in Baku, in fact a complex of buildings in a magnificent park, will soon be converted into a children's health-building centre.

City, Rayon Soviet Sessions Opened to Public
LD2406095088 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1036 GMT 23 Jun 88

[Excerpt] Odessa, 23 Jun (TASS)—TASS correspondent Georgiy Vorotnik reports:

For the first time, sessions of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies are being held with open doors. In Reni (city-port on the River Danube) about 70 members of the electorate—representatives of labor collectives, housing committee activists, and members of the informal associations which have sprung up in the town of late—came to the session of the city soviet together with 75 deputies. Like all the town's people, they had been invited through the local newspaper to take part in the work of the session. All those who wished to do so were able to carry on discussions freely with the deputies, appraise their activities, and demand that they be more active in resolving the town's problems. [passage omitted]

Rigged Election in Arkhangelsk Criticized

LD2406111388 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1300 GMT on 23 June carries a 45-minute program entitled "Dramatis Personae," presented by journalist V.I. Novikov. The program shows how officials of the Arkhangelsk Oblast soviet and party organization had rigged an election on the Solovetskiye Islands in order to oust a popular local leader who championed local ecological and community interests. His lack of deference to oblast and ministry officials led to his being slandered, ousted from his local soviet job, and, finally, from his post.

The program shows clips from a 1986 television program, entitled Ecological Diary, in which G.D. Dzhavadov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the local soviet of the Solovetskiye Islands, calls for greater local

autonomy to correct the mismanagement caused by remote and disparate bureaucracies. The program then cuts to the following year, 1987, and relates how local government was reorganized into a rayon soviet, to which Dzhavadov was not elected. All the local people interviewed claim that the elections were rigged with the express purpose of removing Dzhavadov. S.P. Pytsovskiy, secretary of the Solovetskiy territorial primary party organization is shown saying: "There were no violations of the election legislation." The clip showing him saying this is repeated after each specific example of violation cited by the local inhabitants.

The television interviewer asks N.P. Varakin, chairman of the rayispolkom of the Solovetskiye Islands: "In our conversations with the inhabitants of the settlement we frequently heard them say that the elections were conducted in such a way that the people were up in arms over them. I am not saying we talked to everyone, but that is the impression we got. What do you think? Is this correct or not?" Varakin replies: "You were talking to the wrong people." The filming group invited the officials to organize a meeting with people with a different opinion. "We agreed on the time and place of the meeting. But, you guessed it, no one came. Perhaps, there is no other opinion." Pytsovskiy says it was necessary to bring in competent leaders as there were none living locally. Dzhavadov is then shown relating his achievements. O.S. Shegolkov, deputy chairman of the Arkhangelsk Oblispolkom, praises the work that had been started under the previous local administration.

V.I. Novikov comments: "A year passed. The program about the elections which had taken place on the Solovetskiye Islands was ready for transmission but it lay on the shelf. Of course, this was not at our request. So what was preventing it from being broadcast?

"We passed the program that you have been watching so far to the leadership of the Arkhangelsk Oblispolkom and asked them to comment but they refused. Later, they suggested that we go to the Solovetskiye Islands again to meet with as many people as possible and get them to express their opinions on the events depicted in the program."

The program shows a packed public meeting in which most local inhabitants repeat that they consider the elections to have been rigged and that they respected what Dzhavadov had been trying to do, while officials continue to deny it. The meeting's chairman calls for a vote: "Have we done right to come here and raise the question of whether there were violations during the elections?" A show of hands gives an overwhelming majority in favor.

Novikov goes on. "The result of this vote is well known to the leaders of Arkhangelsk Oblast. So how is one to explain the fact that Comrade Bakhushkin, secretary of the obkom, published the following assessment of these events. Just listen: Dzhavadov, who had previously compromised himself by his total lack of initiative, tried, with the support of a group of demagogues, to get himself the post of chairman of the newly created rayispolkom. Well, what can you say; they do not want to know the truth."

The video cuts back to the public meeting, with Dzhavadov saying: "I agree, you did not elect me deputy or chairman, but comrades, do not destroy me physically as a person, me and my family. Do not do this. You know, they tried to pin all sorts of financial scandals on me. They tried to pin all sorts of theft on me. The offered me a good job on the mainland. Anything I liked as long as I left the Solovetskiye Islands. But I will not leave. I will not."

Novikov ends the program with these words: "Today as a result of staff cutbacks, Gennadiy Dzhavadov is out of work. Such is the fate of yet another Arkhangelsk guy."

Meeting Reported at Afghan War Memorial Site

LD2606202888 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Jun 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by A. Livanskaya, identified by screen caption]

[Text] [Announcer] In Moscow today, in Druzhby Park on Leningrad Highway, the foundations were laid for a memorial to servicemen who died fulfilling their international duty in Afghanistan. [video shows people playing guitar, a queue of people in leafy surroundings]

[Livanskaya] The lime tree is in bloom and its fragrance wafts across the Aleksandrovskiy Sad, over the memorial to the unknown soldier, and over all who assembled here today to take some of this flame to a new memorial which doesn't exist in Moscow at present, but which will soon be built in Druzhby Park. [video shows memorial to unknown soldier, group of uniformed men bearing a wreath toward it] And then some of the flame from Aleksandrovskiy Sad will remain here forever, as a symbol in memory of the servicemen who died in Afghanistan. [video shows serviceman bending to light torch from flame; small troop seen marching]

But today, there is a meeting here. [video shows meeting, shot of small memorial covered with red material, young man speaking at microphone] No one has been forgotten, and nothing is forgotten—a solemn oath heard once again in this square. [video shows people adding to a pile of flowers, shot of the uncovered memorial and plaque bearing the inscription: "On This Site a Memorial Will Be Erected and an Avenue Planted in Honor of Soviet Servicemen Who Died Fulfilling Their International Duty in Afghanistan;" shot of young men sitting around, one playing a guitar] Reservists, and former international servicemen came here from all over the country to prepare the square, clean it up and make it tidy. Each of them wanted to work for at least a day and in a few weeks

everything was ready. No one knows yet what kind of memorial this will be. [video shows interview of young men with long hair and beard, and a medal pinned to his shirt].

[Begin recording] [Man] It should be the truth about Afghanistan. We need the truth, not just for the sake of truth alone, but so that people understand what war is, and what this war in particular was.

[Second man] It should be a big memorial.

[Third man] It should be a memorial which says something, which can be heard, you understand, so that the parents of those who died, the mothers and fathers; so that they can.... [changes thought] in a word so that the memorial should say something for them; it shouldn't be dumb. [end recording]

[Livanskaya] A competition for the best design for the memorial will be announced. Perhaps a special bank account will be opened for its construction, but for the time being, this is how a collection of donations took place. [Video shows a small bowl on a table containing ruble notes, also a large petition with the heading "Collection of Signatures for the Repatriation of Soviet Prisoners." People sign this, including a man in a wheelchair] Also here, alongside the future memorial there was a collection of signatures for the liberation of those who are imprisoned far from home.

The flame from the Aleksandrovskiy Sad will from today be kept in the Soviet Peace Committee until the memorial is erected. And may it also serve to remind people that the memorial for those servicemen who died in Afghanistan should be put up as soon as possible.

Borovik Addresses Veterans

LD2606202988 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English 1400 GMT 26 Jun 88

[Text] Today, on the initiative of the Soviet Peace Committee and the Moscow City Council of War Reservists, a ceremony was held in one of Moscow's parks for laying a monument to soldiers and officers killed while performing their internationalist duty in Afghanistan.

A meeting was held at which the speakers were public representatives, World War II veterans, and mothers of fallen soldiers, and they all noted that Soviet soldiers fulfilled their obligations with honor and dignity in aiding a friendly country. Writer Genrikh Borovik stressed that the present young generation of this country has continued the traditions of their fathers and grandfathers who struggled against fascism in Spain in the 1930s. Today, said the chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, Genrikh Borovik, all our efforts must be directed at bringing peace on earth. Major General (Sokolov) said all Soviet prisoners must immediately be freed.

After the meeting signatures were collected for an appeal to the Government of Pakistan not to hinder the settling of this problem. Cosmonaut Svetlana Savitskaya said the Soviet Peace Fund has decided to grant a big sum of money for a monument in honor of the soldiers and also for building a center for the rehabilitation of soldiers wounded in Afghanistan.

Council of Ministers Reviews Inventions Law

PM2306091188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "At the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium examined the USSR draft Law "On the Work of Inventors in the USSR" at a session held 18 June.

The draft was circulated well in advance to the country's leading inventors, scientists, specialists, the leaders of a number of associations, enterprises, and USSR ministries and departments, and the representatives of public organizations. They were all then invited to the session of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium, and the number of guests exceeded 100 people. This enabled everyone to gain a profound knowledge of the provisions of the draft and to take an active part in examining it.

The report delivered by Comrade I.M. Bortnik, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, aroused great interest and—most importantly—an acute and uncompromising reaction from the session's participants, which took the form of a vigorous debate from the very start of the discussion of the draft.

Comrade V.V. Shishkin, inventor and director of the "Yuzhvodoprovod" Engineering Center, was the first to ask for the floor. In his speech he made specific remarks concerning the concept of an invention, particularly the factors characterizing its newness. Referring to world practice, he proposed clarifying the provisions of the draft on this question. Then he touched upon the main point, over which a stormy polemic developed: Who should have exclusive rights to an invention—the inventor or the enterprise where he works and where he was given the task of finding a technical solution to a particular problem? He stressed here that he is firmly convinced that if an enterprise sets an inventor a task and finances his work then the patent protecting exclusive rights to the invention must be granted to the enterprise.

This standpoint was supported by Comrade V.G. Moiseyev, the well-known inventor and lathe operator at the Perovskiy Trade Machine Building Plant. He proposed first of all that the draft indicate that the work of invention is a rational form of joint labor involving scientists, engineering and technical workers, innovators, and specialists in the resolution of priority tasks of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development.

Referring to the innovators' movement as a most progressive movement, he stressed that he welcomes the draft law with all his heart: "I have worried for 27 years," Comrade V.G. Moiseyev said, "and when I saw this document, I realized that a law is finally being adopted whereby ordinary Soviet people can rise to the level of academicians and outstanding specialists."

At the same time he made critical remarks and constructive proposals to the soviets, which do not appreciate innovators in production, do not support them, and do not create the requisite conditions for their creative activity. He especially dwelt on the responsibility of leaders for delaying the use of inventions.

Comrade S.N. Fedorov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director general of the "Mikrokhirurgiya Glaza" Intersectorial Scientific and Technical Complex, had a quite different opinion of the draft law from that of the other session participants. He said: "The law that we want to adopt is simply not well timed. It puts the cart before the horse, because there is virtually no market for inventions. The law will begin to work only when true economic accountability [khozraschet] begins to operate. Then the hunt for inventors will be on. What inventions can there be without a market. There must be market relations." Then he voiced the thought that the draft law must not be 42 pages long or contain 65 articles but have 2-3 pages like the decrees adopted during the first years of Soviet power.

These Theses were not supported by the other speakers. Academician B.N. Kudryavtsev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute, expressed the overall viewpoint most fully. He stressed that he disagreed with Comrade Fedorov's stance that a law three pages long is what is needed and that instructions and provisions will then follow to explain everything. This may nullify the law. The path that has been chosen is the correct one. The law must be operated directly and must contain as many articles as the matter warrants.

He then stressed that the enterprise must have exclusive rights to the patent. Otherwise it will not be interested in introducing inventions. At the same time he proposed that the draft provide a greater number of possible options for relations between the inventor and the enterprise. He fully supported the draft's proposal on the creation of a patent court in the USSR. But the status of this establishment, he said, must be defined more specifically.

He particularly dwelt on certain inconsistencies in the draft law, illustrating this by the fact that the law contains three rights: "the right to a patent invention" [avtorskoye izobreteniye], "the right to an invention," and "the right to use of an invention." The academician pointed out that these are three different questions and must be expressed more lucidly in the articles of the draft law to ensure that there is no confusion.

Doctor of Technical Sciences Comrade V.D. Kalner, an inventor and deputy director general of Moscow's Likhachev Automobile Plant, who was a member of the working group set up by the USSR Council of Ministers to prepare this document, amplified the main theses of Comrade I.M. Bortik's report in his speech.

Then debates again unfolded around the following question: Who should have exclusive rights to the invention and in this connection who should be the patentee—the inventor or the enterprise? The speech made by Comrade A.N. Filippov, USSR honored inventor and chief of a USSR Ministry of the Automotive Industry Central Scientific Research Institute of Automobiles and Automobile Engines laboratory, was the most critical with regard to the way the draft assigns this right to the enterprise. The essence of his speech was that in a socialist state an invention should be introduced and used with the participation of the inventor and all rights should belong to the inventor, this cannot be ignored, and the right of invention cannot be conferred on anyone whatsoever. The draft law incorrectly gives priority to the enterprise or the organization even if the inventor was carrying out a direct technical task in his particular field.

This viewpoint was vigorously supported by Comrade Yu.S. Popinov, honored RSFSR inventor, senior engineer at the All-Union Communications Electrical Engineering Correspondence Institute, and representative of the "Moscow Inventors' Union" informal association, and also by Doctor of Juridical Sciences Comrade S.V. Filippov, deputy director general of the USSR Chamber of Trade and Industry All-Union "Soyuzpatent" Association.

Having expressed support for the draft's provisions on granting the enterprise exclusive rights to inventions, Comrade N.S. Chernyak, an inventor and chief of the Minsk Tractor Plant design bureau, and Doctor of Economic Sciences Comrade O.M. Yun, deputy chief of a USSR Gosplan department, approached this question from completely opposite positions. They based their arguments on the fact that in this instance enterprises have a heightened economic interest in using the inventions and the fact that the enterprise is the environment in which an inventor's creative capabilities are most fully revealed. In response to remarks made by other participants in the discussion that if an enterprise is granted a patent, this will lead to the enterprise holding the monopoly on the use of inventions, they pointed out that the draft envisages that if the plant or other organization does not make use of the invention within 2 years, then the patent right is transferred to the inventor.

The question of the size of the reward and the procedure for issuing it to the inventor was also another major question which riveted the attention of those involved in the discussion of the draft. Academician Comrade L.N. Koshkin, director of the "Rotor" Intersectorial Scientific and Technical Complex, was the first to broach this topic. After dwelling on the entire spectrum of problems

linked with working out a technical solution and creating and using an invention, he stressed that the inventor has no protection on questions of rewards. Dozens of courts must be visited, each of which endeavors to reduce the size of the reward, prohibit its payment, and postpone its review. He demanded that the articles of the draft referring to this important matter be clarified.

Having devoted a large proportion of his speech to this problem, Comrade N.S. Feschenko, chief of a "Konservpromkomplekt" Science and Production Association section, suggested that rewards of various sizes be paid from the sale of the invention both to the inventor and also to the developer of the technical documentation for series production. Other speakers also dealt extensively with various aspects of material incentives for inventors. It was proposed that the draft law indicate the guaranteed minimum sum for the reward and that at the same time there should be no ceiling on the reward. At the same time the provision that an enterprise or public organization guilty of late payment of a reward should pay the author of the invention a fine for every day's delay amounting to 1 percent of the sum due was supported.

The proposal from Academician Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, that the draft law should resolve the question of exclusive rights to an invention in a fundamentally different way evoked great interest among all those present. He proposed that the patent for the invention be issued to its inventor; or to the person or corporate entity nominated by the inventor as patentee; or to the inventor's rightful heir in accordance with the law of inheritance, as also provided for in the draft. Moreover, in his opinion, the patent can indicate two patentees—the inventor and the enterprise where the invention was created. Both patentees enjoy equal rights and can use the invention on the basis of the agreement they conclude. In his opinion, this approach will protect the economic and legal interests of the inventor and the enterprise and will realistically reflect their relationship to the invention as a property. Comrade Ye.P. Velikhov's proposal was met with approval by most of the participants in the discussion of the draft.

The debate which unfolded at the session of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium was not confined solely to discussion of the draft law. The position of the inventor in society and the numerous obstacles which he encounters in creating and especially using his invention in the economy were discussed in a frank, businesslike, and constructive fashion. Concrete examples of a heartless and sometimes irresponsible attitude to inventors' proposals and of individual officials' callous, nonstate approach to inventors' needs and requirements were cited. It was pointed out that a number of leaders assess inventors' vigorous activity from former, prerestructuring positions. This was mentioned by Comrade L.I. Danilov, honored USSR inventor, Comrade T.A. Pungas, honored Estonian SSR inventor, Comrade V.A. Smirnov, chief of the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers Department for the Defense of Inventors' Rights, Comrade S.F. Shtelmakh, honored RSFSR inventor, and Comrade B.I. Ushakov, best Moscow inventor for 1987.

All the participants in the discussion stressed that this frank and thorough discussion on the new draft law became possible in the USSR Government owing to restructuring, the democratization of society, and broad glasnost.

In the light of the discussion the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium adopted the USSR draft Law "On the Work of Inventors in the USSR" as the basis for further work. It tasked the working group which prepared the draft with clarifying the draft and enlisting in this work the session participants who had submitted the most interesting and fundamental proposals.

The order was given to circulate the clarified draft to USSR ministries and deparments and to the Councils of Ministers in the union republics for possible remarks and proposals and the working group was ordered to submit the finished draft to the USSR Council of Ministers no later than 15 July 1988.

Yu.D. Maslyukov and N.V. Talyzin, candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, took part in the work of the session of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium.

The results of the discussion were summed up by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

MVD Chief on Moscow Anti-Gambling Measures

PM2806133788 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Jun 88 Second Edition p 3

["Response to Criticism" by V. Pankin, chief of the USSR MVD Main Criminal Investigation Department: "'Not a Pastime, But a Crime'"]

[Text] Measures have been taken by the Moscow and Moscow Oblast internal affairs organs to step up the struggle against gambling. In February this year, special groups were set up which, with public participation, are putting a stop to it and are handing offenders over to the militia.

In Moscow this year 1,400 such persons were identified.

An analysis of administrative practice testifies that the imposition of fines of up to R50 and confiscation of gambling equipment are not sufficient deterrents. The unearned income derived from gambling exceeds the total of fines many times over.

In this connection, in addition to further stepping up the struggle on the basis of existing legislation, a decision was made to submit a proposal to establish criminal liability for gambling.

Vorotnikov Visits Ryazan Oblast 15-16 Jun

LD1606183888 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 16 Jun 88

[Text] Comrade Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, spent 15-16 June in Ryazan Oblast. He visited several rayons to acquaint himself with the work being done in kolkhozes and sovkhozes to increase agricultural production, and with the progress achieved in restructuring management of that sector by the oblast party organization in the light of the latest party decisions and the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

Concluding his stay in Ryazam, Comrade Vorotnikov spoke at an assembly of the oblast's party economic aktiv. He touched on questions of eliminating the prolonged agricultural lagging behind there and to accelerating by every means the implementation of the food program, stressing the oblast party organization's particular role in raising the responsibility of every Communist involved in that industry for the work entrusted to him.

Solovyev Attends Leningrad Soviet Session

LD1806152988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 18 Jun 88

[Text] A session of the oblast soviet was held in Leningrad today. The deputies adopted a comprehensive program for providing every family with a separate apartment house by the year 2000. Special attention was paid to the coordination of resources, the enhancement of the quality of housing, and the harmonious development of the social infrastructure in the oblast's towns, villages, and hamlets.

Comrade Solovyev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of Leningrad oblast obkom, took part in the session's work.

Zaykov, Chazov Attend Moscow Clinic Opening

LD2406091988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 24 Jun 88

[Excerpts] A remarkable event occurred today in southwest Moscow. At the City Outpatients' Clinic No. 78 in Cheremushkiy, an inter-rayon diagnostic center received its first visitors. [passage omitted]

Comrade Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, and Comrade Chazov, USSR minister of health, took part in the opening ceremony.

Zaykov Interviewed by NEPSZABADSAG

LD2706084388 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0430 GMT 27 Jun 88

[Text] Lev Zaykov, member of the CPSU Politburo and first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, speaks about the CPSU party conference, which is to open tomorrow. The interview deals with the selection of delegates and the questions to be debated at the conference. One interesting sentence is as follows: The staff members of the party apparatus are often, and frequently justly, criticized these days, but I do not agree with those who are trying portrayal of them as opponents of perestroyka or to rank them only in the second or third rank of its supporters. The interview is published in NEPSZABADSAG.

Baklanov Attends Aktiv Meeting at Ministry

LD2406055488 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Jun 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A party-economic aktiv meeting was held today at the USSR Ministry of the Electronics Industry. It discussed the industry's tasks in carrying out the decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on accelerating development in the electronics industry.

The aktiv meeting was addressed by Comrade Baklanov. Taking part in its work were Comrade Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and other senior functionaries of party and economic bodies.

Economic

Icebreakers Unable To Free 2 Convoys in Arctic

LD2906012588 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 28 Jun 88

[Text] The efforts of three icebreakers have proved to be insufficient for cutting packed ice in the vicinity of the (Aryan Massif) in the Arctic Ocean. For 8 days the crews of the nuclear icebreakers have been trying to cut the ice. They're attempting to save the cargoes of two convoys of ships that were sailing from Vladivostok to the Arctic port of Pevek.

In fact, the situation of 5 years ago repeated when dozens of (?eastern) vessels had found themselves icebound. But that time it was in the autumn at the end of the navigational season. This time it happened at the beginning of it. The many-day-long stoppage of the two Arctic convoys of ships disrupted the regular supply of the necessary cargoes to residents of the far north and east coast of Siberia.

Minister Briefs Press on Railroad Safety

PM2806124188 Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Jun 88 p 1

[V. Karpov report under the "Topical Theme" rubric: "Accidents. How To Prevent Them?"]

[Text] Our newspaper discussed problems of rail transport safety and the causes of the numerous railroad accidents in the articles "Ruisbolo. A Typical Accident?" and "Old Brakes" (TRUD 6 January and 4 June). The theme is still topical. Yesterday USSR Deputy Railways Minister G. Kozlov held a news conference on safety questions at the Ministry of Railways.

The statistics have caused alarm. Four passenger train accidents have occurred since the beginning of the year. One person has died and 21 passengers have been injured. A further five people died and as many were hospitalized as a result of an accident involving freight trains. The direct damage alone is estimated at R5 million. Unfortunately, rail accidents are still a frequent event. Crashes caused 60 fatalities in 1986 and 157 in 1987.

Deputy Minister G. Kozlov expounded the ministry's view on this mattter. One of the basic, crucial causes of such a situation, he stressed, is "laxity, indiscipline, and criminal negligence by workers." But do we not oversimplify the situation time and time again?

Today more than one-third of locomotives are electric, while 25 percent of the diesel locomotives are obsolete, having been in operation 20-30 years. In the last 10 years the average breakdown rate of railroad cars has doubled. Some tens of thousands of electric tractor units need to be replaced and 300,000 kilometers of track fail to receive regular maintenance on time, in other words, pose an increased danger. Around 130,000 radio stations used by engineers and station workers are obsolete and worn-out. And only 30 percent of the demand for them is met (let us recall that there was no communication between the engineers and the dispatcher when the accident occurred at Kamenskaya station). The technical state of the sector is causing understandable alarm. Let us add that by 1975 traffic handling capacity was exhausted—train speeds began to fall and railroad car turnaround time increased, which naturally led to intensification of people's work. And this, of course, could not fail to make its mark. Despite the fact, for example, that 9,000 more people work for the ministry than laid down by the plan, the amount of overtime they work is extremely high. The overtime figure amounted to roughly 10 million hours in the first quarter. And there should not be a single surplus hour! Add the acute shortage of accommodation and the difficult conditions of work, recreation, production....

Deputy Minister Kozlov described the measures the ministry is carrying out to instill order in transport. The selection of cadres is being carried out more exactingly, crossings are being certificated, and a special safety day has been inaugurated.... He cited, among other things, the number of monitoring devices designed to check on driver's vigilance that have been installed. But will complete checks solve safety problems if people sometimes work till they are exhausted, to the limit of their capacity? Other sectors are also letting the Ministry of Railways down. The Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems, for example, is unwilling to produce an effective automatic braking control system and the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building has not gotten down to producing fault-detection cars.

As for the events in Arzamas, G. Kozlov briefly described them as follows: "We traced the complete route of the train and found no deviations on the part of railroad workers." The fact that cars containing explosives were immediately behind the locomotive does not, according to the deputy minister, constitute a violation. There are restrictions only for steam locomotives operating on solid fuel. The brakes were fitted with composition shoes that prevented sparking. Moreover, the locomotive was traveling down a gradient and the traction was shut off. Several minutes before the explosion engineers of an oncoming train saw the train that was en route for Arzamas but noticed nothing suspicious...

And the last thing I would like to say is that the discussion was open, direct, and frank, and here undoubtedly credit must be paid to the organizers of the news conference. Democratization in our society has now touched on a topic that was previously not touched—railroad safety. This is gratifying. Let us hope that a similar exchange of opinion and information will continue and become a tradition. It is a pity only that representatives of the sector trade union central committee did not take part in the discussion at the meeting. The question of safety is, after all, one of their vital concerns.

Agricultural

Price Increments Set for Top-Value Grains

PM2806133588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have approved the resolution "On Enhancing Economic Incentives for the Production and Sale of High Quality Grain to the State."

In order to increase the material interest of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises and organizations in increasing the production and sale of high quality grain to the state and reduce grain imports, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers have resolved, in partial amendment to the USSR Council of Ministers resolutions of 30 June 1958, No

690, and 11 July 1967, No 637, and the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolutions of 25 November 1982, No 1017, and 4 June 1985, No 526, to pay the following increments to grain purchase prices beginning with the 1988 harvest through the introduction of new purchase prices for agricultural produce: top-grade durum wheat—150 percent; second-grade durum wheat—100 percent; third-grade durum wheat—50 percent; top-grade soft wheat (the strong variety, containing no less than 40 percent gluten)—100 percent; top-grade (strong)—75 percent; second-grade (strong)—50 percent; third-grade (valuable)—30 percent; highest-value varieties of buckwheat—25 percent; buckwheat to be used in baby foods—50 percent; highest-value varieties of rice (wholegrain)—20 percent; long-grain varieties of rice—100 percent; highest-value varieties of oats—100 percent; highest-value varieties of oats with a weight of no less than 520 grams per liter—150 percent; oats to be used in baby foods—200 percent; highest-value varieties of millet—50 percent; highest-value varieties of barley—20 percent; highest-value varieties of peas—50 percent; highest-value varieties of lentils—25 percent; and highest-value varieties of beans—50 percent.

The above increments will be paid on the basis of product quality conforming with All-Union State Standard requirements.

In partial amendment of Clause 2 of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 20 March 1986, No 358, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers have resolved to pay kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises—beginning with the 1988 harvest—increments of 150 percent to purchase prices for grain sold in excess of the 11th 5-Year Plan average annual level on the condition that they honor contracts for the sale of grain to the state which have been concluded in line with purchase volumes stipulated in the plan for the 12th 5-year period (economic units that exceed this level but have failed to secure the purchase volumes stipulated in the plan for the 12th 5-year period will be paid increments of 50 percent). The aforementioned increments to purchase prices for durum wheat, buckwheat, peas, millet, beans, mung beans, chick peas, and lentils will be paid irrespective of whether or not the level of grain sales as a whole has been exceeded.

In connection with the introduction of higher increments to grain purchase prices in line with this resolution, beginning 1 July 1988 there will be no compensation from the budget for discrepancies in the price of raw materials used in the manufacture of mixed feed at state mixed feed production enterprises.

The USSR State Committee on Prices has been instructed to work with the USSR Ministry of Finance, the USSR Gosagroprom, and the USSR Ministry of Grain Products to establish a procedure for determining the cost of raw materials used in the manufacture of mixed feed and supplying it to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises and organizations. They have also been instructed to provide for maintaining the present level of prices for mixed feed for broiler poultry farming and subsidiary rural enterprises and organizations, and also for mixed feed supplied in exchange for high quality wheat grain for state resources and mixed feed sold to the population by consumer cooperative organizations.

The councils of ministers of union and autonomous republics, krayispolkoms, and oblispolkoms are instructed in addition to examine the question of economic incentives for the production and sale of grain to the state using resources allocated in accordance with the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 18 December 1987, No 1428, to establish differentiated increments to purchase prices for agricultural produce.

Uzbek Grain Harvest 'Cause for Concern'

PM2706162588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

["Harvest-88: Between the Lines of the Official Report": "There Is Still a Chance"]

[Excerpts] The USSR State Committee for Statistics reports that more than 230,000 hectares of grain had been cut in Uzbekistan by the beginning of the 3d 10-day period. [passage omitted]

I. Dzhurabekov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Gosagroprom:

"This year we have grown quite a good harvest: The machine operators are threshing more than 30 quintals of grain [per hectare] from irrigated land, and on average 15 quintals each from nonirrigated land. Already two-thirds of the grain crops have been harvested on farms in Surkhan-Darya, Syr-Darya, and Fergana Oblasts. But overall the pace of the harvest is giving cause for concern. In Bukhara Oblast, for example, only 74 of the 216 combines are being utilized, and the average daily output per machine is less than 2.3 hectares. The picture is similar in Samarkand, Dzhizak, and Tashkent Oblasts." [passage omitted]

Kursk Oblast Aktiv Discusses Plan Fulfillment

LD2506210788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Text] A meeting of the party and economic aktiv of the Kursk Oblast today discussed tasks relating to improving the provision of foodstuffs to the population. These problems arose in Kursk Oblast a long time ago, however little has been done to resolve them. For many years

running, the plans for procuring strong wheat, buckwheat, millet, and peas have not been fulfilled. Because of the poor quality of the grain handed over, kolkhozes and two sovkhozes in the oblast have failed to bank R6 million.

Numerous unresolved problems have accumulated relating to supplying the population with vegatables, fruit, meat, and dairy products. Despite this, at the Kursk Agro-Industrial Committee, command management methods are being eliminated slowly. Economic management methods are being introduced weakly. The Communists personally responsible for all this were brought to strict account by the party.

Agricultural Developments for 23-24 Jun

LD2606023088 [Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, unless otherwise indicated, for 23-24 June. GMT times of broadcasts are given in parentheses at the end of each item.

23 June:

The farms of Brest Polesye are procuring feed in a fight against the elements. Four times the normal monthly precipitation has fallen here in June, and the rivers of the Polesye plain have overflowed their banks. Our correspondent, who visited the flood area, reports that the situation is still worsening. In most cases, animal-drawn transport is saving the day. In Stolinskiy Rayon, for example, more than 2,000 horses are being used to transport the feed from the flooded fields. (0204)

The USSR State Committee on Statistics has reported that grain had been cut from an area of more than 230,000 hectares in Uzbekistan by 20 June. (0600)

In Uzbekistan 70,000 tonnes of grain have been delivered to granaries. (0800)

With about 10 days to go before the start of the harvest, the Don farmers have problems. The weather is wet and windy, with hailstorms, flattening the cereal crop "over large areas." In other respects, the crop is a good one, especially the winter wheat. The 100,000 Don machine operators face the task of harvesting over 2.5 million hectares of cereal crops. How this is to be done, quickly and without losses, has been discussed at preharvest zonal conferences. The Don-1500 combine harvester, which is good at dealing with flattened crops, will have a vital role to play. Many of the problems are perennial ones: irregular supplies of fuel and lubricants; many farm trucks have no tires, making it necessary to bring in vehicles from the towns once again. Many farms are sharing their facilities. (1800)

24 June:

Grain harvest began in southern Kirghizia today. Estimates show that one can harvest 20-22 quintals of grain per hectare, which is considerably above plan. (1500)

Military

Military Leadership Views Pre-Conference Debate

LD2806111788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 88 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the USSR Defense Ministry and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate"]

[Text] The USSR Defense Ministry and Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate have discussed the results of the debate among Army and Navy Communists and personnel on the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference.

It was noted that the CPSU Central Committee Theses have occupied a central place in Army and Navy life. The discussion has been conducted at open party, trade union, and Komsomol meetings and in military and labor collectives. Delegates elected to the conference have taken an active part in this work. They have been given numerous mandates at their meetings with personnel.

Everywhere the discussion was conducted in an atmosphere of free, businesslike exchange of opinion, critical analysis of the achievements to date in the years of restructuring in the country as a whole and in every military and labor collective, and a frank comparison of views. The participants in the meetings tried to establish as clearly as possible where restructuring is successfully gathering momentum and where it is moving only slowly, boldly discussed the factors holding back the process of renewal and the people responsible, and suggested real measures to smash the braking mechanism.

More than 92,000 proposals were made at the meetings, including some 35,000 addressed to the 19th all-union party conference. A special place was given to proposals designed to create reliable guarantees of restructuring's irreversibility. Most of them are concerned with improving the ideological and political situation in the country, consolidating the policy of glasnost, and tackling the problems of strengthening the party, making internal party life more democratic, and enhancing the role played by the CPSU as the leading, organizing force in Soviet society.

A considerable proportion of the proposals are aimed at strengthening the defense capability of our state and its Armed Forces. In this connection the Thesis on the Priority of Qualitative Parameters in Defense Building, the Technical Equipping of the Army and Navy, and the Training and Education of Personnel was discussed with particular interest. The state of affairs in specific military collectives was studied in depth and from every

angle and constructive proposals were made. Considering the danger of war that exists, the conference documents propose that emphasis be placed on the constitutional and program thesis on the duty of every Soviet citizen to defend the socialist fatherland.

The participants in the meetings addressed a considerable number of critical observations and proposals to a series of main and central directorates under the USSR Defense Ministry. They are concerned with seeking ways to more effectively enhance the combat readiness and quality of training of Army and Navy personnel, improve cadre policy, and restructure the sociopolitical life of military collectives.

The proposals addressed to the conference have been sent to the CPSU Central Committee and the remainder are being examined by the USSR Defense Ministry and Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. Personnel will be informed of the decisions taken on these proposals through political bodies and party organizations.

Numerous proposals and observations were addressed to administrative bodies and to the command and party organizations of units and subunits. The USSR Defense Ministry and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy are appealing to commanders, staffs, political bodies, and elected party bodies to take the necessary measures to implement them.

Preparations for the 19th all-union party conference and the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses have had a favorable impact on every aspect of life and activity in army and navy collectives and contributed to enhanced combat readiness and stronger military discipline.

The USSR Defense Ministry and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy are confident that Army and Navy personnel will take the decisions of the 19th all-union party conference to heart, make every effort to put them into practice, and, through their military labor, make a worthy contribution to the task of strengthening the armed defense of our motherland.

Pre-Conference Remarks by Navy Delegate Noted

PM2806105788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 88 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed conference-eve feature under the heading "Time of Real Action" and the rubric "Conference Delegates Speak," comprising comments by various individuals elected as delegates to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Rear Admiral V. Vodovatov, commander of a submarine formation:

I will not be giving away a big secret if I tell you that our submarines are updated and improved at regular intervals. This is a constant, natural process. I cannot help but admire the talent and ability of our scientists, designers, engineers, and workers—thousands upon thousands of people whose work materializes into "products" bordering on the fantastic. This makes it all the worse that some mistakes and shortcomings are repeated—not so vital, perhaps, but annoying nevertheless.

Correspondent: What, in your view, is the cause of this?

V. Vodovatov: New equipment ought to be assimilated by the operators and the theoreticians in parallel, so to say. Then it would immediately become clear what to accept and what to reject. Unfortunately, representatives of scientific research institutes are not very frequent visitors. The reason is laughable, particularly if you consider that it is a matter of state importance we are talking about here—they say there is a shortage of special assignment funds for the relevant category of scientific workers.

Correspondent: How can one credit this? Is it not absurd?

V. Vodovatov: Certainly it is absurd. It is just one example of the bureaucratic, administrative work style of the interested parties, so to speak. Take the combat training process—the holy of holies in the Army and Navy. To the detriment of this training we are forced to use submarine personnel—and, what is more, the most well qualified and experienced, the seagoing personnel—to perform all manner of economic and other duties.... The reason for this is the outdated staff organization structure and the incapacity of the rear, technical, and engineering services. This problem really needs to be urgently solved, to say nothing of the social sphere. A considerable number of our officers and ensigns who are away at sea for months have to leave their wives and children behind in overcrowded communal housing or even living with strangers. It is true that we can now see a ray of hope. Perhaps in around 2 years we will be able to provide housing for all who need it, even if it is only communal housing. [passage omitted]

Failures in Predraft Training Criticized

PM2706153988 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Aviation Ye. Savitskiy article in response to reader's letter: "Our Service Is Not for Parades"—first four paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] "Today's Armed Forces servicemen are entrusted with highly complex modern equipment. Understandably, it is not easy to learn to operate it in a matter of months. This task is only within the abilities of young men who are well prepared for service: technically competent, physically fit young men. Our difficult time demands special spiritual and ideological tempering from a soldier.

"But how do things look in practice? In recent years more and more young people have entered the Army who cannot even do chin-ups, are poor shots, have a confused impression of military regulations, and suffer from excessive conceit, moral insensitivity, weak will, and apathy.

"Of course, the Army corrects even these people. But are we not paying too high a price for our omissions 'in civilian life'?

"Lieutenant Colonel N. Brechka, commander of a subunit, Moscow Oblast."

This letter reminded me of my youth. How persistently we prepared for service! What a thrill we got from competing at shooting, learning to parachute, and doing equestrian acrobatics at the riding school! The "Voroshilov Sharpshooter," "Ready for Air Defense and Chemical Defense," and "Ready for Medical Defense" circles were a true school of military knowledge, courage, and patriotism. Before the war there were 14 million volunteers in the Society for Assisting the Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Building of the USSR. During the 1st months of the Great Patriotic War, more than one-half of the members of the Society for Assisting the Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Building of the USSR fought in the Army in the field, the people's militia, fighter battalions, and partisan detachments. Here is another figure: Of the 2,785 military airmen awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 950 had received initial military training at the Society for Assisting the Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Building of the USSR flying clubs. In many respects their pre-Army training fostered in them high moral and combat qualities and the readiness to sacrifice themselves on behalf of the motherland.

But how are things with military-patriotic work today? For Lieutenant Colonel N. Brechka quite rightly writes that many of the young men who enter the Army and Navy are too weak physically for service, are very inept on ideological questions too, and have a poor understanding of the international situation. Anti-Army sentiments are also flourishing among young people. I myself have heard it said that the struggle for peace is irreversible and therefore does not need to be particularly defended, so Army service is a complete waste of time. Some young men and women are even setting up pacifist organizations in an attempt to strengthen their convictions and convince others. Central Television recently acquainted us with one of them. It is called "Trust." But, in my opinion, the title "Camouflage" would have suited it better: camouflage for ideological immaturity, spiritual sloth, and unwillingness to work and perform their civic duty.

I have before me data from a sociological survey conducted among young men of draft age by the personnel of the Higher Komsomol School Research Center. Only 47.2 percent of those polled replied firmly that they would enter the Army willingly, and 47.4 percent replied that Army service is merely one's civic duty and must be carried out. One in four said he was doing no training for military service. Only 1 in 2 was prepared to undergo the hardships of military service, 1 in 10 is not ready morally and psychologically, 1 in 3 is not ready militarily, and very many are not physically ready for military service.

What is the point here? I believe it is that the people responsible for military-patriotic work cannot eradicate formalism, stereotypes, and regimentation in their activity.

Take meetings with schoolchildren and technical college and vocational and technical school pupils and the speeches given there by veterans of the Great Patriotic War and internationalist soldiers. What are they like? Stories of victory. They tell 14-year-old boys about global strategic operations but they forget to speak about the life of a soldier at the front, his love, and dreams and how he fought for his love and dreams. There is no frank, sincere conversation. This is least of all the fault of the speaker. The trouble is that sincere conversation is not "in the plan" and the event takes place "according to form."

Oh, this bureaucratism can deaden the most vital matter! Isn't that why young people have lost interest in the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" military sporting games? For these games have long since ceased to be lively mock combat exercises with unpredictable results. Everything is planned right down to the "victory" of the record-breaking team. And if anyone plays, then it is only the organizers playing their own bureaucratic games. Moreover, you can't expect a great deal of them. I would not be wrong if I said that most of their ideas about the modern Army are at best derived from books and movies.

Who actually, for example, works with people of predraft age in the Komsomol? It is a shame to say it, but in my native city—in Moscow, the capital of our motherland—only one-fourth of all raykom first secretaries have gone through the Army school. Isn't that why they swamp military commissariats with letters and applications for Komsomol activists' service to be deferred? An official document arrived at the military commissariat signed by a Moscow Komsomol Gorkom secretary: The letter asked for the question of the release of Senior Lieutenant (Reserve) P. Korovenkov, chief of the Komsomol Moscow Gorkom Komsomol Organizations Department, from participation in training to be examined. Can one expect real, comprehensive interest in military-patriotic work with this kind of attitude to military service? I think not. This is convincingly illustrated by the following fact. I asked a number of military commissariat and DOSAAF workers: "Did Komsomol workers suggest that you help young men to prepare for service?" No one answered in the affirmative.

Never mind help! If only they just visited people, talked to them, found out their problems, and met with draftees. Even this doesn't happen. For instance, V. Smolyakov, first secretary of the Balashikha Komsomol Gorkom—City Military Commissar Colonel L.A. Bogachkov said with sorrow—has only visited the military commissariat once in 4 years. Small wonder that Komsomol Gorkom apparatus personnel, especially secretaries, rarely take part in the rayon's "Draftee Day," solemn sendoffs for young men entering the Army, and the presentation of driving licenses to those who have graduated from DOSAAF schools.

So how can work be carried out in this way to train young men for the Army? But why pick on Komsomol workers when the standard of military training at secondary schools, which are simply obliged to give the Army well-trained and skilled draftees, is barely above zero. The main problem here is cadres. Almost one-half of military training officers are elderly people. Many of them have a conscientious attitude toward matters, but nonetheless often the educative value of their classes is low. The main reason for this is that owing to their age they cannot demonstrate a particular exercise on the chinning bar or horizontal bars and cannot go on a forced march or run with the young men. The most important army training principle of "Do as I do" has been lost.

Recently more and more often ensigns, sergeants, and privates from the reserve have come to replace them. They take on the work willingly but once again they lack teaching experience. We should open up the broad road to knowledge for them! But pedagogical institutes' military departments do not have correspondence courses and military training officers are forced to study at faculties which are remote from military matters. Every year one in four of them ceases to be a military training officer after graduating from a VUZ and obtaining a teaching diploma in physics, chemistry, or history. And a new sergeant or reserve private takes his place, especially in rural schools.

Parents also have an important role in preparing young men for service. But if we look again at the data from the sociological survey we can see that only the families of 60 percent of draftees consider service to be an honorable duty. One in five draftees is advised to enter an institute or find other reasons for not serving in the Army. Parents rarely take part in "Draftee Days" yet they still often organize sendoffs with magnificent banquets and an abundance of liquor.

As we can see, there are many questions linked with young people's military-patriotic education and with the preparation of young men for military service. I have cited only some which I and other veterans of our Armed Forces find most worrying. All this, like many other questions, requires a serious and thoughtful solution. For instance, schools everywhere lack shooting ranges and areas for military training. I recently saw the training of young men for the Army in Moscow Oblast's Pushkinskiy Rayon. Or to be more precise, I saw for myself the practically total lack of such work. Out of 38 educational establishments only 11 have the statutory sports facilities, 15 have military training camps, and 2 have gymnastics complexes. This is one of the lowest indicators in the oblast. A defense sports camp has still not been set up in the rayon.

The rayispolkom was familiarized with these observations. But people there brushed them aside: "Training for the Army is a matter for the military commissariats. Address all comments there." It was necessary to remind V. Chicheurov of lines from the USSR Law on Universal Military Service which he had obviously forgotten: "...Ispolkoms...together with the USSR Defense Ministry and the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, create the requisite educational and material base, select and train military leaders for initial military training, and monitor its organization and implementation."

Many critical remarks can now be heard regarding military commissariats. Quite rightly—it's no good making them "bastions closed to criticism."

During the years when criticism could not penetrate the atmosphere around military commissariats, a pernicious callous attitude toward the young men preparing to don military uniform prevailed in a number of them. I was profoundly indignant when young people were sent off from the assembly point in the capital's House of Culture named for the 40th anniversary of October without even being allowed to say goodbye to their parents. The officers and servicemen guilty of this were strictly punished. The Defense Ministry is renewing cadres at commissariats and getting rid of people who have discredited themselves and cannot work in the new way.

But, all the same, what is to become of those problems which cannot be resolved by cadre reshuffles? The state of draft points—the Armed Forces' "calling cards"? The draft points in Moscow Oblast's Leninskiy Rayon and the Buryat ASSR's Kurmkanskiy Rayon are in such unprepossessing and dilapidated buildings! Everything is said to be in the hands of the rayispolkoms which are the patrons of the enterprises and organizations.

In my opinion, no reasons can justify nonobservance of the Law on Universal Military Service as regards defense of the fatherland. What kind of blinders do you need not to see a problem common to everyone, a concern of state significance. The training of young people for military service has always been and will always be a nationwide affair. There must be no onlookers here.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Pacific Rocket Tests

PM2806115788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 88 First Edition p 3

["TASS Announcement"]

[Text] With the completion of the planned launching of carrier rockets, TASS is authorized to announce that the regions of the Pacific Ocean bounded by:

A rectangle determined by the coordinates 30 degrees 30 minutes north and 170 degrees 10 minutes east, 30 degrees 45 minutes north and 171 degrees 30 minutes east, 23 degrees 00 minutes north and 173 degrees 40 minutes east, and 22 degrees 45 minutes north and 172 degrees 20 minutes east;

A rectangle determined by the coordinates 18 degrees 00 minutes north and 173 degrees 10 minutes east, 18 degrees 30 minutes north and 175 degrees 20 minutes east, 16 degrees 40 minutes north and 175 degrees 40 minutes east, and 16 degrees 10 minutes north and 173 degrees 30 minutes east;

And the area with a radius of 50 nautical miles whose center is determined by the coordinates 10 degrees 45 minutes north and 175 degrees 40 minutes east, announced on 22 June 1988, are open to shipping and aircraft from 26 June 1988.

Reserve Officer Writers' Refresher Course Held

PM2806134788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 88 First Edition p 1

[Lieutenant P. Tkachenko report: "Familiarization With the Service"]

[Excerpts] It may sound a bit unusual—a refresher course for writers. Or rather unaccustomed. After all, there was a wonderful tradition in accordance with which writers used to spend time in military units or subunits, not as part of duty tours, not as honored guests of the servicemen, but as a result of being called up for refresher courses to undergo military training. It was precisely such a 1-month refresher course for writer reserve officers which was organized as part of the Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov "Vystrel" Advanced Officer Courses. The writers were enabled to see current military service for themselves, study certain types of modern weapons, and acquaint themselves with the tasks which servicemen are resolving in the course of their combat training. [passage omitted]

A meeting with the participants of the refresher course was attended by Army General K. Kochetov, commander of the Moscow Military District; V. Karpov, first secretary of the USSR Writers Union Board; Yu. Verchenko, secretary of the USSR Writers Union Board; A. Chakovskiy, chief editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA; writers I. Stadnyuk, Yu. Gribov, B. Leonov, M. Borisov, and Yu. Vinogradov, and V. Stepanov, chief of a CPSU Central Committee sector.